| /* ssl/t1_enc.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by |
| * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source |
| * license. |
| * |
| * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of |
| * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites |
| * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. |
| * |
| * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in |
| * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received |
| * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. |
| * |
| * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not |
| * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third |
| * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights |
| * to make use of the Contribution. |
| * |
| * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN |
| * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA |
| * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY |
| * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR |
| * OTHERWISE. |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_STARBOARD) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #endif // !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_STARBOARD) |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| # include <openssl/comp.h> |
| #endif |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| # include <openssl/des.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
| static int tls1_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *sec, |
| int sec_len, |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
| unsigned char *out, int olen) |
| { |
| int chunk; |
| size_t j; |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx, ctx_tmp; |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key; |
| unsigned char A1[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| size_t A1_len; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| chunk = EVP_MD_size(md); |
| OPENSSL_assert(chunk >= 0); |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx_tmp); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(&ctx_tmp, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW); |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NULL, sec, sec_len); |
| if (!mac_key) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| /* Reinit mac contexts */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(&ctx_tmp, NULL, md, NULL, mac_key)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, A1, A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx_tmp, A1, A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed1 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed1, seed1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed2 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed2, seed2_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed3 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed3, seed3_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed4 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed4, seed4_len)) |
| goto err; |
| if (seed5 && !EVP_DigestSignUpdate(&ctx, seed5, seed5_len)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (olen > chunk) { |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, out, &j)) |
| goto err; |
| out += j; |
| olen -= j; |
| /* calc the next A1 value */ |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx_tmp, A1, &A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| } else { /* last one */ |
| |
| if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(&ctx, A1, &A1_len)) |
| goto err; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(out, A1, olen); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx_tmp); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(A1, sizeof(A1)); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| /* seed1 through seed5 are virtually concatenated */ |
| static int tls1_PRF(long digest_mask, |
| const void *seed1, int seed1_len, |
| const void *seed2, int seed2_len, |
| const void *seed3, int seed3_len, |
| const void *seed4, int seed4_len, |
| const void *seed5, int seed5_len, |
| const unsigned char *sec, int slen, |
| unsigned char *out1, unsigned char *out2, int olen) |
| { |
| int len, i, idx, count; |
| const unsigned char *S1; |
| long m; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| /* Count number of digests and partition sec evenly */ |
| count = 0; |
| for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { |
| if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) |
| count++; |
| } |
| if (!count) { |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| len = slen / count; |
| if (count == 1) |
| slen = 0; |
| S1 = sec; |
| OPENSSL_port_memset(out1, 0, olen); |
| for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &m, &md); idx++) { |
| if ((m << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) & digest_mask) { |
| if (!md) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_PRF, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_DIGEST_TYPE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!tls1_P_hash(md, S1, len + (slen & 1), |
| seed1, seed1_len, seed2, seed2_len, seed3, |
| seed3_len, seed4, seed4_len, seed5, seed5_len, |
| out2, olen)) |
| goto err; |
| S1 += len; |
| for (i = 0; i < olen; i++) { |
| out1[i] ^= out2[i]; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| static int tls1_generate_key_block(SSL *s, unsigned char *km, |
| unsigned char *tmp, int num) |
| { |
| int ret; |
| ret = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL, 0, NULL, 0, s->session->master_key, |
| s->session->master_key_length, km, tmp, num); |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_generate_key_block() ==> %d byte master_key =\n\t", |
| s->session->master_key_length); |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->session->master_key_length; i++) { |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02X", s->session->master_key[i]); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which) |
| { |
| static const unsigned char empty[] = ""; |
| unsigned char *p, *mac_secret; |
| unsigned char *exp_label; |
| unsigned char tmp1[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char tmp2[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char iv1[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; |
| unsigned char iv2[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH * 2]; |
| unsigned char *ms, *key, *iv; |
| int client_write; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *dd; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| const SSL_COMP *comp; |
| #endif |
| const EVP_MD *m; |
| int mac_type; |
| int *mac_secret_size; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *mac_ctx; |
| EVP_PKEY *mac_key; |
| int is_export, n, i, j, k, exp_label_len, cl; |
| int reuse_dd = 0; |
| |
| is_export = SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher); |
| c = s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc; |
| m = s->s3->tmp.new_hash; |
| mac_type = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| comp = s->s3->tmp.new_compression; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_change_cipher_state(which= %d) w/\n", which); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\talg= %ld/%ld, comp= %p\n", |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey, |
| s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth, comp); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\tevp_cipher == %p ==? &d_cbc_ede_cipher3\n", c); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\tevp_cipher: nid, blksz= %d, %d, keylen=%d, ivlen=%d\n", |
| c->nid, c->block_size, c->key_len, c->iv_len); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\tkey_block: len= %d, data= ", |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block_length); |
| { |
| int i; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.key_block_length; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02x", s->s3->tmp.key_block[i]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (which & SSL3_CC_READ) { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
| s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
| else |
| s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM; |
| |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) |
| reuse_dd = 1; |
| else if ((s->enc_read_ctx = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX))) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| else |
| /* |
| * make sure it's intialized in case we exit later with an error |
| */ |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| dd = s->enc_read_ctx; |
| mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->read_hash, NULL); |
| if (mac_ctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| if (s->expand != NULL) { |
| COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); |
| s->expand = NULL; |
| } |
| if (comp != NULL) { |
| s->expand = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); |
| if (s->expand == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, |
| SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) |
| s->s3->rrec.comp = (unsigned char *) |
| OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); |
| if (s->s3->rrec.comp == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION |
| */ |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| OPENSSL_port_memset(&(s->s3->read_sequence[0]), 0, 8); |
| mac_secret = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); |
| mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->read_mac_secret_size); |
| } else { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm2 & TLS1_STREAM_MAC) |
| s->mac_flags |= SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
| else |
| s->mac_flags &= ~SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM; |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) |
| reuse_dd = 1; |
| else if ((s->enc_write_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| dd = s->enc_write_ctx; |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { |
| mac_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create(); |
| if (mac_ctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| s->write_hash = mac_ctx; |
| } else { |
| mac_ctx = ssl_replace_hash(&s->write_hash, NULL); |
| if (mac_ctx == NULL) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| if (s->compress != NULL) { |
| COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); |
| s->compress = NULL; |
| } |
| if (comp != NULL) { |
| s->compress = COMP_CTX_new(comp->method); |
| if (s->compress == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, |
| SSL_R_COMPRESSION_LIBRARY_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif |
| /* |
| * this is done by dtls1_reset_seq_numbers for DTLS1_VERSION |
| */ |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) |
| OPENSSL_port_memset(&(s->s3->write_sequence[0]), 0, 8); |
| mac_secret = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); |
| mac_secret_size = &(s->s3->write_mac_secret_size); |
| } |
| |
| if (reuse_dd) |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(dd); |
| |
| p = s->s3->tmp.key_block; |
| i = *mac_secret_size = s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size; |
| |
| cl = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); |
| j = is_export ? (cl < SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) ? |
| cl : SSL_C_EXPORT_KEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher)) : cl; |
| /* Was j=(exp)?5:EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); */ |
| /* If GCM mode only part of IV comes from PRF */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) |
| k = EVP_GCM_TLS_FIXED_IV_LEN; |
| else |
| k = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
| if ((which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE) || |
| (which == SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { |
| ms = &(p[0]); |
| n = i + i; |
| key = &(p[n]); |
| n += j + j; |
| iv = &(p[n]); |
| n += k + k; |
| exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST; |
| exp_label_len = TLS_MD_CLIENT_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; |
| client_write = 1; |
| } else { |
| n = i; |
| ms = &(p[n]); |
| n += i + j; |
| key = &(p[n]); |
| n += j + k; |
| iv = &(p[n]); |
| n += k; |
| exp_label = (unsigned char *)TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST; |
| exp_label_len = TLS_MD_SERVER_WRITE_KEY_CONST_SIZE; |
| client_write = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (n > s->s3->tmp.key_block_length) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(mac_secret, ms, i); |
| |
| if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { |
| mac_key = EVP_PKEY_new_mac_key(mac_type, NULL, |
| mac_secret, *mac_secret_size); |
| if (mac_key == NULL |
| || EVP_DigestSignInit(mac_ctx, NULL, m, NULL, mac_key) <= 0) { |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| EVP_PKEY_free(mac_key); |
| } |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("which = %04X\nmac key=", which); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < i; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", ms[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (is_export) { |
| /* |
| * In here I set both the read and write key/iv to the same value |
| * since only the correct one will be used :-). |
| */ |
| if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| exp_label, exp_label_len, |
| s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL, 0, NULL, 0, |
| key, j, tmp1, tmp2, EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c))) |
| goto err2; |
| key = tmp1; |
| |
| if (k > 0) { |
| if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST, TLS_MD_IV_BLOCK_CONST_SIZE, |
| s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| NULL, 0, NULL, 0, empty, 0, iv1, iv2, k * 2)) |
| goto err2; |
| if (client_write) |
| iv = iv1; |
| else |
| iv = &(iv1[k]); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| s->session->key_arg_length = 0; |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| int i; |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd,c,key=,iv=,which)\n"); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\tkey= "); |
| for (i = 0; i < c->key_len; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02x", key[i]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\t iv= "); |
| for (i = 0; i < c->iv_len; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02x", iv[i]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(c) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { |
| if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, NULL, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE)) |
| || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, k, iv)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(dd, c, NULL, key, iv, (which & SSL3_CC_WRITE))) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| } |
| /* Needed for "composite" AEADs, such as RC4-HMAC-MD5 */ |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(c) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) && *mac_secret_size |
| && !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(dd, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, |
| *mac_secret_size, mac_secret)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err2; |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("which = %04X\nkey=", which); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c); z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", key[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("\niv="); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < k; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", iv[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("\n"); |
| #endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp1, sizeof(tmp1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp2, sizeof(tmp1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(iv1, sizeof(iv1)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(iv2, sizeof(iv2)); |
| return (1); |
| err: |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CHANGE_CIPHER_STATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| err2: |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p1, *p2 = NULL; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *c; |
| const EVP_MD *hash; |
| int num; |
| SSL_COMP *comp; |
| int mac_type = NID_undef, mac_secret_size = 0; |
| int ret = 0; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_setup_key_block()\n"); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.key_block_length != 0) |
| return (1); |
| |
| if (!ssl_cipher_get_evp |
| (s->session, &c, &hash, &mac_type, &mac_secret_size, &comp)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, SSL_R_CIPHER_OR_HASH_UNAVAILABLE); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.new_sym_enc = c; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_hash = hash; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_pkey_type = mac_type; |
| s->s3->tmp.new_mac_secret_size = mac_secret_size; |
| num = |
| EVP_CIPHER_key_length(c) + mac_secret_size + EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(c); |
| num *= 2; |
| |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| if ((p1 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block_length = num; |
| s->s3->tmp.key_block = p1; |
| |
| if ((p2 = (unsigned char *)OPENSSL_malloc(num)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_SETUP_KEY_BLOCK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| OPENSSL_free(p1); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("client random\n"); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", s->s3->client_random[z], |
| ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("server random\n"); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", s->s3->server_random[z], |
| ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("pre-master\n"); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < s->session->master_key_length; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", s->session->master_key[z], |
| ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| #endif |
| if (!tls1_generate_key_block(s, p1, p2, num)) |
| goto err; |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("\nkey block\n"); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < num; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printf("%02X%c", p1[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS) |
| && s->method->version <= TLS1_VERSION) { |
| /* |
| * enable vulnerability countermeasure for CBC ciphers with known-IV |
| * problem (http://www.openssl.org/~bodo/tls-cbc.txt) |
| */ |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 1; |
| |
| if (s->session->cipher != NULL) { |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_eNULL) |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 |
| if (s->session->cipher->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4) |
| s->s3->need_empty_fragments = 0; |
| #endif |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| err: |
| if (p2) { |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(p2, num); |
| OPENSSL_free(p2); |
| } |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts the record in |s->wrec| / |s->rrec|, respectively. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publically invalid (i.e. too |
| * short etc). |
| * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. |
| * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, |
| * an internal error occured. |
| */ |
| int tls1_enc(SSL *s, int send) |
| { |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; |
| unsigned long l; |
| int bs, i, j, k, pad = 0, ret, mac_size = 0; |
| const EVP_CIPHER *enc; |
| |
| if (send) { |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { |
| int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
| } |
| ds = s->enc_write_ctx; |
| rec = &(s->s3->wrec); |
| if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) |
| enc = NULL; |
| else { |
| int ivlen; |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); |
| /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ |
| if (s->version >= TLS1_1_VERSION |
| && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) |
| ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); |
| else |
| ivlen = 0; |
| if (ivlen > 1) { |
| if (rec->data != rec->input) |
| /* |
| * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever |
| * happen?? (steve) |
| */ |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "%s:%d: rec->data != rec->input\n", |
| __FILE__, __LINE__); |
| else if (RAND_bytes(rec->input, ivlen) <= 0) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { |
| int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(n >= 0); |
| } |
| ds = s->enc_read_ctx; |
| rec = &(s->s3->rrec); |
| if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) |
| enc = NULL; |
| else |
| enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); |
| } |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_enc(%d)\n", send); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_port_memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); |
| rec->input = rec->data; |
| ret = 1; |
| } else { |
| l = rec->length; |
| bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(ds->cipher); |
| |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { |
| unsigned char buf[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN], *seq; |
| |
| seq = send ? s->s3->write_sequence : s->s3->read_sequence; |
| |
| if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; |
| |
| s2n(send ? s->d1->w_epoch : s->d1->r_epoch, p); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(buf, dtlsseq, 8); |
| } else { |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(buf, seq, 8); |
| for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ |
| ++seq[i]; |
| if (seq[i] != 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| buf[8] = rec->type; |
| buf[9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); |
| buf[10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); |
| buf[11] = rec->length >> 8; |
| buf[12] = rec->length & 0xff; |
| pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, |
| EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf); |
| if (pad <= 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (send) { |
| l += pad; |
| rec->length += pad; |
| } |
| } else if ((bs != 1) && send) { |
| i = bs - ((int)l % bs); |
| |
| /* Add weird padding of upto 256 bytes */ |
| |
| /* we need to add 'i' padding bytes of value j */ |
| j = i - 1; |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG) { |
| if (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_TLS_PADDING_BUG) |
| j++; |
| } |
| for (k = (int)l; k < (int)(l + i); k++) |
| rec->input[k] = j; |
| l += i; |
| rec->length += i; |
| } |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| unsigned long ui; |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "EVP_Cipher(ds=%p,rec->data=%p,rec->input=%p,l=%ld) ==>\n", |
| ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "\tEVP_CIPHER_CTX: %d buf_len, %d key_len [%lu %lu], %d iv_len\n", |
| ds->buf_len, ds->cipher->key_len, DES_KEY_SZ, |
| DES_SCHEDULE_SZ, ds->cipher->iv_len); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\t\tIV: "); |
| for (i = 0; i < ds->cipher->iv_len; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02X", ds->iv[i]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\trec->input="); |
| for (ui = 0; ui < l; ui++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr(" %02x", rec->input[ui]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| if (!send) { |
| if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| i = EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, l); |
| if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(ds->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) |
| ? (i < 0) |
| : (i == 0)) |
| return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ |
| if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE && !send) { |
| rec->data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| rec->input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| rec->length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; |
| } |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| { |
| unsigned long i; |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\trec->data="); |
| for (i = 0; i < l; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr(" %02x", rec->data[i]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) |
| mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); |
| if ((bs != 1) && !send) |
| ret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, rec, bs, mac_size); |
| if (pad && !send) |
| rec->length -= pad; |
| } |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_cert_verify_mac(SSL *s, int md_nid, unsigned char *out) |
| { |
| unsigned int ret; |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx, *d = NULL; |
| int i; |
| |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < SSL_MAX_DIGEST; i++) { |
| if (s->s3->handshake_dgst[i] |
| && EVP_MD_CTX_type(s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]) == md_nid) { |
| d = s->s3->handshake_dgst[i]; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!d) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_CERT_VERIFY_MAC, SSL_R_NO_REQUIRED_DIGEST); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, d) <=0 |
| || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, out, &ret) <= 0) |
| ret = 0; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| return ((int)ret); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, |
| const char *str, int slen, unsigned char *out) |
| { |
| unsigned int i; |
| EVP_MD_CTX ctx; |
| unsigned char buf[2 * EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| unsigned char *q, buf2[12]; |
| int idx; |
| long mask; |
| int err = 0; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| |
| q = buf; |
| |
| if (s->s3->handshake_buffer) |
| if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s)) |
| return 0; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| |
| for (idx = 0; ssl_get_handshake_digest(idx, &mask, &md); idx++) { |
| if (mask & ssl_get_algorithm2(s)) { |
| int hashsize = EVP_MD_size(md); |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst[idx]; |
| if (!hdgst || hashsize < 0 |
| || hashsize > (int)(sizeof buf - (size_t)(q - buf))) { |
| /* |
| * internal error: 'buf' is too small for this cipersuite! |
| */ |
| err = 1; |
| } else { |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(&ctx, hdgst) || |
| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctx, q, &i) || |
| (i != (unsigned int)hashsize)) |
| err = 1; |
| q += hashsize; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (!tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| str, slen, buf, (int)(q - buf), NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, |
| s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, |
| out, buf2, sizeof buf2)) |
| err = 1; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, (int)(q - buf)); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buf2, sizeof(buf2)); |
| if (err) |
| return 0; |
| else |
| return sizeof buf2; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *md, int send) |
| { |
| SSL3_RECORD *rec; |
| unsigned char *seq; |
| EVP_MD_CTX *hash; |
| size_t md_size, orig_len; |
| int i; |
| EVP_MD_CTX hmac, *mac_ctx; |
| unsigned char header[13]; |
| int stream_mac = (send ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) |
| : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); |
| int t; |
| |
| if (send) { |
| rec = &(ssl->s3->wrec); |
| seq = &(ssl->s3->write_sequence[0]); |
| hash = ssl->write_hash; |
| } else { |
| rec = &(ssl->s3->rrec); |
| seq = &(ssl->s3->read_sequence[0]); |
| hash = ssl->read_hash; |
| } |
| |
| t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); |
| OPENSSL_assert(t >= 0); |
| md_size = t; |
| |
| /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ |
| if (stream_mac) { |
| mac_ctx = hash; |
| } else { |
| if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy(&hmac, hash)) |
| return -1; |
| mac_ctx = &hmac; |
| } |
| |
| if (ssl->version == DTLS1_VERSION || ssl->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; |
| |
| s2n(send ? ssl->d1->w_epoch : ssl->d1->r_epoch, p); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); |
| |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); |
| } else |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(header, seq, 8); |
| |
| /* |
| * kludge: tls1_cbc_remove_padding passes padding length in rec->type |
| */ |
| orig_len = rec->length + md_size + ((unsigned int)rec->type >> 8); |
| rec->type &= 0xff; |
| |
| header[8] = rec->type; |
| header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); |
| header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); |
| header[11] = (rec->length) >> 8; |
| header[12] = (rec->length) & 0xff; |
| |
| if (!send && |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && |
| ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { |
| /* |
| * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any |
| * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we |
| * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. |
| */ |
| /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ |
| if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, |
| md, &md_size, |
| header, rec->input, |
| rec->length + md_size, orig_len, |
| ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, |
| ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { |
| if (!stream_mac) |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 |
| || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 |
| || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { |
| if (!stream_mac) |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS |
| if (!send && FIPS_mode()) |
| tls_fips_digest_extra(ssl->enc_read_ctx, |
| mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length, orig_len); |
| #endif |
| } |
| |
| if (!stream_mac) |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&hmac); |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("seq="); |
| { |
| int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02X ", seq[z]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("rec="); |
| { |
| unsigned int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02X ", rec->data[z]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| if (ssl->version != DTLS1_VERSION && ssl->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { |
| ++seq[i]; |
| if (seq[i] != 0) |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| #ifdef TLS_DEBUG |
| { |
| unsigned int z; |
| for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%02X ", md[z]); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| } |
| #endif |
| return (md_size); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, |
| int len) |
| { |
| unsigned char buff[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; |
| const void *co = NULL, *so = NULL; |
| int col = 0, sol = 0; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_generate_master_secret(%p,%p, %p, %d)\n", s, out, p, |
| len); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL |
| && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL |
| && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len > 0 |
| && s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { |
| co = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input; |
| col = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| so = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input; |
| /* |
| * must be same as col (see |
| * draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt, section 3.1) |
| */ |
| sol = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE, |
| s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| co, col, |
| s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, |
| so, sol, p, len, s->session->master_key, buff, sizeof buff); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, sizeof buff); |
| #ifdef SSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("Premaster Secret:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)p, len); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("Client Random:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("Server Random:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("Master Secret:\n"); |
| BIO_dump_fp(stderr, (char *)s->session->master_key, |
| SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_generate_master_secret() complete\n"); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| return (SSL3_MASTER_SECRET_SIZE); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, |
| const char *label, size_t llen, |
| const unsigned char *context, |
| size_t contextlen, int use_context) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buff; |
| unsigned char *val = NULL; |
| size_t vallen, currentvalpos; |
| int rv; |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_export_keying_material(%p,%p,%lu,%s,%lu,%p,%lu)\n", |
| s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| |
| buff = OPENSSL_malloc(olen); |
| if (buff == NULL) |
| goto err2; |
| |
| /* |
| * construct PRF arguments we construct the PRF argument ourself rather |
| * than passing separate values into the TLS PRF to ensure that the |
| * concatenation of values does not create a prohibited label. |
| */ |
| vallen = llen + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2; |
| if (use_context) { |
| vallen += 2 + contextlen; |
| } |
| |
| val = OPENSSL_malloc(vallen); |
| if (val == NULL) |
| goto err2; |
| currentvalpos = 0; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(val + currentvalpos, (unsigned char *)label, llen); |
| currentvalpos += llen; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(val + currentvalpos, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| currentvalpos += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| |
| if (use_context) { |
| val[currentvalpos] = (contextlen >> 8) & 0xff; |
| currentvalpos++; |
| val[currentvalpos] = contextlen & 0xff; |
| currentvalpos++; |
| if ((contextlen > 0) || (context != NULL)) { |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(val + currentvalpos, context, contextlen); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * disallow prohibited labels note that SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE > max(prohibited |
| * label len) = 15, so size of val > max(prohibited label len) = 15 and |
| * the comparisons won't have buffer overflow |
| */ |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(val, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) |
| goto err1; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(val, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE) == 0) |
| goto err1; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(val, TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST, |
| TLS_MD_MASTER_SECRET_CONST_SIZE) == 0) |
| goto err1; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(val, TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST, |
| TLS_MD_KEY_EXPANSION_CONST_SIZE) == 0) |
| goto err1; |
| |
| rv = tls1_PRF(ssl_get_algorithm2(s), |
| val, vallen, |
| NULL, 0, |
| NULL, 0, |
| NULL, 0, |
| NULL, 0, |
| s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length, |
| out, buff, olen); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(val, vallen); |
| OPENSSL_cleanse(buff, olen); |
| |
| #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("tls1_export_keying_material() complete\n"); |
| #endif /* KSSL_DEBUG */ |
| goto ret; |
| err1: |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, |
| SSL_R_TLS_ILLEGAL_EXPORTER_LABEL); |
| rv = 0; |
| goto ret; |
| err2: |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_EXPORT_KEYING_MATERIAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| rv = 0; |
| ret: |
| if (buff != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(buff); |
| if (val != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(val); |
| return (rv); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_alert_code(int code) |
| { |
| switch (code) { |
| case SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY: |
| return (SSL3_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY); |
| case SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE: |
| return (SSL3_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC: |
| return (SSL3_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC); |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED: |
| return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPTION_FAILED); |
| case SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW: |
| return (TLS1_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW); |
| case SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE: |
| return (SSL3_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE); |
| case SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE: |
| return (SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| case SSL_AD_NO_CERTIFICATE: |
| return (-1); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE: |
| return (SSL3_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE: |
| return (SSL3_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED: |
| return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED: |
| return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN: |
| return (SSL3_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN); |
| case SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER: |
| return (SSL3_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER); |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA: |
| return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_CA); |
| case SSL_AD_ACCESS_DENIED: |
| return (TLS1_AD_ACCESS_DENIED); |
| case SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR: |
| return (TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR: |
| return (TLS1_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION: |
| return (TLS1_AD_EXPORT_RESTRICTION); |
| case SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION: |
| return (TLS1_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION); |
| case SSL_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY: |
| return (TLS1_AD_INSUFFICIENT_SECURITY); |
| case SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR: |
| return (TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| case SSL_AD_USER_CANCELLED: |
| return (TLS1_AD_USER_CANCELLED); |
| case SSL_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION: |
| return (TLS1_AD_NO_RENEGOTIATION); |
| case SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION: |
| return (TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION); |
| case SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE: |
| return (TLS1_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNOBTAINABLE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME: |
| return (TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE: |
| return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE); |
| case SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE: |
| return (TLS1_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_HASH_VALUE); |
| case SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY: |
| return (TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY); |
| case SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK: |
| return (TLS1_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); |
| #if 0 |
| /* not appropriate for TLS, not used for DTLS */ |
| case DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE: |
| return (DTLS1_AD_MISSING_HANDSHAKE_MESSAGE); |
| #endif |
| default: |
| return (-1); |
| } |
| } |
