| // Copyright (c) 2012 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "net/base/cert_verify_proc_win.h" |
| |
| #include <string> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include "base/memory/scoped_ptr.h" |
| #include "base/sha1.h" |
| #include "base/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/utf_string_conversions.h" |
| #include "crypto/capi_util.h" |
| #include "crypto/scoped_capi_types.h" |
| #include "crypto/sha2.h" |
| #include "net/base/asn1_util.h" |
| #include "net/base/cert_status_flags.h" |
| #include "net/base/cert_verifier.h" |
| #include "net/base/cert_verify_result.h" |
| #include "net/base/crl_set.h" |
| #include "net/base/ev_root_ca_metadata.h" |
| #include "net/base/net_errors.h" |
| #include "net/base/test_root_certs.h" |
| #include "net/base/x509_certificate.h" |
| #include "net/base/x509_certificate_known_roots_win.h" |
| |
| #pragma comment(lib, "crypt32.lib") |
| |
| #if !defined(CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) |
| // This was introduced in Windows 8 / Windows Server 2012, but retroactively |
| // ported as far back as Windows XP via system update. |
| #define CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE 0x00100000 |
| #endif |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| struct FreeChainEngineFunctor { |
| void operator()(HCERTCHAINENGINE engine) const { |
| if (engine) |
| CertFreeCertificateChainEngine(engine); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| struct FreeCertChainContextFunctor { |
| void operator()(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) const { |
| if (chain_context) |
| CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| struct FreeCertContextFunctor { |
| void operator()(PCCERT_CONTEXT context) const { |
| if (context) |
| CertFreeCertificateContext(context); |
| } |
| }; |
| |
| typedef crypto::ScopedCAPIHandle<HCERTCHAINENGINE, FreeChainEngineFunctor> |
| ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE; |
| |
| typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT, |
| FreeCertChainContextFunctor> |
| ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT; |
| |
| typedef scoped_ptr_malloc<const CERT_CONTEXT, |
| FreeCertContextFunctor> ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT; |
| |
| //----------------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| |
| // TODO(wtc): This is a copy of the MapSecurityError function in |
| // ssl_client_socket_win.cc. Another function that maps Windows error codes |
| // to our network error codes is WinInetUtil::OSErrorToNetError. We should |
| // eliminate the code duplication. |
| int MapSecurityError(SECURITY_STATUS err) { |
| // There are numerous security error codes, but these are the ones we thus |
| // far find interesting. |
| switch (err) { |
| case SEC_E_WRONG_PRINCIPAL: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID; |
| case SEC_E_UNTRUSTED_ROOT: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_UNTRUSTEDROOT: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID; |
| case SEC_E_CERT_EXPIRED: // Schannel |
| case CERT_E_EXPIRED: // CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID; |
| case CRYPT_E_NO_REVOCATION_CHECK: |
| return ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| case CRYPT_E_REVOCATION_OFFLINE: |
| return ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| case CRYPT_E_REVOKED: // Schannel and CryptoAPI |
| return ERR_CERT_REVOKED; |
| case SEC_E_CERT_UNKNOWN: |
| case CERT_E_ROLE: |
| return ERR_CERT_INVALID; |
| case CERT_E_WRONG_USAGE: |
| // TODO(wtc): Should we add ERR_CERT_WRONG_USAGE? |
| return ERR_CERT_INVALID; |
| // We received an unexpected_message or illegal_parameter alert message |
| // from the server. |
| case SEC_E_ILLEGAL_MESSAGE: |
| return ERR_SSL_PROTOCOL_ERROR; |
| case SEC_E_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH: |
| return ERR_SSL_VERSION_OR_CIPHER_MISMATCH; |
| case SEC_E_INVALID_HANDLE: |
| return ERR_UNEXPECTED; |
| case SEC_E_OK: |
| return OK; |
| default: |
| LOG(WARNING) << "Unknown error " << err << " mapped to net::ERR_FAILED"; |
| return ERR_FAILED; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Map the errors in the chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus returned by |
| // CertGetCertificateChain to our certificate status flags. |
| int MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus(DWORD error_status) { |
| CertStatus cert_status = 0; |
| |
| // We don't include CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_NESTED because it's obsolete and |
| // we wouldn't consider it an error anyway |
| const DWORD kDateInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_TIME_VALID; |
| if (error_status & kDateInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID; |
| |
| const DWORD kAuthorityInvalidErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_UNTRUSTED_ROOT | |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_EXPLICIT_DISTRUST | |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN; |
| if (error_status & kAuthorityInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID; |
| |
| if ((error_status & CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN) && |
| !(error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION)) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_REVOKED) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; |
| |
| const DWORD kWrongUsageErrors = CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE; |
| if (error_status & kWrongUsageErrors) { |
| // TODO(wtc): Should we add CERT_STATUS_WRONG_USAGE? |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| } |
| |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID) { |
| // Check for a signature that does not meet the OS criteria for strong |
| // signatures. |
| // Note: These checks may be more restrictive than the current weak key |
| // criteria implemented within CertVerifier, such as excluding SHA-1 or |
| // excluding RSA keys < 2048 bits. However, if the user has configured |
| // these more stringent checks, respect that configuration and err on the |
| // more restrictive criteria. |
| if (error_status & CERT_TRUST_HAS_WEAK_SIGNATURE) { |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY; |
| } else { |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // The rest of the errors. |
| const DWORD kCertInvalidErrors = |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_CYCLIC | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_EXTENSION | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_POLICY_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_INVALID_NAME_CONSTRAINTS | |
| CERT_TRUST_CTL_IS_NOT_SIGNATURE_VALID | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_DEFINED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_PERMITTED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_EXCLUDED_NAME_CONSTRAINT | |
| CERT_TRUST_NO_ISSUANCE_CHAIN_POLICY | |
| CERT_TRUST_HAS_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT; |
| if (error_status & kCertInvalidErrors) |
| cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| return cert_status; |
| } |
| |
| // Returns true if any common name in the certificate's Subject field contains |
| // a NULL character. |
| bool CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert) { |
| CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; |
| decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); |
| decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; |
| decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; |
| CERT_NAME_INFO* name_info = NULL; |
| DWORD name_info_size = 0; |
| BOOL rv; |
| rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, |
| X509_NAME, |
| cert->pCertInfo->Subject.pbData, |
| cert->pCertInfo->Subject.cbData, |
| CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, |
| &decode_para, |
| &name_info, |
| &name_info_size); |
| if (rv) { |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_NAME_INFO> scoped_name_info(name_info); |
| |
| // The Subject field may have multiple common names. According to the |
| // "PKI Layer Cake" paper, CryptoAPI uses every common name in the |
| // Subject field, so we inspect every common name. |
| // |
| // From RFC 5280: |
| // X520CommonName ::= CHOICE { |
| // teletexString TeletexString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // printableString PrintableString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // universalString UniversalString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // utf8String UTF8String (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)), |
| // bmpString BMPString (SIZE (1..ub-common-name)) } |
| // |
| // We also check IA5String and VisibleString. |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < name_info->cRDN; ++i) { |
| PCERT_RDN rdn = &name_info->rgRDN[i]; |
| for (DWORD j = 0; j < rdn->cRDNAttr; ++j) { |
| PCERT_RDN_ATTR rdn_attr = &rdn->rgRDNAttr[j]; |
| if (strcmp(rdn_attr->pszObjId, szOID_COMMON_NAME) == 0) { |
| switch (rdn_attr->dwValueType) { |
| // After the CryptoAPI ASN.1 security vulnerabilities described in |
| // http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS09-056.mspx |
| // were patched, we get CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB for a common name |
| // that contains a NULL character. |
| case CERT_RDN_ENCODED_BLOB: |
| break; |
| // Array of 8-bit characters. |
| case CERT_RDN_PRINTABLE_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_TELETEX_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_IA5_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_VISIBLE_STRING: |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < rdn_attr->Value.cbData; ++k) { |
| if (rdn_attr->Value.pbData[k] == '\0') |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| // Array of 16-bit characters. |
| case CERT_RDN_BMP_STRING: |
| case CERT_RDN_UTF8_STRING: { |
| DWORD num_wchars = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 2; |
| wchar_t* common_name = |
| reinterpret_cast<wchar_t*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_wchars; ++k) { |
| if (common_name[k] == L'\0') |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| // Array of ints (32-bit). |
| case CERT_RDN_UNIVERSAL_STRING: { |
| DWORD num_ints = rdn_attr->Value.cbData / 4; |
| int* common_name = |
| reinterpret_cast<int*>(rdn_attr->Value.pbData); |
| for (DWORD k = 0; k < num_ints; ++k) { |
| if (common_name[k] == 0) |
| return true; |
| } |
| break; |
| } |
| default: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // IsIssuedByKnownRoot returns true if the given chain is rooted at a root CA |
| // which we recognise as a standard root. |
| // static |
| bool IsIssuedByKnownRoot(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context) { |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; |
| int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| if (num_elements < 1) |
| return false; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; |
| |
| SHA1HashValue hash = X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(cert); |
| return IsSHA1HashInSortedArray( |
| hash, &kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes[0][0], sizeof(kKnownRootCertSHA1Hashes)); |
| } |
| |
| // Saves some information about the certificate chain |chain_context| in |
| // |*verify_result|. The caller MUST initialize |*verify_result| before |
| // calling this function. |
| void GetCertChainInfo(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, |
| CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { |
| if (chain_context->cChain == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain_context->rgpChain[0]; |
| int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT verified_cert = NULL; |
| std::vector<PCCERT_CONTEXT> verified_chain; |
| |
| bool has_root_ca = num_elements > 1 && |
| !(chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_PARTIAL_CHAIN); |
| |
| // Each chain starts with the end entity certificate (i = 0) and ends with |
| // either the root CA certificate or the last available intermediate. If a |
| // root CA certificate is present, do not inspect the signature algorithm of |
| // the root CA certificate because the signature on the trust anchor is not |
| // important. |
| if (has_root_ca) { |
| // If a full chain was constructed, regardless of whether it was trusted, |
| // don't inspect the root's signature algorithm. |
| num_elements -= 1; |
| } |
| |
| for (int i = 0; i < num_elements; ++i) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; |
| if (i == 0) { |
| verified_cert = cert; |
| } else { |
| verified_chain.push_back(cert); |
| } |
| |
| const char* algorithm = cert->pCertInfo->SignatureAlgorithm.pszObjId; |
| if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD5RSA) == 0) { |
| // md5WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.4 |
| verify_result->has_md5 = true; |
| if (i != 0) |
| verify_result->has_md5_ca = true; |
| } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD2RSA) == 0) { |
| // md2WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.2 |
| verify_result->has_md2 = true; |
| if (i != 0) |
| verify_result->has_md2_ca = true; |
| } else if (strcmp(algorithm, szOID_RSA_MD4RSA) == 0) { |
| // md4WithRSAEncryption: 1.2.840.113549.1.1.3 |
| verify_result->has_md4 = true; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (verified_cert) { |
| // Add the root certificate, if present, as it was not added above. |
| if (has_root_ca) |
| verified_chain.push_back(element[num_elements]->pCertContext); |
| verify_result->verified_cert = |
| X509Certificate::CreateFromHandle(verified_cert, verified_chain); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Decodes the cert's certificatePolicies extension into a CERT_POLICIES_INFO |
| // structure and stores it in *output. |
| void GetCertPoliciesInfo(PCCERT_CONTEXT cert, |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO>* output) { |
| PCERT_EXTENSION extension = CertFindExtension(szOID_CERT_POLICIES, |
| cert->pCertInfo->cExtension, |
| cert->pCertInfo->rgExtension); |
| if (!extension) |
| return; |
| |
| CRYPT_DECODE_PARA decode_para; |
| decode_para.cbSize = sizeof(decode_para); |
| decode_para.pfnAlloc = crypto::CryptAlloc; |
| decode_para.pfnFree = crypto::CryptFree; |
| CERT_POLICIES_INFO* policies_info = NULL; |
| DWORD policies_info_size = 0; |
| BOOL rv; |
| rv = CryptDecodeObjectEx(X509_ASN_ENCODING | PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING, |
| szOID_CERT_POLICIES, |
| extension->Value.pbData, |
| extension->Value.cbData, |
| CRYPT_DECODE_ALLOC_FLAG | CRYPT_DECODE_NOCOPY_FLAG, |
| &decode_para, |
| &policies_info, |
| &policies_info_size); |
| if (rv) |
| output->reset(policies_info); |
| } |
| |
| bool CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, |
| CRLSet* crl_set) { |
| if (chain->cChain == 0) |
| return true; |
| |
| const PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; |
| const PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| |
| const int num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| if (num_elements == 0) |
| return true; |
| |
| // We iterate from the root certificate down to the leaf, keeping track of |
| // the issuer's SPKI at each step. |
| std::string issuer_spki_hash; |
| for (int i = num_elements - 1; i >= 0; i--) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; |
| |
| base::StringPiece der_bytes( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), |
| cert->cbCertEncoded); |
| |
| base::StringPiece spki; |
| if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki)) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| const std::string spki_hash = crypto::SHA256HashString(spki); |
| |
| const CRYPT_INTEGER_BLOB* serial_blob = &cert->pCertInfo->SerialNumber; |
| scoped_array<uint8> serial_bytes(new uint8[serial_blob->cbData]); |
| // The bytes of the serial number are stored little-endian. |
| for (unsigned j = 0; j < serial_blob->cbData; j++) |
| serial_bytes[j] = serial_blob->pbData[serial_blob->cbData - j - 1]; |
| base::StringPiece serial(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(serial_bytes.get()), |
| serial_blob->cbData); |
| |
| CRLSet::Result result = crl_set->CheckSPKI(spki_hash); |
| |
| if (result != CRLSet::REVOKED && !issuer_spki_hash.empty()) |
| result = crl_set->CheckSerial(serial, issuer_spki_hash); |
| |
| issuer_spki_hash = spki_hash; |
| |
| switch (result) { |
| case CRLSet::REVOKED: |
| return false; |
| case CRLSet::UNKNOWN: |
| case CRLSet::GOOD: |
| continue; |
| default: |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| continue; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| void AppendPublicKeyHashes(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain, |
| HashValueVector* hashes) { |
| if (chain->cChain == 0) |
| return; |
| |
| PCERT_SIMPLE_CHAIN first_chain = chain->rgpChain[0]; |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* const element = first_chain->rgpElement; |
| |
| const DWORD num_elements = first_chain->cElement; |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < num_elements; i++) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert = element[i]->pCertContext; |
| |
| base::StringPiece der_bytes( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(cert->pbCertEncoded), |
| cert->cbCertEncoded); |
| base::StringPiece spki_bytes; |
| if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(der_bytes, &spki_bytes)) |
| continue; |
| |
| HashValue sha1(HASH_VALUE_SHA1); |
| base::SHA1HashBytes(reinterpret_cast<const uint8*>(spki_bytes.data()), |
| spki_bytes.size(), sha1.data()); |
| hashes->push_back(sha1); |
| |
| HashValue sha256(HASH_VALUE_SHA256); |
| crypto::SHA256HashString(spki_bytes, sha1.data(), crypto::kSHA256Length); |
| hashes->push_back(sha256); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Returns true if the certificate is an extended-validation certificate. |
| // |
| // This function checks the certificatePolicies extensions of the |
| // certificates in the certificate chain according to Section 7 (pp. 11-12) |
| // of the EV Certificate Guidelines Version 1.0 at |
| // http://cabforum.org/EV_Certificate_Guidelines.pdf. |
| bool CheckEV(PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context, |
| bool rev_checking_enabled, |
| const char* policy_oid) { |
| DCHECK_NE(static_cast<DWORD>(0), chain_context->cChain); |
| // If the cert doesn't match any of the policies, the |
| // CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE bit (0x10) in |
| // chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus is set. |
| DWORD error_status = chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus; |
| |
| if (!rev_checking_enabled) { |
| // If online revocation checking is disabled then we will have still |
| // requested that the revocation cache be checked. However, that will often |
| // cause the following two error bits to be set. These error bits mean that |
| // the local OCSP/CRL is stale or missing entries for these certificates. |
| // Since they are expected, we mask them away. |
| error_status &= ~(CERT_TRUST_IS_OFFLINE_REVOCATION | |
| CERT_TRUST_REVOCATION_STATUS_UNKNOWN); |
| } |
| if (!chain_context->cChain || error_status != CERT_TRUST_NO_ERROR) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Check the end certificate simple chain (chain_context->rgpChain[0]). |
| // If the end certificate's certificatePolicies extension contains the |
| // EV policy OID of the root CA, return true. |
| PCERT_CHAIN_ELEMENT* element = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->rgpElement; |
| int num_elements = chain_context->rgpChain[0]->cElement; |
| if (num_elements < 2) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Look up the EV policy OID of the root CA. |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT root_cert = element[num_elements - 1]->pCertContext; |
| SHA1HashValue fingerprint = |
| X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint(root_cert); |
| EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); |
| return metadata->HasEVPolicyOID(fingerprint, policy_oid); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| CertVerifyProcWin::CertVerifyProcWin() {} |
| |
| CertVerifyProcWin::~CertVerifyProcWin() {} |
| |
| int CertVerifyProcWin::VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert, |
| const std::string& hostname, |
| int flags, |
| CRLSet* crl_set, |
| CertVerifyResult* verify_result) { |
| PCCERT_CONTEXT cert_handle = cert->os_cert_handle(); |
| if (!cert_handle) |
| return ERR_UNEXPECTED; |
| |
| // Build and validate certificate chain. |
| CERT_CHAIN_PARA chain_para; |
| memset(&chain_para, 0, sizeof(chain_para)); |
| chain_para.cbSize = sizeof(chain_para); |
| // ExtendedKeyUsage. |
| // We still need to request szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO and szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE |
| // today because some certificate chains need them. IE also requests these |
| // two usages. |
| static const LPSTR usage[] = { |
| szOID_PKIX_KP_SERVER_AUTH, |
| szOID_SERVER_GATED_CRYPTO, |
| szOID_SGC_NETSCAPE |
| }; |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_OR; |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = arraysize(usage); |
| chain_para.RequestedUsage.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = |
| const_cast<LPSTR*>(usage); |
| |
| // Get the certificatePolicies extension of the certificate. |
| scoped_ptr_malloc<CERT_POLICIES_INFO> policies_info; |
| LPSTR ev_policy_oid = NULL; |
| if (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_EV_CERT) { |
| GetCertPoliciesInfo(cert_handle, &policies_info); |
| if (policies_info.get()) { |
| EVRootCAMetadata* metadata = EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(); |
| for (DWORD i = 0; i < policies_info->cPolicyInfo; ++i) { |
| LPSTR policy_oid = policies_info->rgPolicyInfo[i].pszPolicyIdentifier; |
| if (metadata->IsEVPolicyOID(policy_oid)) { |
| ev_policy_oid = policy_oid; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.dwType = USAGE_MATCH_TYPE_AND; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 1; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = |
| &ev_policy_oid; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // We can set CERT_CHAIN_RETURN_LOWER_QUALITY_CONTEXTS to get more chains. |
| DWORD chain_flags = CERT_CHAIN_CACHE_END_CERT | |
| CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT; |
| const bool rev_checking_enabled = |
| (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED) || |
| (ev_policy_oid != NULL && |
| (flags & CertVerifier::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED_EV_ONLY)); |
| |
| if (rev_checking_enabled) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED; |
| } else { |
| chain_flags |= CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CACHE_ONLY; |
| } |
| |
| // For non-test scenarios, use the default HCERTCHAINENGINE, NULL, which |
| // corresponds to HCCE_CURRENT_USER and is is initialized as needed by |
| // crypt32. However, when testing, it is necessary to create a new |
| // HCERTCHAINENGINE and use that instead. This is because each |
| // HCERTCHAINENGINE maintains a cache of information about certificates |
| // encountered, and each test run may modify the trust status of a |
| // certificate. |
| ScopedHCERTCHAINENGINE chain_engine(NULL); |
| if (TestRootCerts::HasInstance()) |
| chain_engine.reset(TestRootCerts::GetInstance()->GetChainEngine()); |
| |
| ScopedPCCERT_CONTEXT cert_list(cert->CreateOSCertChainForCert()); |
| PCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT chain_context; |
| // IE passes a non-NULL pTime argument that specifies the current system |
| // time. IE passes CERT_CHAIN_REVOCATION_CHECK_CHAIN_EXCLUDE_ROOT as the |
| // chain_flags argument. |
| if (!CertGetCertificateChain( |
| chain_engine, |
| cert_list.get(), |
| NULL, // current system time |
| cert_list->hCertStore, |
| &chain_para, |
| chain_flags, |
| NULL, // reserved |
| &chain_context)) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| |
| if (chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus & |
| CERT_TRUST_IS_NOT_VALID_FOR_USAGE) { |
| ev_policy_oid = NULL; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.cUsageIdentifier = 0; |
| chain_para.RequestedIssuancePolicy.Usage.rgpszUsageIdentifier = NULL; |
| CertFreeCertificateChain(chain_context); |
| if (!CertGetCertificateChain( |
| chain_engine, |
| cert_list.get(), |
| NULL, // current system time |
| cert_list->hCertStore, |
| &chain_para, |
| chain_flags, |
| NULL, // reserved |
| &chain_context)) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| ScopedPCCERT_CHAIN_CONTEXT scoped_chain_context(chain_context); |
| |
| GetCertChainInfo(chain_context, verify_result); |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapCertChainErrorStatusToCertStatus( |
| chain_context->TrustStatus.dwErrorStatus); |
| |
| // Flag certificates that have a Subject common name with a NULL character. |
| if (CertSubjectCommonNameHasNull(cert_handle)) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_INVALID; |
| |
| if (crl_set && !CheckRevocationWithCRLSet(chain_context, crl_set)) |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_REVOKED; |
| |
| std::wstring wstr_hostname = ASCIIToWide(hostname); |
| |
| SSL_EXTRA_CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA extra_policy_para; |
| memset(&extra_policy_para, 0, sizeof(extra_policy_para)); |
| extra_policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(extra_policy_para); |
| extra_policy_para.dwAuthType = AUTHTYPE_SERVER; |
| extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = 0; |
| extra_policy_para.pwszServerName = |
| const_cast<wchar_t*>(wstr_hostname.c_str()); |
| |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_PARA policy_para; |
| memset(&policy_para, 0, sizeof(policy_para)); |
| policy_para.cbSize = sizeof(policy_para); |
| policy_para.dwFlags = 0; |
| policy_para.pvExtraPolicyPara = &extra_policy_para; |
| |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_STATUS policy_status; |
| memset(&policy_status, 0, sizeof(policy_status)); |
| policy_status.cbSize = sizeof(policy_status); |
| |
| if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, |
| chain_context, |
| &policy_para, |
| &policy_status)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| |
| if (policy_status.dwError) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( |
| MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); |
| |
| // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy reports only one error (in |
| // policy_status.dwError) if the certificate has multiple errors. |
| // CertGetCertificateChain doesn't report certificate name mismatch, so |
| // CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy is the only function that can report |
| // certificate name mismatch. |
| // |
| // To prevent a potential certificate name mismatch from being hidden by |
| // some other certificate error, if we get any other certificate error, |
| // we call CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy again, ignoring all other |
| // certificate errors. Both extra_policy_para.fdwChecks and |
| // policy_para.dwFlags allow us to ignore certificate errors, so we set |
| // them both. |
| if (policy_status.dwError != CERT_E_CN_NO_MATCH) { |
| const DWORD extra_ignore_flags = |
| 0x00000080 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_REVOCATION |
| 0x00000100 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_UNKNOWN_CA |
| 0x00002000 | // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_CERT_DATE_INVALID |
| 0x00000200; // SECURITY_FLAG_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE |
| extra_policy_para.fdwChecks = extra_ignore_flags; |
| const DWORD ignore_flags = |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_NOT_TIME_VALID_FLAGS | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_UNKNOWN_CA_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_WRONG_USAGE_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_NAME_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_INVALID_POLICY_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_ALL_REV_UNKNOWN_FLAGS | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_ALLOW_TESTROOT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_TRUST_TESTROOT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_NOT_SUPPORTED_CRITICAL_EXT_FLAG | |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_IGNORE_PEER_TRUST_FLAG; |
| policy_para.dwFlags = ignore_flags; |
| if (!CertVerifyCertificateChainPolicy( |
| CERT_CHAIN_POLICY_SSL, |
| chain_context, |
| &policy_para, |
| &policy_status)) { |
| return MapSecurityError(GetLastError()); |
| } |
| if (policy_status.dwError) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= MapNetErrorToCertStatus( |
| MapSecurityError(policy_status.dwError)); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // TODO(wtc): Suppress CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM for now to be |
| // compatible with WinHTTP, which doesn't report this error (bug 3004). |
| verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM; |
| |
| if (!rev_checking_enabled) { |
| // If we didn't do online revocation checking then Windows will report |
| // CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION unless it had cached OCSP or CRL |
| // information for every certificate. We only want to put up revoked |
| // statuses from the offline checks so we squash this error. |
| verify_result->cert_status &= ~CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION; |
| } |
| |
| AppendPublicKeyHashes(chain_context, &verify_result->public_key_hashes); |
| verify_result->is_issued_by_known_root = IsIssuedByKnownRoot(chain_context); |
| |
| if (IsCertStatusError(verify_result->cert_status)) |
| return MapCertStatusToNetError(verify_result->cert_status); |
| |
| if (ev_policy_oid && |
| CheckEV(chain_context, rev_checking_enabled, ev_policy_oid)) { |
| verify_result->cert_status |= CERT_STATUS_IS_EV; |
| } |
| return OK; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace net |
