Google Git
Sign in
cobalt / cobalt / 25902c6cb1ab9cfd8ae2ee6b0fb52953f73deda5 / . / net / cert / cert_verify_proc_unittest.cc
blob: 12cac4f4f2427cb119e592d4830a8efa71daa726 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2012 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc.h"
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
#include "base/files/file_path.h"
#include "base/files/file_util.h"
#include "base/functional/bind.h"
#include "base/functional/callback_helpers.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/raw_ptr.h"
#include "base/message_loop/message_pump_type.h"
#include "base/rand_util.h"
#include "base/ranges/algorithm.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/test/metrics/histogram_tester.h"
#include "base/test/scoped_feature_list.h"
#include "base/test/task_environment.h"
#include "base/threading/thread.h"
#include "base/time/time.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "net/base/net_errors.h"
#include "net/cert/asn1_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_net_fetcher.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verifier.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_builtin.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_result.h"
#include "net/cert/crl_set.h"
#include "net/cert/ev_root_ca_metadata.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/system_trust_store.h"
#include "net/cert/ocsp_revocation_status.h"
#include "net/cert/pem.h"
#include "net/cert/pki/extended_key_usage.h"
#include "net/cert/pki/parse_certificate.h"
#include "net/cert/pki/signature_algorithm.h"
#include "net/cert/pki/trust_store.h"
#include "net/cert/test_root_certs.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h"
#include "net/cert/x509_util.h"
#include "net/cert_net/cert_net_fetcher_url_request.h"
#include "net/der/input.h"
#include "net/der/parser.h"
#include "net/log/test_net_log.h"
#include "net/proxy_resolution/proxy_config.h"
#include "net/proxy_resolution/proxy_config_service_fixed.h"
#include "net/test/cert_builder.h"
#include "net/test/cert_test_util.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/embedded_test_server.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/http_request.h"
#include "net/test/embedded_test_server/http_response.h"
#include "net/test/gtest_util.h"
#include "net/test/revocation_builder.h"
#include "net/test/test_certificate_data.h"
#include "net/test/test_data_directory.h"
#include "net/url_request/url_request_context.h"
#include "net/url_request/url_request_context_builder.h"
#include "net/url_request/url_request_context_getter.h"
#include "testing/gmock/include/gmock/gmock.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/bytestring.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/mem.h"
#include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pool.h"
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_android.h"
#elif BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
#include "base/ios/ios_util.h"
#include "net/cert/cert_verify_proc_ios.h"
#elif BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
#include "base/mac/mac_util.h"
#include "net/cert/internal/trust_store_mac.h"
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(CHROME_ROOT_STORE_SUPPORTED)
#include "net/cert/internal/trust_store_chrome.h"
#endif
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Add tests that only certificates with
// serverAuth are accepted.
using net::test::IsError;
using net::test::IsOk;
using base::HexEncode;
namespace net {
namespace {
const char kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram[] = "Net.Certificate.TrustAnchor.Verify";
const char kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram[] =
"Net.Certificate.TrustAnchor.VerifyOutOfDate";
// Returns a TLV to use as an unknown signature algorithm when building a cert.
// The specific contents are as follows (the OID is from
// https://davidben.net/oid):
//
// SEQUENCE {
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.0 }
// NULL {}
// }
std::string TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV() {
constexpr uint8_t kTestOid0SigAlgTLV[] = {0x30, 0x10, 0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86,
0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x12, 0x04, 0x01,
0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x00, 0x05, 0x00};
return std::string(std::begin(kTestOid0SigAlgTLV),
std::end(kTestOid0SigAlgTLV));
}
// An OID for use in tests, from https://davidben.net/oid
// OBJECT_IDENTIFIER { 1.2.840.113554.4.1.72585.0 }
der::Input TestOid0() {
static uint8_t kTestOid0[] = {0x06, 0x0c, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7,
0x12, 0x04, 0x01, 0x84, 0xb7, 0x09, 0x00};
return der::Input(kTestOid0);
}
// Mock CertVerifyProc that sets the CertVerifyResult to a given value for
// all certificates that are Verify()'d
class MockCertVerifyProc : public CertVerifyProc {
public:
explicit MockCertVerifyProc(const CertVerifyResult& result)
: CertVerifyProc(CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet()), result_(result) {}
MockCertVerifyProc(const CertVerifyResult& result, int error)
: CertVerifyProc(CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet()),
result_(result),
error_(error) {}
MockCertVerifyProc(const MockCertVerifyProc&) = delete;
MockCertVerifyProc& operator=(const MockCertVerifyProc&) = delete;
// CertVerifyProc implementation:
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const override { return false; }
protected:
~MockCertVerifyProc() override = default;
private:
int VerifyInternal(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
const std::string& sct_list,
int flags,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result,
const NetLogWithSource& net_log) override;
const CertVerifyResult result_;
const int error_ = OK;
};
int MockCertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal(
X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
const std::string& ocsp_response,
const std::string& sct_list,
int flags,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result,
const NetLogWithSource& net_log) {
*verify_result = result_;
verify_result->verified_cert = cert;
return error_;
}
// This enum identifies a concrete implemenation of CertVerifyProc.
//
// The type is erased by CreateCertVerifyProc(), however needs to be known for
// some of the test expectations.
enum CertVerifyProcType {
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN,
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS,
};
// Returns a textual description of the CertVerifyProc implementation
// that is being tested, used to give better names to parameterized
// tests.
std::string VerifyProcTypeToName(
const testing::TestParamInfo<CertVerifyProcType>& params) {
switch (params.param) {
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID:
return "CertVerifyProcAndroid";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS:
return "CertVerifyProcIOS";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN:
return "CertVerifyProcBuiltin";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS:
return "CertVerifyProcBuiltinChromeRoots";
}
return "";
}
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> CreateCertVerifyProc(
CertVerifyProcType type,
scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcher> cert_net_fetcher,
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set) {
switch (type) {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID:
return base::MakeRefCounted<CertVerifyProcAndroid>(
std::move(cert_net_fetcher), std::move(crl_set));
#elif BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS:
return base::MakeRefCounted<CertVerifyProcIOS>(std::move(crl_set));
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA) || BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || \
defined(STARBOARD)
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN:
return CreateCertVerifyProcBuiltin(std::move(cert_net_fetcher),
std::move(crl_set),
CreateSslSystemTrustStore());
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(CHROME_ROOT_STORE_SUPPORTED)
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS:
return CreateCertVerifyProcBuiltin(
std::move(cert_net_fetcher), std::move(crl_set),
CreateSslSystemTrustStoreChromeRoot(
std::make_unique<net::TrustStoreChrome>()));
#endif
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
// The set of all CertVerifyProcTypes that tests should be parameterized on.
// This needs to be kept in sync with CertVerifyProc::CreateSystemVerifyProc()
// and the platforms where CreateSslSystemTrustStore() is not a dummy store.
// TODO(crbug.com/649017): Enable CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN everywhere. Right
// now this is gated on having CertVerifyProcBuiltin understand the roots added
// via TestRootCerts.
constexpr CertVerifyProcType kAllCertVerifiers[] = {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID,
#elif BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS,
#elif BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA) || BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || \
BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS) || defined(STARBOARD)
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN,
#endif
#if BUILDFLAG(CHROME_ROOT_STORE_SUPPORTED)
CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS,
#endif
};
static_assert(std::size(kAllCertVerifiers) != 0, "Unsupported platform");
// Returns true if a test root added through ScopedTestRoot can verify
// successfully as a target certificate with chain of length 1 on the given
// CertVerifyProcType.
bool ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(CertVerifyProcType verify_proc_type) {
return verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID;
}
// Returns true if a non-self-signed CA certificate added through
// ScopedTestRoot can verify successfully as the root of a chain by the given
// CertVerifyProcType.
bool ScopedTestRootCanTrustIntermediateCert(
CertVerifyProcType verify_proc_type) {
return verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS ||
verify_proc_type == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID;
}
std::string MakeRandomHexString(size_t num_bytes) {
std::vector<char> rand_bytes;
rand_bytes.resize(num_bytes);
base::RandBytes(rand_bytes.data(), rand_bytes.size());
return base::HexEncode(rand_bytes.data(), rand_bytes.size());
}
} // namespace
// This fixture is for tests that apply to concrete implementations of
// CertVerifyProc. It will be run for all of the concrete CertVerifyProc types.
//
// It is called "Internal" as it tests the internal methods like
// "VerifyInternal()".
class CertVerifyProcInternalTest
: public testing::TestWithParam<CertVerifyProcType> {
protected:
void SetUp() override { SetUpCertVerifyProc(CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet()); }
// CertNetFetcher may be initialized by subclasses that want to use net
// fetching by calling SetUpWithCertNetFetcher instead of SetUp.
void SetUpWithCertNetFetcher(scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcher> cert_net_fetcher,
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set) {
CertVerifyProcType type = verify_proc_type();
verify_proc_ = CreateCertVerifyProc(type, std::move(cert_net_fetcher),
std::move(crl_set));
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_proc_);
}
virtual void SetUpCertVerifyProc(scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set) {
SetUpWithCertNetFetcher(nullptr, std::move(crl_set));
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result,
const NetLogWithSource& net_log) {
return verify_proc_->Verify(cert, hostname, /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags,
additional_trust_anchors, verify_result,
net_log);
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert,
const std::string& hostname,
int flags,
const CertificateList& additional_trust_anchors,
CertVerifyResult* verify_result) {
return Verify(cert, hostname, flags, additional_trust_anchors,
verify_result, NetLogWithSource());
}
int Verify(X509Certificate* cert, const std::string& hostname) {
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
return Verify(cert, hostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
}
CertVerifyProcType verify_proc_type() const { return GetParam(); }
bool SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors() const {
return verify_proc_->SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors();
}
// Returns true if the RSA/DSA keysize will be considered weak on the current
// platform. IsInvalidRsaDsaKeySize should be checked prior, since some very
// weak keys may be considered invalid.
bool IsWeakRsaDsaKeySize(int size) const {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
// Beginning with iOS 13, the minimum key size for RSA/DSA algorithms is
// 2048 bits. See https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT210176
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS &&
base::ios::IsRunningOnIOS13OrLater()) {
return size < 2048;
}
#endif
return size < 1024;
}
// Returns true if the RSA/DSA keysize will be considered invalid on the
// current platform.
bool IsInvalidRsaDsaKeySize(int size) const {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
if (base::ios::IsRunningOnIOS12OrLater()) {
// On iOS using SecTrustEvaluateWithError it is not possible to
// distinguish between weak and invalid key sizes.
return IsWeakRsaDsaKeySize(size);
}
#endif
// This platform does not mark certificates with weak keys as invalid.
return false;
}
static bool ParseKeyType(const std::string& key_type,
std::string* type,
int* size) {
size_t pos = key_type.find("-");
std::string size_str = key_type.substr(0, pos);
*type = key_type.substr(pos + 1);
return base::StringToInt(size_str, size);
}
// Some platforms may reject certificates with very weak keys as invalid.
bool IsInvalidKeyType(const std::string& key_type) const {
std::string type;
int size = 0;
if (!ParseKeyType(key_type, &type, &size))
return false;
if (type == "rsa" || type == "dsa")
return IsInvalidRsaDsaKeySize(size);
return false;
}
// Currently, only RSA and DSA keys are checked for weakness, and our example
// weak size is 768. These could change in the future.
//
// Note that this means there may be false negatives: keys for other
// algorithms and which are weak will pass this test.
//
// Also, IsInvalidKeyType should be checked prior, since some weak keys may be
// considered invalid.
bool IsWeakKeyType(const std::string& key_type) const {
std::string type;
int size = 0;
if (!ParseKeyType(key_type, &type, &size))
return false;
if (type == "rsa" || type == "dsa")
return IsWeakRsaDsaKeySize(size);
return false;
}
bool SupportsCRLSet() const { return VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin(); }
bool SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding() const {
return VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin();
}
bool SupportsEV() const {
// Android and iOS do not support EV. See https://crbug.com/117478#7
#if defined(PLATFORM_USES_CHROMIUM_EV_METADATA)
return true;
#else
return false;
#endif
}
bool SupportsSoftFailRevChecking() const { return VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin(); }
bool SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors() const {
return VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin();
}
bool VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin() const {
return verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS;
}
bool VerifyProcTypeIsIOSAtMostOS14() const {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS &&
!base::ios::IsRunningOnIOS15OrLater()) {
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
bool VerifyProcTypeIsIOSAtMostOS15() const {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS &&
!base::ios::IsRunningOnIOS16OrLater()) {
return true;
}
#endif
return false;
}
CertVerifyProc* verify_proc() const { return verify_proc_.get(); }
private:
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcInternalTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, DistrustedIntermediate) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
constexpr char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
// Chain should not verify without any ScopedTestRoots.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(chain.get(), kHostname),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
// Trusting root should cause chain to verify successfully.
ScopedTestRoot trust_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get(),
CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor());
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(chain.get(), kHostname), IsOk());
ScopedTestRoot distrust_intermediate(intermediate->GetX509Certificate().get(),
CertificateTrust::ForDistrusted());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Distrusting intermediate should cause chain to not verify again.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(chain.get(), kHostname),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
// Specifying trust types for the platform verifiers through ScopedTestRoot
// is not supported, so this should still verify successfully.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(chain.get(), kHostname), IsOk());
}
}
// Tests that a certificate is recognized as EV, when the valid EV policy OID
// for the trust anchor is the second candidate EV oid in the target
// certificate. This is a regression test for crbug.com/705285.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, EVVerificationMultipleOID) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
// The policies that target certificate asserts.
static const char kOtherTestCertPolicy[] = "2.23.140.1.1";
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
// Specify the extraneous policy first, then the actual policy.
leaf->SetCertificatePolicies({kOtherTestCertPolicy, kEVTestCertPolicy});
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
// Build a CRLSet that covers the target certificate.
//
// This way CRLSet coverage will be sufficient for EV revocation checking,
// so this test does not depend on online revocation checking.
base::StringPiece spki;
ASSERT_TRUE(asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert(
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(root->GetCertBuffer()), &spki));
SHA256HashValue spki_sha256;
crypto::SHA256HashString(spki, spki_sha256.data, sizeof(spki_sha256.data));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(CRLSet::ForTesting(false, &spki_sha256, "", "", {}));
// Consider the root of the test chain a valid EV root for the test policy.
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(root->GetCertBuffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_other_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(), SHA256HashValue(), kOtherTestCertPolicy);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// Target cert has an EV policy, and verifies successfully, but has a chain of
// length 1 because the target cert was directly trusted in the trust store.
// Should verify OK but not with STATUS_IS_EV.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, TrustedTargetCertWithEVPolicy) {
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
leaf->SetCertificatePolicies({kEVTestCertPolicy});
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(), SHA256HashValue(), kEVTestCertPolicy);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root(cert.get());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(verify_proc_type())) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().empty());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// Target cert has an EV policy, and verifies successfully with a chain of
// length 1, and its fingerprint matches the cert fingerprint for that ev
// policy. This should never happen in reality, but just test that things don't
// explode if it does.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest,
TrustedTargetCertWithEVPolicyAndEVFingerprint) {
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
leaf->SetCertificatePolicies({kEVTestCertPolicy});
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(leaf->GetCertBuffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root(cert.get());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (ScopedTestRootCanTrustTargetCert(verify_proc_type())) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().empty());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
// An EV Root certificate should never be used as an end-entity certificate.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
// Target cert has an EV policy, and has a valid path to the EV root, but the
// intermediate has been trusted directly. Should stop building the path at the
// intermediate and verify OK but not with STATUS_IS_EV.
// See https://crbug.com/979801
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, TrustedIntermediateCertWithEVPolicy) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
if (!ScopedTestRootCanTrustIntermediateCert(verify_proc_type())) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as intermediate cert cannot be trusted";
return;
}
for (bool trust_the_intermediate : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(trust_the_intermediate);
// Need to build unique certs for each try otherwise caching can break
// things.
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
static const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
leaf->SetCertificatePolicies({kEVTestCertPolicy});
intermediate->SetCertificatePolicies({kEVTestCertPolicy});
// Consider the root of the test chain a valid EV root for the test policy.
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(root->GetCertBuffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
intermediate->GetX509Certificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert = root->GetX509Certificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(root_cert.get());
if (!trust_the_intermediate) {
// First trust just the root. This verifies that the test setup is
// actually correct.
#if defined(STARBOARD)
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root(root_cert.get());
#else
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root({root_cert});
#endif
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
// Verified chain should include the intermediate and the root.
EXPECT_EQ(2U, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
// Should be EV.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
} else {
// Now try with trusting both the intermediate and the root.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_test_root({intermediate_cert, root_cert});
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
// Verified chain should only go to the trusted intermediate, not the
// root.
EXPECT_EQ(1U, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
// Should not be EV.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CertWithNullInCommonNameAndNoSAN) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
leaf->EraseExtension(der::Input(kSubjectAltNameOid));
std::string common_name;
common_name += "www.fake.com";
common_name += '\0';
common_name += "a" + MakeRandomHexString(12) + ".example.com";
leaf->SetSubjectCommonName(common_name);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.fake.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// This actually fails because Chrome only looks for hostnames in
// SubjectAltNames now and no SubjectAltName is present.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CertWithNullInCommonNameAndValidSAN) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
leaf->SetSubjectAltName("www.fake.com");
std::string common_name;
common_name += "www.fake.com";
common_name += '\0';
common_name += "a" + MakeRandomHexString(12) + ".example.com";
leaf->SetSubjectCommonName(common_name);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.fake.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// SubjectAltName is valid and Chrome does not use the common name.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CertWithNullInSAN) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
std::string hostname;
hostname += "www.fake.com";
hostname += '\0';
hostname += "a" + MakeRandomHexString(12) + ".example.com";
leaf->SetSubjectAltName(hostname);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.fake.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// SubjectAltName is invalid.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID));
}
// Tests the case where the target certificate is accepted by
// X509CertificateBytes, but has errors that should cause verification to fail.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, InvalidTarget) {
base::FilePath certs_dir =
GetTestNetDataDirectory().AppendASCII("parse_certificate_unittest");
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> bad_cert;
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Builtin verifier doesn't distinguish between invalid signature algorithm
// and unknown signature algorithm, so use a different test file that will
// fail in ParsedCertificate::Create. The other verifiers use a different
// test file since the platform verifiers don't all consider empty
// extensions sequence invalid.
bad_cert = ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "extensions_empty_sequence.pem");
} else {
bad_cert = ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "signature_algorithm_null.pem");
}
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ok_cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(ok_cert);
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(ok_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_with_bad_target(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(bad_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates)));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_with_bad_target);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, cert_with_bad_target->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_with_bad_target.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Tests the case where an intermediate certificate is accepted by
// X509CertificateBytes, but has errors that should prevent using it during
// verification. The verification should succeed, since the intermediate
// wasn't necessary.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, UnnecessaryInvalidIntermediate) {
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
base::FilePath certs_dir =
GetTestNetDataDirectory().AppendASCII("parse_certificate_unittest");
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> bad_cert =
x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(base::StringPiece("invalid"));
ASSERT_TRUE(bad_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ok_cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(ok_cert);
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(std::move(bad_cert));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_with_bad_intermediate(
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(ok_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates)));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_with_bad_intermediate);
EXPECT_EQ(1U, cert_with_bad_intermediate->intermediate_buffers().size());
RecordingNetLogObserver net_log_observer(NetLogCaptureMode::kDefault);
NetLogWithSource net_log(NetLogWithSource::Make(
net::NetLog::Get(), net::NetLogSourceType::CERT_VERIFIER_TASK));
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_with_bad_intermediate.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result, net_log);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status);
auto events = net_log_observer.GetEntriesForSource(net_log.source());
EXPECT_FALSE(events.empty());
auto event = base::ranges::find(events, NetLogEventType::CERT_VERIFY_PROC,
&NetLogEntry::type);
ASSERT_NE(event, events.end());
EXPECT_EQ(net::NetLogEventPhase::BEGIN, event->phase);
const std::string* host = event->params.FindString("host");
ASSERT_TRUE(host);
EXPECT_EQ("127.0.0.1", *host);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
event =
base::ranges::find(events, NetLogEventType::CERT_VERIFY_PROC_INPUT_CERT,
&NetLogEntry::type);
ASSERT_NE(event, events.end());
EXPECT_EQ(net::NetLogEventPhase::NONE, event->phase);
const std::string* errors = event->params.FindString("errors");
ASSERT_TRUE(errors);
EXPECT_EQ(
"ERROR: Failed parsing Certificate SEQUENCE\nERROR: Failed parsing "
"Certificate\n",
*errors);
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, RejectExpiredCert) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
certs_dir, "expired_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ASSERT_EQ(0U, cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, RejectWeakKeys) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
typedef std::vector<std::string> Strings;
Strings key_types;
// generate-weak-test-chains.sh currently has:
// key_types="768-rsa 1024-rsa 2048-rsa prime256v1-ecdsa"
// We must use the same key types here. The filenames generated look like:
// 2048-rsa-ee-by-768-rsa-intermediate.pem
key_types.push_back("768-rsa");
key_types.push_back("1024-rsa");
key_types.push_back("2048-rsa");
key_types.push_back("prime256v1-ecdsa");
// Add the root that signed the intermediates for this test.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "2048-rsa-root.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
// Now test each chain.
for (Strings::const_iterator ee_type = key_types.begin();
ee_type != key_types.end(); ++ee_type) {
for (Strings::const_iterator signer_type = key_types.begin();
signer_type != key_types.end(); ++signer_type) {
std::string basename =
*ee_type + "-ee-by-" + *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
SCOPED_TRACE(basename);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), ee_cert.get());
basename = *signer_type + "-intermediate.pem";
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, basename);
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), intermediate.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(intermediate->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(ee_cert->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (IsInvalidKeyType(*ee_type) || IsInvalidKeyType(*signer_type)) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_INVALID,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
} else if (IsWeakKeyType(*ee_type) || IsWeakKeyType(*signer_type)) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_KEY);
}
}
}
}
// Regression test for http://crbug.com/108514.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ExtraneousMD5RootCert) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-leaf.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> extra_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-md5.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), extra_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "cross-signed-root-sha256.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), root_cert.get());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(extra_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(server_cert->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
// The extra MD5 root should be discarded
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
ASSERT_EQ(1u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().front().get(),
root_cert->cert_buffer()));
}
// Test for bug 94673.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, GoogleDigiNotarTest) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> server_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "google_diginotar.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), server_cert.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "diginotar_public_ca_2025.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), intermediate_cert.get());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(intermediate_cert->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(server_cert->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "mail.google.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
// Now turn off revocation checking. Certificate verification should still
// fail.
flags = 0;
error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "mail.google.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, NameConstraintsOk) {
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
// Use the private key matching the public_key_hash of the kDomainsTest
// constraint in CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation.
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf->UseKeyFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("name_constrained_key.pem")));
// example.com is allowed by kDomainsTest, and notarealtld is not a known
// TLD, so that's allowed too.
leaf->SetSubjectAltNames({"test.ExAmPlE.CoM", "example.notarealtld",
"*.test2.ExAmPlE.CoM", "*.example2.notarealtld"},
{});
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf_cert = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf_cert.get(), "test.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
error = Verify(leaf_cert.get(), "foo.test2.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, NameConstraintsFailure) {
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
// Use the private key matching the public_key_hash of the kDomainsTest
// constraint in CertVerifyProc::HasNameConstraintsViolation.
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf->UseKeyFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("name_constrained_key.pem")));
// example.com is allowed by kDomainsTest, but example.org is not.
leaf->SetSubjectAltNames({"test.ExAmPlE.CoM", "test.ExAmPlE.OrG"}, {});
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf_cert = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf_cert.get(), "test.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NAME_CONSTRAINT_VIOLATION);
}
// This fixture is for testing the verification of a certificate chain which
// has some sort of mismatched signature algorithm (i.e.
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm and TBSCertificate.algorithm are different).
class CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest : public ::testing::Test {
protected:
// In the test setup, SHA384 is given special treatment as an unknown
// algorithm.
static constexpr DigestAlgorithm kUnknownDigestAlgorithm =
DigestAlgorithm::Sha384;
struct CertParams {
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm
DigestAlgorithm cert_algorithm;
// TBSCertificate.algorithm
DigestAlgorithm tbs_algorithm;
};
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the leaf's parameters need
// to be specified.
[[nodiscard]] int VerifyLeaf(const CertParams& leaf_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
leaf_params,
// Root
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256}});
}
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the intermediate's parameters need
// to be specified.
[[nodiscard]] int VerifyIntermediate(const CertParams& intermediate_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Intermediate
intermediate_params,
// Root
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256}});
}
// Shorthand for VerifyChain() where only the root's parameters need to be
// specified.
[[nodiscard]] int VerifyRoot(const CertParams& root_params) {
return VerifyChain({// Target
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Intermediate
{DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256},
// Root
root_params});
}
// Manufactures a certificate chain where each certificate has the indicated
// signature algorithms, and then returns the result of verifying this chain.
//
// TODO(mattm): Replace the custom cert mangling code in this test with
// CertBuilder.
[[nodiscard]] int VerifyChain(const std::vector<CertParams>& chain_params) {
auto chain = CreateChain(chain_params);
if (!chain) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed creating certificate chain";
return ERR_UNEXPECTED;
}
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
return verify_proc->Verify(
chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
}
private:
// Overwrites the AlgorithmIdentifier pointed to by |algorithm_sequence| with
// |algorithm|. Note this violates the constness of StringPiece.
[[nodiscard]] static bool SetAlgorithmSequence(
DigestAlgorithm algorithm,
base::StringPiece* algorithm_sequence) {
// This string of bytes is the full SEQUENCE for an AlgorithmIdentifier.
std::vector<uint8_t> replacement_sequence;
switch (algorithm) {
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha1:
// sha1WithRSAEncryption
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x05, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
case DigestAlgorithm::Sha256:
// sha256WithRSAEncryption
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86,
0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
case kUnknownDigestAlgorithm:
// This shouldn't be anything meaningful (modified numbers at random).
replacement_sequence = {0x30, 0x0D, 0x06, 0x09, 0x8a, 0x87, 0x18, 0x46,
0xd7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00};
break;
default:
ADD_FAILURE() << "Unsupported digest algorithm";
return false;
}
// For this simple replacement to work (without modifying any
// other sequence lengths) the original algorithm and replacement
// algorithm must have the same encoded length.
if (algorithm_sequence->size() != replacement_sequence.size()) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "AlgorithmIdentifier must have length "
<< replacement_sequence.size();
return false;
}
memcpy(const_cast<char*>(algorithm_sequence->data()),
replacement_sequence.data(), replacement_sequence.size());
return true;
}
// Locate the serial number bytes.
[[nodiscard]] static bool ExtractSerialNumberFromDERCert(
base::StringPiece der_cert,
base::StringPiece* serial_value) {
der::Parser parser((der::Input(der_cert)));
der::Parser certificate;
if (!parser.ReadSequence(&certificate))
return false;
der::Parser tbs_certificate;
if (!certificate.ReadSequence(&tbs_certificate))
return false;
bool unused;
if (!tbs_certificate.SkipOptionalTag(
der::kTagConstructed | der::kTagContextSpecific | 0, &unused)) {
return false;
}
// serialNumber
der::Input serial_value_der;
if (!tbs_certificate.ReadTag(der::kInteger, &serial_value_der))
return false;
*serial_value = serial_value_der.AsStringView();
return true;
}
// Creates a certificate (based on some base certificate file) using the
// specified signature algorithms.
static scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> CreateCertificate(
const CertParams& params) {
// Dosn't really matter which base certificate is used, so long as it is
// valid and uses a signature AlgorithmIdentifier with the same encoded
// length as sha1WithRSASignature.
const char* kLeafFilename = "ok_cert.pem";
auto cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), kLeafFilename, X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
if (!cert) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed to load certificate: " << kLeafFilename;
return nullptr;
}
// Start with the DER bytes of a valid certificate. The der data is copied
// to a new std::string as it will modified to create a new certificate.
std::string cert_der(
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert->cert_buffer()));
// Parse the certificate and identify the locations of interest within
// |cert_der|.
base::StringPiece cert_algorithm_sequence;
base::StringPiece tbs_algorithm_sequence;
if (!asn1::ExtractSignatureAlgorithmsFromDERCert(
cert_der, &cert_algorithm_sequence, &tbs_algorithm_sequence)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed parsing certificate algorithms";
return nullptr;
}
base::StringPiece serial_value;
if (!ExtractSerialNumberFromDERCert(cert_der, &serial_value)) {
ADD_FAILURE() << "Failed parsing certificate serial number";
return nullptr;
}
// Give each certificate a unique serial number based on its content (which
// in turn is a function of |params|, otherwise importing it may fail.
// Upper bound for last entry in DigestAlgorithm
const int kNumDigestAlgorithms = 15;
*const_cast<char*>(serial_value.data()) +=
static_cast<int>(params.tbs_algorithm) * kNumDigestAlgorithms +
static_cast<int>(params.cert_algorithm);
// Change the signature AlgorithmIdentifiers.
if (!SetAlgorithmSequence(params.cert_algorithm,
&cert_algorithm_sequence) ||
!SetAlgorithmSequence(params.tbs_algorithm, &tbs_algorithm_sequence)) {
return nullptr;
}
// NOTE: The signature is NOT recomputed over TBSCertificate -- for these
// tests it isn't needed.
return X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes(
base::as_bytes(base::make_span(cert_der)));
}
static scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> CreateChain(
const std::vector<CertParams>& params) {
// Manufacture a chain with the given combinations of signature algorithms.
// This chain isn't actually a valid chain, but it is good enough for
// testing the base CertVerifyProc.
CertificateList certs;
for (const auto& cert_params : params) {
certs.push_back(CreateCertificate(cert_params));
if (!certs.back())
return nullptr;
}
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
for (size_t i = 1; i < certs.size(); ++i)
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[i]->cert_buffer()));
return X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(certs[0]->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
}
};
// This is a control test to make sure that the test helper
// VerifyLeaf() works as expected. There is no actual mismatch in the
// algorithms used here.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha1Sha1) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
}
// This is a control test to make sure that the test helper
// VerifyLeaf() works as expected. There is no actual mismatch in the
// algorithms used here.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Sha256) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha1Sha256) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Sha1) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: ?
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafSha256Unknown) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, kUnknownDigestAlgorithm});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the leaf certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: ?
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, LeafUnknownSha256) {
int rv = VerifyLeaf({kUnknownDigestAlgorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the intermediate certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, IntermediateSha1Sha256) {
int rv = VerifyIntermediate({DigestAlgorithm::Sha1, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the intermediate certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, IntermediateSha256Sha1) {
int rv = VerifyIntermediate({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
// Mismatched signature algorithms in the root certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha1WithRSASignature
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, RootSha256Sha1) {
int rv = VerifyRoot({DigestAlgorithm::Sha256, DigestAlgorithm::Sha1});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
// Unrecognized signature algorithm in the root certificate.
//
// Certificate.signatureAlgorithm: ?
// TBSCertificate.algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcInspectSignatureAlgorithmsTest, RootUnknownSha256) {
int rv = VerifyRoot({kUnknownDigestAlgorithm, DigestAlgorithm::Sha256});
ASSERT_THAT(rv, IsOk());
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, TestHasTooLongValidity) {
struct {
const char* const file;
bool is_valid_too_long;
} tests[] = {
{"start_after_expiry.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_ok.pem", false},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_121.pem", true},
{"pre_br_validity_bad_2020.pem", true},
{"10_year_validity.pem", false},
{"11_year_validity.pem", true},
{"39_months_after_2015_04.pem", false},
{"40_months_after_2015_04.pem", true},
{"60_months_after_2012_07.pem", false},
{"61_months_after_2012_07.pem", true},
{"825_days_after_2018_03_01.pem", false},
{"826_days_after_2018_03_01.pem", true},
{"825_days_1_second_after_2018_03_01.pem", true},
{"39_months_based_on_last_day.pem", false},
{"398_days_after_2020_09_01.pem", false},
{"399_days_after_2020_09_01.pem", true},
{"398_days_1_second_after_2020_09_01.pem", true},
};
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
for (const auto& test : tests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(test.file);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, test.file);
ASSERT_TRUE(certificate);
EXPECT_EQ(test.is_valid_too_long,
CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity(*certificate));
}
}
// Integration test for CertVerifyProc::HasTooLongValidity.
// There isn't a way to add test entries to the known roots list for testing
// the full CertVerifyProc implementations, but HasTooLongValidity is checked
// by the outer CertVerifyProc::Verify. Thus the test can mock the
// VerifyInternal result to pretend there was a successful verification with
// is_issued_by_known_root and see that Verify overrides that with error.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, VerifyCertValidityTooLong) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "900_days_after_2019_07_01.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
{
// Locally trusted cert should be ok.
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_ALL_ERRORS);
}
{
// Publicly trusted cert that was otherwise okay should get changed to
// ERR_CERT_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG.
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG));
// TODO(mattm): generate a dedicated cert or use CertBuilder so that this
// test doesn't also hit CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME.
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG | CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_ALL_ERRORS);
}
{
// Publicly trusted cert that had some other error should retain the
// original error, but CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG should be added to
// cert_status.
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
dummy_result.cert_status = CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(
dummy_result, ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
// TODO(mattm): generate a dedicated cert or use CertBuilder so that this
// test doesn't also hit CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME.
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID | CERT_STATUS_VALIDITY_TOO_LONG |
CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME,
verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_ALL_ERRORS);
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, DISABLED_TestKnownRoot) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
certs_dir, "leaf_from_known_root.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "horseweather.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk()) << "This test relies on a real certificate that "
<< "expires on May 10 2024. If failing on/after "
<< "that date, please disable and file a bug "
<< "against mattm.";
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN) {
auto* mac_trust_debug_info =
net::TrustStoreMac::ResultDebugData::Get(&verify_result);
ASSERT_TRUE(mac_trust_debug_info);
// Since this test queries the real trust store, can't know exactly
// what bits should be set in the trust debug info, but it should at
// least have something set.
EXPECT_NE(0, mac_trust_debug_info->combined_trust_debug_info());
}
#endif
}
// This tests that on successful certificate verification,
// CertVerifyResult::public_key_hashes is filled with a SHA256 hash for each
// of the certificates in the chain.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, PublicKeyHashes) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(certs[0]->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(2U, cert_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(3u, verify_result.public_key_hashes.size());
// Convert |public_key_hashes| to strings for ease of comparison.
std::vector<std::string> public_key_hash_strings;
for (const auto& public_key_hash : verify_result.public_key_hashes)
public_key_hash_strings.push_back(public_key_hash.ToString());
std::vector<std::string> expected_public_key_hashes = {
// Target
"sha256/Ru/08Ru275Zlf42sbI6lqi2OUun3r4YgrrK/vJ3+Yzk=",
// Intermediate
"sha256/D9u0epgvPYlG9YiVp7V+IMT+xhUpB5BhsS/INjDXc4Y=",
// Trust anchor
"sha256/VypP3VWL7OaqTJ7mIBehWYlv8khPuFHpWiearZI2YjI="};
// |public_key_hashes| does not have an ordering guarantee.
EXPECT_THAT(expected_public_key_hashes,
testing::UnorderedElementsAreArray(public_key_hash_strings));
}
// Tests that a Netscape Server Gated crypto is accepted in place of a
// serverAuth EKU.
// TODO(crbug.com/843735): Deprecate support for this.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, Sha1IntermediateUsesServerGatedCrypto) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
root->GenerateRSAKey();
root->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kRsaPkcs1Sha1);
intermediate->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kNetscapeServerGatedCrypto)});
intermediate->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kRsaPkcs1Sha1);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// The cert chain including the root is passed to Verify, as on recent
// Android versions (something like 11+) the verifier fails on SHA1 certs and
// then the CertVerifyProc wrapper just returns the input chain, which this
// test then depends on for its expectations. (This is all kind of silly, but
// this is just matching how the test was originally written, and we'll
// delete this sometime soon anyway so there's not much benefit to thinking
// about it too hard.)
int error =
Verify(leaf->GetX509CertificateFullChain().get(), "www.example.com",
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(error, OK);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
// Basic test for returning the chain in CertVerifyResult. Note that the
// returned chain may just be a reflection of the originally supplied chain;
// that is, if any errors occur, the default chain returned is an exact copy
// of the certificate to be verified. The remaining VerifyReturn* tests are
// used to ensure that the actual, verified chain is being returned by
// Verify().
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainBasic) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr), google_full_chain.get());
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_EQ(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr),
verify_result.verified_cert.get());
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
// Test that certificates issued for 'intranet' names (that is, containing no
// known public registry controlled domain information) issued by well-known
// CAs are flagged appropriately, while certificates that are issued by
// internal CAs are not flagged.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, IntranetHostsRejected) {
const std::string kIntranetHostname = "webmail";
auto [leaf, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain2();
leaf->SetSubjectAltName(kIntranetHostname);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(leaf->GetX509Certificate());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = 0;
// Intranet names for public CAs should be flagged:
CertVerifyResult dummy_result;
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), kIntranetHostname,
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
// However, if the CA is not well known, these should not be flagged:
dummy_result.Reset();
dummy_result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(dummy_result);
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), kIntranetHostname,
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NON_UNIQUE_NAME);
}
// Tests that certificates issued by Symantec's legacy infrastructure
// are rejected according to the policies outlined in
// https://security.googleblog.com/2017/09/chromes-plan-to-distrust-symantec.html
// unless the caller has explicitly disabled that enforcement.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, SymantecCertsRejected) {
constexpr SHA256HashValue kSymantecHashValue = {
{0xb2, 0xde, 0xf5, 0x36, 0x2a, 0xd3, 0xfa, 0xcd, 0x04, 0xbd, 0x29,
0x04, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x84, 0x4f, 0x76, 0x70, 0x34, 0xea, 0x48, 0x92,
0xf8, 0x0e, 0x56, 0xbe, 0xe6, 0x90, 0x24, 0x3e, 0x25, 0x02}};
constexpr SHA256HashValue kGoogleHashValue = {
{0xec, 0x72, 0x29, 0x69, 0xcb, 0x64, 0x20, 0x0a, 0xb6, 0x63, 0x8f,
0x68, 0xac, 0x53, 0x8e, 0x40, 0xab, 0xab, 0x5b, 0x19, 0xa6, 0x48,
0x56, 0x61, 0x04, 0x2a, 0x10, 0x61, 0xc4, 0x61, 0x27, 0x76}};
// Test that certificates from the legacy Symantec infrastructure are
// rejected:
// - dec_2017.pem : A certificate issued after 2017-12-01, which is rejected
// as of M65
// - pre_june_2016.pem : A certificate issued prior to 2016-06-01, which is
// rejected as of M66.
for (const char* rejected_cert : {"dec_2017.pem", "pre_june_2016.pem"}) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), rejected_cert, X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc;
int error = 0;
// Test that a legacy Symantec certificate is rejected.
CertVerifyResult symantec_result;
symantec_result.verified_cert = cert;
symantec_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
symantec_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(symantec_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_1;
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &test_result_1,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_SYMANTEC_LEGACY));
EXPECT_TRUE(test_result_1.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
// ... Unless the Symantec cert chains through a allowlisted intermediate.
CertVerifyResult allowlisted_result;
allowlisted_result.verified_cert = cert;
allowlisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(
HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
allowlisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kGoogleHashValue));
allowlisted_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(allowlisted_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_2;
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &test_result_2,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_2.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
// ... Or the caller disabled enforcement of Symantec policies.
CertVerifyResult test_result_3;
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(),
CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_DISABLE_SYMANTEC_ENFORCEMENT, CertificateList(),
&test_result_3, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_3.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
}
// Test that certificates from the legacy Symantec infrastructure issued
// after 2016-06-01 appropriately rejected.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "post_june_2016.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
scoped_refptr<CertVerifyProc> verify_proc;
int error = 0;
// Test that a legacy Symantec certificate is rejected if the feature
// flag is enabled, and accepted if it is not.
CertVerifyResult symantec_result;
symantec_result.verified_cert = cert;
symantec_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
symantec_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(symantec_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_1;
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1",
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(),
&test_result_1, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_SYMANTEC_LEGACY));
EXPECT_TRUE(test_result_1.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
// ... Unless the Symantec cert chains through a allowlisted intermediate.
CertVerifyResult allowlisted_result;
allowlisted_result.verified_cert = cert;
allowlisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kSymantecHashValue));
allowlisted_result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(kGoogleHashValue));
allowlisted_result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(allowlisted_result);
CertVerifyResult test_result_2;
error = verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1",
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(),
&test_result_2, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_2.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
// ... Or the caller disabled enforcement of Symantec policies.
CertVerifyResult test_result_3;
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(),
CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_DISABLE_SYMANTEC_ENFORCEMENT, CertificateList(),
&test_result_3, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(test_result_3.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SYMANTEC_LEGACY);
}
// Test that the certificate returned in CertVerifyResult is able to reorder
// certificates that are not ordered from end-entity to root. While this is
// a protocol violation if sent during a TLS handshake, if multiple sources
// of intermediate certificates are combined, it's possible that order may
// not be maintained.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainProperlyOrdered) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
// Construct the chain out of order.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(google_full_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(2U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.verified_cert);
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
// Test that Verify() filters out certificates which are not related to
// or part of the certificate chain being verified.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts) {
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
CertificateList certs = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
certs_dir, "x509_verify_results.chain.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(3U, certs.size());
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(certs[2].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "duplicate_cn_1.pem");
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> unrelated_certificate2 =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, "google.single.pem");
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr),
unrelated_certificate.get());
ASSERT_NE(static_cast<X509Certificate*>(nullptr),
unrelated_certificate2.get());
// Interject unrelated certificates into the list of intermediates.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(unrelated_certificate->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(unrelated_certificate2->cert_buffer()));
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> google_full_chain =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(bssl::UpRef(certs[0]->cert_buffer()),
std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(google_full_chain);
ASSERT_EQ(4U, google_full_chain->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.verified_cert);
int error = Verify(google_full_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1", 0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_NE(google_full_chain, verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_TRUE(
x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(google_full_chain->cert_buffer(),
verify_result.verified_cert->cert_buffer()));
const auto& return_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(2U, return_intermediates.size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[0].get(),
certs[1]->cert_buffer()));
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(return_intermediates[1].get(),
certs[2]->cert_buffer()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, AdditionalTrustAnchors) {
if (!SupportsAdditionalTrustAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test in this platform.";
return;
}
// |ca_cert| is the issuer of |cert|.
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ca_cert(ca_cert_list[0]);
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
// Verification of |cert| fails when |ca_cert| is not in the trust anchors
// list.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Now add the |ca_cert| to the |trust_anchors|, and verification should pass.
CertificateList trust_anchors;
trust_anchors.push_back(ca_cert);
error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, trust_anchors, &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
// Clearing the |trust_anchors| makes verification fail again (the cache
// should be skipped).
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor);
}
// Tests that certificates issued by user-supplied roots are not flagged as
// issued by a known root. This should pass whether or not the platform supports
// detecting known roots.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, IsIssuedByKnownRootIgnoresTestRoots) {
// Load root_ca_cert.pem into the test root store.
ScopedTestRoot test_root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem").get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
// Verification should pass.
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// But should not be marked as a known root.
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
// Test verification with a leaf that does not contain embedded SCTs, and which
// has a notBefore date after 2018/10/15, and passing a valid |sct_list| to
// Verify(). Verification should succeed on all platforms. (Assuming the
// verifier trusts the SCT Logs used in |sct_list|.)
//
// Fails on multiple plaforms, see crbug.com/1050152.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest,
DISABLED_LeafNewerThan20181015WithTlsSctList) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "treadclimber.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE);
ASSERT_TRUE(chain);
if (base::Time::Now() > chain->valid_expiry()) {
FAIL() << "This test uses a certificate chain which is now expired. Please "
"disable and file a bug against mattm.";
}
std::string sct_list;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("treadclimber.sctlist"), &sct_list));
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc()->Verify(chain.get(), "treadclimber.com",
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(), sct_list,
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
// Since the valid |sct_list| was passed to Verify, verification should
// succeed on all verifiers and OS versions.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.is_issued_by_known_root);
}
// Test that CRLSets are effective in making a certificate appear to be
// revoked.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSet) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
CertificateList cert_list = CreateCertificateListFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert_list.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(cert_list[0]);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
// First test blocking by SPKI.
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_leaf_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Second, test revocation by serial number of a cert directly under the
// root.
crl_set_bytes.clear();
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetLeafSerial) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
// Test revocation by serial number of a certificate not under the root.
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_intermediate_serial.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetRootReturnsChain) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
CertificateList ca_cert_list =
CreateCertificateListFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, ca_cert_list.size());
ScopedTestRoot test_root(ca_cert_list[0].get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
// Test revocation of the root itself.
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_EQ(3u, verify_result.public_key_hashes.size());
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert);
EXPECT_EQ(2u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
}
// Tests that CertVerifyProc implementations apply CRLSet revocations by
// subject.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetRevokedBySubject) {
if (!SupportsCRLSet()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support CRLSet";
return;
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(leaf);
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Confirm that verifying the certificate chain with an empty CRLSet succeeds.
SetUpCertVerifyProc(CRLSet::EmptyCRLSetForTesting());
int error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
std::string crl_set_bytes;
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
// Revoke the leaf by subject. Verification should now fail.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_leaf_subject_no_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Revoke the root by subject. Verification should now fail.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_subject_no_spki.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
// Revoke the leaf by subject, but only if the SPKI doesn't match the given
// one. Verification should pass when using the certificate's actual SPKI.
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII("crlset_by_root_subject.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
// Ensures that CRLSets can be used to block known interception roots on
// platforms that support CRLSets, while otherwise detect known interception
// on platforms that do not.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, BlockedInterceptionByRoot) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
// A default/built-in CRLSet should not block
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set = CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet();
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// Read in a CRLSet that marks the root as blocked for interception.
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(
base::ReadFileToString(GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(
"crlset_blocked_interception_by_root.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (SupportsCRLSet()) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_BLOCKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_BLOCKED);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_DETECTED);
}
}
// Ensures that CRLSets can be used to block known interception intermediates,
// while still allowing other certificates from that root..
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, BlockedInterceptionByIntermediate) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
// A default/built-in CRLSEt should not block
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set = CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet();
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// Read in a CRLSet that marks the intermediate as blocked for interception.
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(
"crlset_blocked_interception_by_intermediate.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (SupportsCRLSet()) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_BLOCKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_BLOCKED);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_DETECTED);
}
// Load a different certificate from that root, which should be unaffected.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> second_cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem", X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(second_cert);
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error = Verify(second_cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
}
// Ensures that CRLSets can be used to flag known interception roots, even
// when they are not blocked.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, DetectsInterceptionByRoot) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root);
ScopedTestRoot test_root(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
// A default/built-in CRLSet should not block
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set = CRLSet::BuiltinCRLSet();
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
// Read in a CRLSet that marks the root as blocked for interception.
std::string crl_set_bytes;
ASSERT_TRUE(
base::ReadFileToString(GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(
"crlset_known_interception_by_root.raw"),
&crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
error =
Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_KNOWN_INTERCEPTION_DETECTED);
}
// Tests that CRLSets participate in path building functions, and that as
// long as a valid path exists within the verification graph, verification
// succeeds.
//
// In this test, there are two roots (D and E), and three possible paths
// to validate a leaf (A):
// 1. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(D) -> D(D)
// 2. A(B) -> B(C) -> C(E) -> E(E)
// 3. A(B) -> B(F) -> F(E) -> E(E)
//
// Each permutation of revocation is tried:
// 1. Revoking E by SPKI, so that only Path 1 is valid (as E is in Paths 2 & 3)
// 2. Revoking C(D) and F(E) by serial, so that only Path 2 is valid.
// 3. Revoking C by SPKI, so that only Path 3 is valid (as C is in Paths 1 & 2)
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, CRLSetDuringPathBuilding) {
if (!SupportsCRLSetsInPathBuilding()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping this test on this platform.";
return;
}
CertificateList path_1_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem",
"multi-root-C-by-D.pem", "multi-root-D-by-D.pem"},
&path_1_certs));
CertificateList path_2_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-C.pem",
"multi-root-C-by-E.pem", "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"},
&path_2_certs));
CertificateList path_3_certs;
ASSERT_TRUE(
LoadCertificateFiles({"multi-root-A-by-B.pem", "multi-root-B-by-F.pem",
"multi-root-F-by-E.pem", "multi-root-E-by-E.pem"},
&path_3_certs));
// Add D and E as trust anchors.
ScopedTestRoot test_root_D(path_1_certs[3].get()); // D-by-D
ScopedTestRoot test_root_E(path_2_certs[3].get()); // E-by-E
// Create a chain that contains all the certificate paths possible.
// CertVerifyProcInternalTest.VerifyReturnChainFiltersUnrelatedCerts already
// ensures that it's safe to send additional certificates as inputs, and
// that they're ignored if not necessary.
// This is to avoid relying on AIA or internal object caches when
// interacting with the underlying library.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(
bssl::UpRef(path_1_certs[1]->cert_buffer())); // B-by-C
intermediates.push_back(
bssl::UpRef(path_1_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // C-by-D
intermediates.push_back(
bssl::UpRef(path_2_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // C-by-E
intermediates.push_back(
bssl::UpRef(path_3_certs[1]->cert_buffer())); // B-by-F
intermediates.push_back(
bssl::UpRef(path_3_certs[2]->cert_buffer())); // F-by-E
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(path_1_certs[0]->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
struct TestPermutations {
const char* crlset;
bool expect_valid;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> expected_intermediate;
} kTests[] = {
{"multi-root-crlset-D-and-E.raw", false, nullptr},
{"multi-root-crlset-E.raw", true, path_1_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-CD-and-FE.raw", true, path_2_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-C.raw", true, path_3_certs[2].get()},
{"multi-root-crlset-unrelated.raw", true, nullptr}};
for (const auto& testcase : kTests) {
SCOPED_TRACE(testcase.crlset);
scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set;
std::string crl_set_bytes;
EXPECT_TRUE(base::ReadFileToString(
GetTestCertsDirectory().AppendASCII(testcase.crlset), &crl_set_bytes));
ASSERT_TRUE(CRLSet::Parse(crl_set_bytes, &crl_set));
SetUpCertVerifyProc(crl_set);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (!testcase.expect_valid) {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_NE(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
continue;
}
ASSERT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ASSERT_EQ(0U, verify_result.cert_status);
ASSERT_TRUE(verify_result.verified_cert.get());
if (!testcase.expected_intermediate)
continue;
const auto& verified_intermediates =
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers();
ASSERT_EQ(3U, verified_intermediates.size());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate =
X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(verified_intermediates[1].get()), {});
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate);
EXPECT_TRUE(testcase.expected_intermediate->EqualsExcludingChain(
intermediate.get()))
<< "Expected: " << testcase.expected_intermediate->subject().common_name
<< " issued by " << testcase.expected_intermediate->issuer().common_name
<< "; Got: " << intermediate->subject().common_name << " issued by "
<< intermediate->issuer().common_name;
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityDayPlus5MinutesBeforeNotBefore) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(1) + base::Minutes(5);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(30);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is before certificate's notBefore. Verification should fail.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityDayBeforeNotBefore) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(1);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(30);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is before certificate's notBefore. Verification should fail.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityJustBeforeNotBefore) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() + base::Minutes(5);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(30);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is before certificate's notBefore. Verification should fail.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityJustAfterNotBefore) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() - base::Seconds(1);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() + base::Days(30);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is between notBefore and notAfter. Verification should
// succeed.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityJustBeforeNotAfter) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() - base::Days(30);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() + base::Minutes(5);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is between notBefore and notAfter. Verification should
// succeed.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, ValidityJustAfterNotAfter) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
base::Time not_before = base::Time::Now() - base::Days(30);
base::Time not_after = base::Time::Now() - base::Seconds(1);
leaf->SetValidity(not_before, not_after);
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// Current time is after certificate's notAfter. Verification should fail.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_DATE_INVALID);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, FailedIntermediateSignatureValidation) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Intermediate has no authorityKeyIdentifier. Also remove
// subjectKeyIdentifier from root for good measure.
intermediate->EraseExtension(der::Input(kAuthorityKeyIdentifierOid));
root->EraseExtension(der::Input(kSubjectKeyIdentifierOid));
// Get the chain with the leaf and the intermediate signed by the original
// key of |root|.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
// Generate a new key for root.
root->GenerateECKey();
// Trust the new root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// The intermediate was signed by a different root with a different key but
// with the same name as the trusted one, and the intermediate has no
// authorityKeyIdentifier, so the verifier must try verifying the signature.
// Should fail with AUTHORITY_INVALID.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalTest, FailedTargetSignatureValidation) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Leaf has no authorityKeyIdentifier. Also remove subjectKeyIdentifier from
// intermediate for good measure.
leaf->EraseExtension(der::Input(kAuthorityKeyIdentifierOid));
intermediate->EraseExtension(der::Input(kSubjectKeyIdentifierOid));
// Get a copy of the leaf signed by the original key of intermediate.
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> leaf_wrong_signature = leaf->DupCertBuffer();
// Generate a new key for intermediate.
intermediate->GenerateECKey();
// Make a chain that includes the original leaf with the wrong signature and
// the new intermediate.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(intermediate->DupCertBuffer());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(leaf_wrong_signature), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert.get());
// Trust the root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(cert.get(), "www.example.com", flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
// The leaf was signed by a different intermediate with a different key but
// with the same name as the one in the chain, and the leaf has no
// authorityKeyIdentifier, so the verifier must try verifying the signature.
// Should fail with AUTHORITY_INVALID.
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_AUTHORITY_INVALID);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
class CertVerifyProcNameNormalizationTest : public CertVerifyProcInternalTest {
protected:
std::string HistogramName() const {
std::string prefix("Net.CertVerifier.NameNormalizationPrivateRoots.");
switch (verify_proc_type()) {
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID:
return prefix + "Android";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS:
return prefix + "IOS";
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN:
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS:
return prefix + "Builtin";
}
}
void ExpectNormalizationHistogram(int verify_error) {
if (verify_error == OK) {
histograms_.ExpectUniqueSample(
HistogramName(), CertVerifyProc::NameNormalizationResult::kNormalized,
1);
} else {
histograms_.ExpectTotalCount(HistogramName(), 0);
}
}
void ExpectByteEqualHistogram() {
histograms_.ExpectUniqueSample(
HistogramName(), CertVerifyProc::NameNormalizationResult::kByteEqual,
1);
}
private:
base::HistogramTester histograms_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcNameNormalizationTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
// Tries to verify a chain where the leaf's issuer CN is PrintableString, while
// the intermediate's subject CN is UTF8String, and verifies the proper
// histogram is logged.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcNameNormalizationTest, StringType) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
std::string issuer_cn = CertBuilder::MakeRandomHexString(12);
leaf->SetIssuerTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
issuer_cn, CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING));
intermediate->SetSubjectTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
issuer_cn, CBS_ASN1_UTF8STRING));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf->GetX509CertificateChain().get(), "www.example.com",
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
switch (verify_proc_type()) {
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS:
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
break;
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID:
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN:
case CERT_VERIFY_PROC_BUILTIN_CHROME_ROOTS:
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
break;
}
ExpectNormalizationHistogram(error);
}
// Tries to verify a chain where the leaf's issuer CN and intermediate's
// subject CN are both PrintableString but have differing case on the first
// character, and verifies the proper histogram is logged.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcNameNormalizationTest, CaseFolding) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
std::string issuer_hex = CertBuilder::MakeRandomHexString(12);
leaf->SetIssuerTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
"Z" + issuer_hex, CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING));
intermediate->SetSubjectTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
"z" + issuer_hex, CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf->GetX509CertificateChain().get(), "www.example.com",
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ExpectNormalizationHistogram(error);
}
// Confirms that a chain generated by the same pattern as the other
// NameNormalizationTest cases which does not require normalization validates
// ok, and that the ByteEqual histogram is logged.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcNameNormalizationTest, ByteEqual) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
std::string issuer_hex = CertBuilder::MakeRandomHexString(12);
leaf->SetIssuerTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
issuer_hex, CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING));
intermediate->SetSubjectTLV(CertBuilder::BuildNameWithCommonNameOfType(
issuer_hex, CBS_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING));
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(leaf->GetX509CertificateChain().get(), "www.example.com",
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
ExpectByteEqualHistogram();
}
std::string Md5WithRSAEncryption() {
const uint8_t kMd5WithRSAEncryption[] = {0x30, 0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a,
0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d,
0x01, 0x01, 0x04, 0x05, 0x00};
return std::string(std::begin(kMd5WithRSAEncryption),
std::end(kMd5WithRSAEncryption));
}
// This is the same as CertVerifyProcInternalTest, but it additionally sets up
// networking capabilities for the cert verifiers, and a test server that can be
// used to serve mock responses for AIA/OCSP/CRL.
//
// An actual HTTP test server is used rather than simply mocking the network
// layer, since the certificate fetching networking layer is not mockable for
// all of the cert verifier implementations.
//
// The approach taken in this test fixture is to generate certificates
// on the fly so they use randomly chosen URLs, subjects, and serial
// numbers, in order to defeat global caching effects from the platform
// verifiers. Moreover, the AIA needs to be chosen dynamically since the
// test server's port number cannot be known statically.
class CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest
: public CertVerifyProcInternalTest {
protected:
CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest()
: task_environment_(
base::test::TaskEnvironment::MainThreadType::DEFAULT) {}
void SetUp() override {
// Create a network thread to be used for network fetches, and wait for
// initialization to complete on that thread.
base::Thread::Options options(base::MessagePumpType::IO, 0);
network_thread_ = std::make_unique<base::Thread>("network_thread");
CHECK(network_thread_->StartWithOptions(std::move(options)));
base::WaitableEvent initialization_complete_event(
base::WaitableEvent::ResetPolicy::MANUAL,
base::WaitableEvent::InitialState::NOT_SIGNALED);
network_thread_->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE,
base::BindOnce(&SetUpOnNetworkThread, &context_, &cert_net_fetcher_,
&initialization_complete_event));
initialization_complete_event.Wait();
EXPECT_TRUE(cert_net_fetcher_);
CertVerifyProcInternalTest::SetUp();
EXPECT_FALSE(test_server_.Started());
// Register a single request handler with the EmbeddedTestServer, that in
// turn dispatches to the internally managed registry of request handlers.
//
// This allows registering subsequent handlers dynamically during the course
// of the test, since EmbeddedTestServer requires its handlers be registered
// prior to Start().
test_server_.RegisterRequestHandler(base::BindRepeating(
&CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest::DispatchToRequestHandler,
base::Unretained(this)));
EXPECT_TRUE(test_server_.Start());
}
void SetUpCertVerifyProc(scoped_refptr<CRLSet> crl_set) override {
EXPECT_TRUE(cert_net_fetcher_);
SetUpWithCertNetFetcher(cert_net_fetcher_, std::move(crl_set));
}
void TearDown() override {
// Do cleanup on network thread.
network_thread_->task_runner()->PostTask(
FROM_HERE, base::BindOnce(&ShutdownOnNetworkThread, &context_,
&cert_net_fetcher_));
network_thread_->Stop();
network_thread_.reset();
CertVerifyProcInternalTest::TearDown();
}
// Registers a handler with the test server that responds with the given
// Content-Type, HTTP status code, and response body, for GET requests
// to |path|.
// Returns the full URL to |path| for the current test server.
GURL RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(std::string path,
HttpStatusCode status_code,
std::string content_type,
std::string content) {
GURL handler_url(GetTestServerAbsoluteUrl(path));
base::AutoLock lock(request_handlers_lock_);
request_handlers_.push_back(base::BindRepeating(
&SimpleTestServerHandler, std::move(path), status_code,
std::move(content_type), std::move(content)));
return handler_url;
}
// Returns a random URL path (starting with /) that has the given suffix.
static std::string MakeRandomPath(base::StringPiece suffix) {
return "/" + MakeRandomHexString(12) + std::string(suffix);
}
// Returns a URL to |path| for the current test server.
GURL GetTestServerAbsoluteUrl(const std::string& path) {
return test_server_.GetURL(path);
}
// Creates a certificate chain for www.example.com, where the leaf certificate
// has an AIA URL pointing to the test server.
void CreateSimpleChainWithAIA(
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>* out_leaf,
std::string* ca_issuers_path,
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>* out_intermediate,
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate>* out_root) {
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Make the leaf certificate have an AIA (CA Issuers) that points to the
// embedded test server. This uses a random URL for predictable behavior in
// the presence of global caching.
*ca_issuers_path = MakeRandomPath(".cer");
GURL ca_issuers_url = GetTestServerAbsoluteUrl(*ca_issuers_path);
leaf->SetCaIssuersUrl(ca_issuers_url);
// The chain being verified is solely the leaf certificate (missing the
// intermediate and root).
*out_leaf = leaf->GetX509Certificate();
*out_root = root->GetX509Certificate();
*out_intermediate = intermediate->DupCertBuffer();
}
// Creates a CRL issued and signed by |crl_issuer|, marking |revoked_serials|
// as revoked, and registers it to be served by the test server.
// Returns the full URL to retrieve the CRL from the test server.
GURL CreateAndServeCrl(
CertBuilder* crl_issuer,
const std::vector<uint64_t>& revoked_serials,
absl::optional<SignatureAlgorithm> signature_algorithm = absl::nullopt) {
std::string crl = BuildCrl(crl_issuer->GetSubject(), crl_issuer->GetKey(),
revoked_serials, signature_algorithm);
std::string crl_path = MakeRandomPath(".crl");
return RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(crl_path, HTTP_OK,
"application/pkix-crl", crl);
}
GURL CreateAndServeCrlWithAlgorithmTlvAndDigest(
CertBuilder* crl_issuer,
const std::vector<uint64_t>& revoked_serials,
const std::string& signature_algorithm_tlv,
const EVP_MD* digest) {
std::string crl = BuildCrlWithAlgorithmTlvAndDigest(
crl_issuer->GetSubject(), crl_issuer->GetKey(), revoked_serials,
signature_algorithm_tlv, digest);
std::string crl_path = MakeRandomPath(".crl");
return RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(crl_path, HTTP_OK,
"application/pkix-crl", crl);
}
private:
std::unique_ptr<test_server::HttpResponse> DispatchToRequestHandler(
const test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
// Called on the embedded test server's IO thread.
base::AutoLock lock(request_handlers_lock_);
for (const auto& handler : request_handlers_) {
auto response = handler.Run(request);
if (response)
return response;
}
return nullptr;
}
// Serves (|status_code|, |content_type|, |content|) in response to GET
// requests for |path|.
static std::unique_ptr<test_server::HttpResponse> SimpleTestServerHandler(
const std::string& path,
HttpStatusCode status_code,
const std::string& content_type,
const std::string& content,
const test_server::HttpRequest& request) {
if (request.relative_url != path)
return nullptr;
auto http_response = std::make_unique<test_server::BasicHttpResponse>();
http_response->set_code(status_code);
http_response->set_content_type(content_type);
http_response->set_content(content);
return http_response;
}
static void SetUpOnNetworkThread(
std::unique_ptr<URLRequestContext>* context,
scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcherURLRequest>* cert_net_fetcher,
base::WaitableEvent* initialization_complete_event) {
URLRequestContextBuilder url_request_context_builder;
url_request_context_builder.set_user_agent("cert_verify_proc_unittest/0.1");
url_request_context_builder.set_proxy_config_service(
std::make_unique<ProxyConfigServiceFixed>(ProxyConfigWithAnnotation()));
*context = url_request_context_builder.Build();
*cert_net_fetcher = base::MakeRefCounted<net::CertNetFetcherURLRequest>();
(*cert_net_fetcher)->SetURLRequestContext(context->get());
initialization_complete_event->Signal();
}
static void ShutdownOnNetworkThread(
std::unique_ptr<URLRequestContext>* context,
scoped_refptr<net::CertNetFetcherURLRequest>* cert_net_fetcher) {
(*cert_net_fetcher)->Shutdown();
cert_net_fetcher->reset();
context->reset();
}
base::test::TaskEnvironment task_environment_;
std::unique_ptr<base::Thread> network_thread_;
// Owned by this thread, but initialized, used, and shutdown on the network
// thread.
std::unique_ptr<URLRequestContext> context_;
scoped_refptr<CertNetFetcherURLRequest> cert_net_fetcher_;
EmbeddedTestServer test_server_;
// The list of registered handlers. Can only be accessed when the lock is
// held, as this data is shared between the embedded server's IO thread, and
// the test main thread.
base::Lock request_handlers_lock_;
std::vector<test_server::EmbeddedTestServer::HandleRequestCallback>
request_handlers_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
// Tries verifying a certificate chain that is missing an intermediate. The
// intermediate is available via AIA, however the server responds with a 404.
//
// NOTE: This test is separate from IntermediateFromAia200 as a different URL
// needs to be used to avoid having the result depend on globally cached success
// or failure of the fetch.
// Test is flaky on iOS crbug.com/860189
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia404 DISABLED_IntermediateFromAia404
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia404 IntermediateFromAia404
#endif
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia404) {
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
// Create a chain where the leaf has an AIA that points to test server.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf;
std::string ca_issuers_path;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> intermediate;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root;
CreateSimpleChainWithAIA(&leaf, &ca_issuers_path, &intermediate, &root);
// Serve a 404 for the AIA url.
RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(ca_issuers_path, HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "text/plain",
"Not Found");
// Trust the root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
// The chain being verified is solely the leaf certificate (missing the
// intermediate and root).
ASSERT_EQ(0u, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
const int flags = 0;
int error;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Verifying the chain should fail as the intermediate is missing, and
// cannot be fetched via AIA.
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
#undef MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia404
// Tries verifying a certificate chain that is missing an intermediate. The
// intermediate is available via AIA.
// TODO(crbug.com/860189): Failing on iOS
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Der DISABLED_IntermediateFromAia200Der
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Der IntermediateFromAia200Der
#endif
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Der) {
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
// Create a chain where the leaf has an AIA that points to test server.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf;
std::string ca_issuers_path;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> intermediate;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root;
CreateSimpleChainWithAIA(&leaf, &ca_issuers_path, &intermediate, &root);
// Setup the test server to reply with the correct intermediate.
RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
ca_issuers_path, HTTP_OK, "application/pkix-cert",
std::string(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(intermediate.get())));
// Trust the root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
// The chain being verified is solely the leaf certificate (missing the
// intermediate and root).
ASSERT_EQ(0u, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
// VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES flag is not implemented in
// CertVerifyProcIOS, only test it on other verifiers.
if (verify_proc_type() != CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS) {
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// If VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES is specified, AIA should not be
// attempted and verifying the chain should fail since the intermediate
// can't be found.
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), kHostname,
CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(0u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
}
{
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Verifying the chain should succeed as the missing intermediate can be
// fetched via AIA.
int error = Verify(leaf.get(), kHostname, /*flags=*/0, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
}
// This test is the same as IntermediateFromAia200Der, except the certificate is
// served as PEM rather than DER.
//
// Tries verifying a certificate chain that is missing an intermediate. The
// intermediate is available via AIA, however is served as a PEM file rather
// than DER.
// TODO(crbug.com/860189): Failing on iOS
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem DISABLED_IntermediateFromAia200Pem
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem IntermediateFromAia200Pem
#endif
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem) {
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
// Create a chain where the leaf has an AIA that points to test server.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf;
std::string ca_issuers_path;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> intermediate;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root;
CreateSimpleChainWithAIA(&leaf, &ca_issuers_path, &intermediate, &root);
std::string intermediate_pem;
ASSERT_TRUE(
X509Certificate::GetPEMEncoded(intermediate.get(), &intermediate_pem));
// Setup the test server to reply with the correct intermediate.
RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
ca_issuers_path, HTTP_OK, "application/x-x509-ca-cert", intermediate_pem);
// Trust the root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
// The chain being verified is solely the leaf certificate (missing the
// intermediate and root).
ASSERT_EQ(0u, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
const int flags = 0;
int error;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Verifying the chain should succeed as the missing intermediate can be
// fetched via AIA.
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
// Android doesn't support PEM - https://crbug.com/725180
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
}
// This test is the same as IntermediateFromAia200Pem, but with a different
// formatting on the PEM data.
//
// TODO(crbug.com/860189): Failing on iOS
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_IOS)
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem2 DISABLED_IntermediateFromAia200Pem2
#else
#define MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem2 IntermediateFromAia200Pem2
#endif
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
MAYBE_IntermediateFromAia200Pem2) {
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
// Create a chain where the leaf has an AIA that points to test server.
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> leaf;
std::string ca_issuers_path;
bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> intermediate;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root;
CreateSimpleChainWithAIA(&leaf, &ca_issuers_path, &intermediate, &root);
std::string intermediate_pem;
ASSERT_TRUE(
X509Certificate::GetPEMEncoded(intermediate.get(), &intermediate_pem));
intermediate_pem = "Text at start of file\n" + intermediate_pem;
// Setup the test server to reply with the correct intermediate.
RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
ca_issuers_path, HTTP_OK, "application/x-x509-ca-cert", intermediate_pem);
// Trust the root certificate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root.get());
// The chain being verified is solely the leaf certificate (missing the
// intermediate and root).
ASSERT_EQ(0u, leaf->intermediate_buffers().size());
const int flags = 0;
int error;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Verifying the chain should succeed as the missing intermediate can be
// fetched via AIA.
error =
Verify(leaf.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
// Android doesn't support PEM - https://crbug.com/725180
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
}
}
// Tries verifying a certificate chain that uses a SHA1 intermediate,
// however, chasing the AIA can discover a SHA256 version of the intermediate.
//
// Path building should discover the stronger intermediate and use it.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
Sha1IntermediateButAIAHasSha256) {
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Make the leaf certificate have an AIA (CA Issuers) that points to the
// embedded test server. This uses a random URL for predictable behavior in
// the presence of global caching.
std::string ca_issuers_path = MakeRandomPath(".cer");
GURL ca_issuers_url = GetTestServerAbsoluteUrl(ca_issuers_path);
leaf->SetCaIssuersUrl(ca_issuers_url);
leaf->SetSubjectAltName(kHostname);
// Make two versions of the intermediate - one that is SHA256 signed, and one
// that is SHA1 signed. Note that the subjectKeyIdentifier for `intermediate`
// is intentionally not changed, so that path building will consider both
// certificate paths.
intermediate->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha256);
intermediate->SetRandomSerialNumber();
auto intermediate_sha256 = intermediate->DupCertBuffer();
intermediate->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha1);
intermediate->SetRandomSerialNumber();
auto intermediate_sha1 = intermediate->DupCertBuffer();
// Trust the root certificate.
auto root_cert = root->GetX509Certificate();
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root_cert.get());
// Setup the test server to reply with the SHA256 intermediate.
RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
ca_issuers_path, HTTP_OK, "application/pkix-cert",
std::string(
x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(intermediate_sha256.get())));
// Build a chain to verify that includes the SHA1 intermediate.
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(intermediate_sha1.get()));
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain_sha1 = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
leaf->DupCertBuffer(), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(chain_sha1.get());
const int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = Verify(chain_sha1.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Should have built a chain through the SHA256 intermediate. This was only
// available via AIA, and not the (SHA1) one provided directly to path
// building.
ASSERT_EQ(2u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
EXPECT_TRUE(x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(
verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers()[0].get(),
intermediate_sha256.get()));
ASSERT_EQ(2u, verify_result.verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.has_sha1);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_NE(OK, error);
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID &&
error == ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID) {
// Newer Android versions reject the chain due to the SHA1 intermediate,
// but do not build the correct chain by AIA. Since only the partial
// chain is returned, CertVerifyProc does not mark it as SHA1 as it does
// not examine the last cert in the chain. Therefore, if
// ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID is returned, don't check the rest of the
// statuses. See https://crbug.com/1191795.
return;
}
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.has_sha1);
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest, RevocationHardFailNoCrls) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
// Create certs which have no AIA or CRL distribution points.
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailNoCrlsDisableNetworkFetches) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
// Create certs which have no AIA or CRL distribution points.
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with flags for both hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors
// and disabling network fetches.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS |
CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should succeed, VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES takes priority.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL hard fail test where both leaf and intermediate are covered by valid
// CRLs which have empty (non-present) revokedCertificates list. Verification
// should succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailCrlGoodNoRevokedCertificates) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Serve an intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should pass, leaf and intermediate were covered by CRLs and were not
// revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL hard fail test where both leaf and intermediate are covered by valid
// CRLs which have revokedCertificates lists that revoke other irrelevant
// serial numbers. Verification should succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailCrlGoodIrrelevantSerialsRevoked) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL revokes leaf's serial number. This is irrelevant.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Intermediate-issued CRL revokes intermediates's serial number. This is
// irrelevant.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {intermediate->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should pass, leaf and intermediate were covered by CRLs and were not
// revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailLeafRevokedByCrl) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Leaf is revoked by intermediate issued CRL.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail, leaf is revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailIntermediateRevokedByCrl) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Intermediate is revoked by root issued CRL.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {intermediate->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail, intermediate is revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL hard fail test where the intermediate certificate has a good CRL, but
// the leaf's distribution point returns an http error. Verification should
// fail.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailLeafCrlDpHttpError) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Serve a 404 for the intermediate-issued CRL distribution point url.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
MakeRandomPath(".crl"), HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "text/plain", "Not Found"));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail since no revocation information was available for the leaf.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL hard fail test where the leaf certificate has a good CRL, but
// the intermediate's distribution point returns an http error. Verification
// should fail.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationHardFailIntermediateCrlDpHttpError) {
if (!SupportsRevCheckingRequiredLocalAnchors()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a 404 for the root-issued CRL distribution point url.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
MakeRandomPath(".crl"), HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "text/plain", "Not Found"));
// Serve an intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with hard-fail revocation checking for local anchors.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_REQUIRED_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail since no revocation information was available for the
// intermediate.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest, RevocationSoftFailNoCrls) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
// Create certs which have no AIA or CRL distribution points.
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_NO_REVOCATION_MECHANISM);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status &
CERT_STATUS_UNABLE_TO_CHECK_REVOCATION);
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL soft fail test where both leaf and intermediate are covered by valid
// CRLs which have empty (non-present) revokedCertificates list. Verification
// should succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailCrlGoodNoRevokedCertificates) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Serve an intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL soft fail test where both leaf and intermediate are covered by valid
// CRLs which have revokedCertificates lists that revoke other irrelevant
// serial numbers. Verification should succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailCrlGoodIrrelevantSerialsRevoked) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL revokes leaf's serial number. This is irrelevant.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Intermediate-issued CRL revokes intermediates's serial number. This is
// irrelevant.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {intermediate->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailLeafRevokedByCrl) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Leaf is revoked by intermediate issued CRL.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail, leaf is revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailLeafRevokedByCrlDisableNetworkFetches) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Leaf is revoked by intermediate issued CRL.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with flags for both soft-fail revocation checking and disabling
// network fetches.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED |
CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should succeed, VERIFY_DISABLE_NETWORK_FETCHES takes priority.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailIntermediateRevokedByCrl) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Intermediate is revoked by root issued CRL.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {intermediate->GetSerialNumber()}));
// Intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail, intermediate is revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailLeafRevokedBySha1Crl) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Leaf is revoked by intermediate issued CRL which is signed with
// ecdsaWithSha256.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(
CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()},
SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha1));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should fail, leaf is revoked.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_REVOKED));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailLeafRevokedByMd5Crl) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// This test wants to check handling of MD5 CRLs, but ecdsa-with-md5
// signatureAlgorithm does not exist. Use an RSA private key for intermediate
// so that the CRL will be signed with the md5WithRSAEncryption algorithm.
intermediate->GenerateRSAKey();
leaf->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kRsaPkcs1Sha256);
// Leaf is revoked by intermediate issued CRL which is signed with
// md5WithRSAEncryption.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrlWithAlgorithmTlvAndDigest(
intermediate.get(), {leaf->GetSerialNumber()}, Md5WithRSAEncryption(),
EVP_md5()));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Verification should succeed: MD5 signature algorithm is not supported
// and soft-fail checking will ignore the inability to get revocation
// status.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL soft fail test where the intermediate certificate has a good CRL, but
// the leaf's distribution point returns an http error. Verification should
// succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailLeafCrlDpHttpError) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a root-issued CRL which does not revoke intermediate.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(root.get(), {}));
// Serve a 404 for the intermediate-issued CRL distribution point url.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
MakeRandomPath(".crl"), HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "text/plain", "Not Found"));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should succeed due to soft-fail revocation checking.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// CRL soft fail test where the leaf certificate has a good CRL, but
// the intermediate's distribution point returns an http error. Verification
// should succeed.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
RevocationSoftFailIntermediateCrlDpHttpError) {
if (!SupportsSoftFailRevChecking()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as verifier doesn't support "
"VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED";
return;
}
const char kHostname[] = "www.example.com";
auto [leaf, intermediate, root] = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain3();
// Serve a 404 for the root-issued CRL distribution point url.
intermediate->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(RegisterSimpleTestServerHandler(
MakeRandomPath(".crl"), HTTP_NOT_FOUND, "text/plain", "Not Found"));
// Serve an intermediate-issued CRL which does not revoke leaf.
leaf->SetCrlDistributionPointUrl(CreateAndServeCrl(intermediate.get(), {}));
// Trust the root and build a chain to verify that includes the intermediate.
ScopedTestRoot scoped_root(root->GetX509Certificate().get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = leaf->GetX509CertificateChain();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Verify with soft-fail revocation checking.
const int flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
Verify(chain.get(), kHostname, flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
// Should succeed due to soft-fail revocation checking.
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// Tests that an EV cert verification with successful online OCSP revocation
// checks is marked as CERT_STATUS_IS_EV.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
EVOnlineOCSPRevocationCheckingGood) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
EmbeddedTestServer::ServerCertificateConfig cert_config;
cert_config.policy_oids = {kEVTestCertPolicy};
cert_config.ocsp_config = EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig(
{{OCSPRevocationStatus::GOOD,
EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig::SingleResponse::Date::kValid}});
EmbeddedTestServer ocsp_test_server(EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS);
ocsp_test_server.SetSSLConfig(cert_config);
EXPECT_TRUE(ocsp_test_server.Start());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = ocsp_test_server.GetCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Consider the root of the test chain a valid EV root for the test policy.
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(root->cert_buffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), ocsp_test_server.host_port_pair().host(),
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// Tests that an EV cert verification with that could not retrieve online OCSP
// revocation information is verified but still marked as CERT_STATUS_IS_EV.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
EVOnlineOCSPRevocationCheckingSoftFail) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
EmbeddedTestServer::ServerCertificateConfig cert_config;
cert_config.policy_oids = {kEVTestCertPolicy};
// Retrieving OCSP status returns an error.
cert_config.ocsp_config = EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig(
EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig::ResponseType::kInternalError);
EmbeddedTestServer ocsp_test_server(EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS);
ocsp_test_server.SetSSLConfig(cert_config);
EXPECT_TRUE(ocsp_test_server.Start());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = ocsp_test_server.GetCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Consider the root of the test chain a valid EV root for the test policy.
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(root->cert_buffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), ocsp_test_server.host_port_pair().host(),
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// Tests that an EV cert verification with online OCSP returning affirmatively
// revoked is marked as CERT_STATUS_IS_EV.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcInternalWithNetFetchingTest,
EVOnlineOCSPRevocationCheckingRevoked) {
if (!SupportsEV()) {
LOG(INFO) << "Skipping test as EV verification is not yet supported";
return;
}
const char kEVTestCertPolicy[] = "1.2.3.4";
EmbeddedTestServer::ServerCertificateConfig cert_config;
cert_config.policy_oids = {kEVTestCertPolicy};
cert_config.ocsp_config = EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig(
{{OCSPRevocationStatus::REVOKED,
EmbeddedTestServer::OCSPConfig::SingleResponse::Date::kValid}});
EmbeddedTestServer ocsp_test_server(EmbeddedTestServer::TYPE_HTTPS);
ocsp_test_server.SetSSLConfig(cert_config);
EXPECT_TRUE(ocsp_test_server.Start());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root =
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "root_ca_cert.pem");
ASSERT_TRUE(root.get());
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> chain = ocsp_test_server.GetCertificate();
ASSERT_TRUE(chain.get());
// Consider the root of the test chain a valid EV root for the test policy.
ScopedTestEVPolicy scoped_test_ev_policy(
EVRootCAMetadata::GetInstance(),
X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256(root->cert_buffer()),
kEVTestCertPolicy);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
int error = Verify(chain.get(), ocsp_test_server.host_port_pair().host(),
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_IS_EV);
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_REV_CHECKING_ENABLED);
}
// A set of tests that check how various constraints are enforced when they
// appear at different points in the chain, such as on the trust anchor versus
// on intermediates.
class CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest : public CertVerifyProcInternalTest {
protected:
void SetUp() override {
CertVerifyProcInternalTest::SetUp();
chain_ = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain(/*chain_length=*/4);
}
int VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust trust) {
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_.back()->GetX509Certificate().get(), trust);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
return CertVerifyProcInternalTest::Verify(
chain_.front()->GetX509CertificateChain().get(), "www.example.com",
flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result);
}
int Verify() { return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor()); }
int VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints() {
return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor()
.WithEnforceAnchorExpiry()
.WithEnforceAnchorConstraints());
}
int VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints() {
return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor()
.WithEnforceAnchorExpiry()
.WithEnforceAnchorConstraints()
.WithRequireAnchorBasicConstraints());
}
int ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError() {
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID)
return ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID;
return ERR_CERT_INVALID;
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<CertBuilder>> chain_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BaseCase) {
// Without changing anything on the test chain, it should validate
// successfully. If this is not true then the rest of the tests in this class
// are unlikely to be useful.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()),
IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotCaRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/false, /*path_len=*/-1);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotCaIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/false, /*path_len=*/-1);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsIsCaLeaf) {
for (bool has_key_usage_cert_sign : {false, true}) {
chain_[0]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/-1);
if (has_key_usage_cert_sign) {
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
} else {
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
}
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsPathlen0Root) {
chain_[3]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/0);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (VerifyProcTypeIsIOSAtMostOS14() ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsPathlen1Root) {
chain_[3]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/1);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (VerifyProcTypeIsIOSAtMostOS14() ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsPathlen2Root) {
chain_[3]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/2);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest,
BasicConstraintsPathlen0IntermediateParent) {
chain_[2]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/0);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest,
BasicConstraintsPathlen1IntermediateParent) {
chain_[2]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/1);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest,
BasicConstraintsPathlen0IntermediateChild) {
chain_[1]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/0);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotPresentRoot) {
chain_[3]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kBasicConstraintsOid));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotPresentRootX509V1) {
chain_[3]->SetCertificateVersion(CertificateVersion::V1);
chain_[3]->ClearExtensions();
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotPresentIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kBasicConstraintsOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, BasicConstraintsNotPresentLeaf) {
chain_[0]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kBasicConstraintsOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, NameConstraintsNotMatchingRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.org"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, NameConstraintsNotMatchingIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(
/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.org"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, NameConstraintsMatchingRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.com"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, NameConstraintsMatchingIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(
/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.com"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, NameConstraintsOnLeaf) {
chain_[0]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(
/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.com"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
// TODO(mattm): this should be an error
// RFC 5280 4.2.1.10 says: "The name constraints extension, which MUST be
// used only in a CA certificate, ..."
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ValidityExpiredRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() - base::Days(14),
base::Time::Now() - base::Days(7));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ValidityNotYetValidRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() + base::Days(7),
base::Time::Now() + base::Days(14));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ValidityExpiredIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() - base::Days(14),
base::Time::Now() - base::Days(7));
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ValidityNotYetValidIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() + base::Days(7),
base::Time::Now() + base::Days(14));
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints0Root) {
for (bool leaf_has_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(leaf_has_policy);
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.4.5";
static const char kPolicy3[] = "1.2.3.5";
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1, kPolicy2});
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy3, kPolicy1});
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
if (leaf_has_policy) {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
} else {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints4Root) {
// Explicit policy is required after 4 certs. Since the chain is 4 certs
// long, an explicit policy is never required.
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/4,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints3Root) {
// Explicit policy is required after 3 certs. Since the chain is 4 certs
// long, an explicit policy is required and the chain should fail if anchor
// constraints are enforced.
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/3,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
// Windows seems to have an off-by-one error in how it enforces
// requireExplicitPolicy.
// (The mac/android verifiers are Ok here since they don't enforce
// policyConstraints on anchors.)
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints2Root) {
// Explicit policy is required after 2 certs. Since the chain is 4 certs
// long, an explicit policy is required and the chain should fail if anchor
// constraints are enforced.
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/2,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
// This is also a regression test for https://crbug.com/31497: If an
// intermediate has requireExplicitPolicy in its policyConstraints extension,
// verification should still succeed as long as some policy is valid for the
// chain, since Chrome does not specify any required policy as an input to
// certificate verification (allows anyPolicy).
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints0Intermediate) {
for (bool leaf_has_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(leaf_has_policy);
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.4.5";
static const char kPolicy3[] = "1.2.3.5";
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1, kPolicy2});
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy3, kPolicy1});
if (leaf_has_policy) {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
} else {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints3Intermediate) {
// Explicit policy is required after 3 certs. Since the chain up to
// |chain_[2]| is 3 certs long, an explicit policy is never required.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/3,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints2Intermediate) {
// Explicit policy is required after 2 certs. Since the chain up to
// |chain_[2]| is 3 certs long, an explicit policy will be required and this
// should fail to verify.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/2,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints1Intermediate) {
// Explicit policy is required after 1 cert. Since the chain up to
// |chain_[2]| is 3 certs long, an explicit policy will be required and this
// should fail to verify.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/1,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyConstraints0Leaf) {
// Setting requireExplicitPolicy to 0 on the target certificate should make
// an explicit policy required for the chain. (Ref: RFC 5280 section 6.1.5.b
// and the final paragraph of 6.1.5)
chain_[0]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitPolicyMapping0Root) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.5";
// Root inhibits policy mapping immediately.
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/absl::nullopt,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/0);
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
// Intermediate uses policy mappings. This should not be allowed if the root
// constraints were enforced.
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[2]->SetPolicyMappings({{kPolicy1, kPolicy2}});
// Children require the policy mapping to have a valid policy.
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
// Windows enforces inhibitPolicyMapping on the root.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitPolicyMapping1Root) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.5";
// Root inhibits policy mapping after 1 cert.
chain_[3]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/absl::nullopt,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/1);
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
// Intermediate uses policy mappings. This should be allowed even if the root
// constraints were enforced, since policy mapping was allowed for 1 cert
// following the root.
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[2]->SetPolicyMappings({{kPolicy1, kPolicy2}});
// Children require the policy mapping to have a valid policy.
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitAnyPolicy0Root) {
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
// Since inhibitAnyPolicy is 0, anyPolicy should not be allow for any certs
// after the root.
chain_[3]->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(0);
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
// This intermediate only asserts anyPolicy, so this chain should
// be invalid if policyConstraints from the root cert are enforced.
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitAnyPolicy1Root) {
for (bool chain_1_has_any_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(chain_1_has_any_policy);
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
// Since inhibitAnyPolicy is 1, anyPolicy should be allowed for the root's
// immediate child, but not after that.
chain_[3]->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(1);
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
// AnyPolicy should be allowed in this cert.
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
if (chain_1_has_any_policy) {
// AnyPolicy should not be allowed in this cert if the inhibitAnyPolicy
// constraint from the root is honored.
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
} else {
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitAnyPolicy0Intermediate) {
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
chain_[2]->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(0);
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
// This shouldn't be allowed as the parent cert set inhibitAnyPolicy=0.
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, InhibitAnyPolicy1Intermediate) {
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
chain_[2]->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(1);
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
// This is okay as the parent cert set inhibitAnyPolicy=1.
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PoliciesRoot) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.5";
for (bool root_has_matching_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(root_has_matching_policy);
if (root_has_matching_policy) {
// This chain should be valid whether or not policies from the root are
// processed.
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
} else {
// If the policies from the root are processed, this chain will not be
// valid for any policy.
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
}
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
if (root_has_matching_policy) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
} else {
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, PolicyMappingsRoot) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
static const char kPolicy2[] = "1.2.3.5";
static const char kPolicy3[] = "1.2.3.6";
for (bool root_has_matching_policy_mapping : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(root_has_matching_policy_mapping);
if (root_has_matching_policy_mapping) {
// This chain should be valid if the policies and policy mapping on the
// root are processed, or if neither is processed. It will not be valid
// if the policies were processed and the policyMappings were not.
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
chain_[3]->SetPolicyMappings({{kPolicy1, kPolicy2}});
} else {
// This chain should not be valid if the policies and policyMappings on
// the root were processed. It will be valid if the policies were
// processed and policyMappings were not.
chain_[3]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
chain_[3]->SetPolicyMappings({{kPolicy2, kPolicy3}});
}
// Policy constraints are specified on an intermediate so that an explicit
// policy will be required regardless if root constraints are applied.
chain_[2]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[2]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
chain_[1]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy2});
if (root_has_matching_policy_mapping) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
} else {
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNoCertSignRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNotPresentRoot) {
chain_[3]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kKeyUsageOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNoCertSignIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNotPresentIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kKeyUsageOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNoDigitalSignatureLeaf) {
// This test is mostly uninteresting since keyUsage on the end-entity is only
// checked at the TLS layer, not during cert verification.
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageNotPresentLeaf) {
// This test is mostly uninteresting since keyUsage on the end-entity is only
// checked at the TLS layer, not during cert verification.
chain_[0]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kKeyUsageOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, KeyUsageCertSignLeaf) {
// Test a leaf that has keyUsage asserting keyCertSign and basicConstraints
// asserting CA=false. This should be an error according to 5280 section
// 4.2.1.3 and 4.2.1.9, however most implementations seem to allow it.
// Perhaps because 5280 section 6 does not explicitly say to enforce this on
// the target cert.
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ExtendedKeyUsageNoServerAuthRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kCodeSigning)});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ExtendedKeyUsageServerAuthRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kServerAuth)});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest,
ExtendedKeyUsageNoServerAuthIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kCodeSigning)});
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID ||
VerifyProcTypeIsIOSAtMostOS15()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ExtendedKeyUsageServerAuthIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kServerAuth)});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, ExtendedKeyUsageNoServerAuthLeaf) {
chain_[0]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kCodeSigning)});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownSignatureAlgorithmRoot) {
chain_[3]->SetSignatureAlgorithmTLV(TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV());
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownSignatureAlgorithmIntermediate) {
chain_[2]->SetSignatureAlgorithmTLV(TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV());
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownSignatureAlgorithmLeaf) {
chain_[0]->SetSignatureAlgorithmTLV(TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV());
if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownExtensionRoot) {
for (bool critical : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(critical);
chain_[3]->SetExtension(TestOid0(), "hello world", critical);
if (critical) {
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndFullConstraints(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS ||
verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_ANDROID) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithExpiryAndConstraints(), IsOk());
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownExtensionIntermediate) {
for (bool critical : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(critical);
chain_[2]->SetExtension(TestOid0(), "hello world", critical);
if (critical) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTest, UnknownExtensionLeaf) {
for (bool critical : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(critical);
chain_[0]->SetExtension(TestOid0(), "hello world", critical);
if (critical) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ExpectedIntermediateConstraintError()));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
// A set of tests that check how various constraints are enforced when they
// are applied to a directly trusted non-self-signed leaf certificate.
class CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest
: public CertVerifyProcInternalTest {
protected:
void SetUp() override {
CertVerifyProcInternalTest::SetUp();
chain_ = CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain(/*chain_length=*/2);
}
int VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust trust) {
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[0]->GetX509Certificate().get(), trust);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
return CertVerifyProcInternalTest::Verify(
chain_.front()->GetX509Certificate().get(), "www.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
}
int Verify() { return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor()); }
int VerifyAsTrustedLeaf() {
return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf());
}
std::vector<std::unique_ptr<CertBuilder>> chain_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, BaseCase) {
// Without changing anything on the test chain, it should validate
// successfully. If this is not true then the rest of the tests in this class
// are unlikely to be useful.
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()),
IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(
VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf().WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, RootAlsoTrusted) {
// Test verifying a chain where both the leaf and the root are marked as
// trusted.
// (Repeating the ScopedTestRoot before each call is due to the limitation
// with destroying any ScopedTestRoot removing all test roots.)
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root1(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
// An explicit trust entry for the leaf with a value of Unspecified
// should be no different than the leaf not being in the trust store at
// all.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForUnspecified()), IsOk());
}
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root1(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
// If the leaf is explicitly distrusted, verification should fail even if
// the root is trusted.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForDistrusted()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
}
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()),
IsOk());
}
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
EXPECT_THAT(
VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf().WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsOk());
}
{
ScopedTestRoot test_root(chain_[1]->GetX509Certificate().get());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, BasicConstraintsIsCa) {
for (bool has_key_usage_cert_sign : {false, true}) {
chain_[0]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/-1);
if (has_key_usage_cert_sign) {
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
} else {
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
}
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, BasicConstraintsPathlen) {
chain_[0]->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/false, /*path_len=*/0);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, BasicConstraintsMissing) {
chain_[0]->EraseExtension(der::Input(kBasicConstraintsOid));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, NameConstraintsNotMatching) {
chain_[0]->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.org"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, ValidityExpired) {
chain_[0]->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() - base::Days(14),
base::Time::Now() - base::Days(7));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, PolicyConstraints) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
for (bool leaf_has_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(leaf_has_policy);
chain_[0]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
if (leaf_has_policy) {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
} else {
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({});
}
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
// Succeeds since the ios/android verifiers appear to not enforce
// this constraint in the "directly trusted leaf" case.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, InhibitAnyPolicy) {
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
chain_[0]->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
chain_[0]->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(0);
chain_[0]->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, KeyUsageNoDigitalSignature) {
// This test is mostly uninteresting since keyUsage on the end-entity is only
// checked at the TLS layer, not during cert verification.
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, KeyUsageCertSignLeaf) {
// Test a leaf that has keyUsage asserting keyCertSign with basicConstraints
// CA=false, which is an error according to 5280 (4.2.1.3 and 4.2.1.9).
chain_[0]->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, ExtendedKeyUsageNoServerAuth) {
chain_[0]->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kCodeSigning)});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, UnknownSignatureAlgorithm) {
chain_[0]->SetSignatureAlgorithmTLV(TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Since no chain is found, signature is not checked, fails with generic
// error for untrusted chain.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
// Valid since signature on directly trusted leaf is not checked.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, WeakSignatureAlgorithm) {
chain_[0]->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha1);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Since no chain is found, signature is not checked, fails with generic
// error for untrusted chain.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
// Valid since signature on directly trusted leaf is not checked.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
// Cert is not self-signed so directly trusted leaf with
// require_leaf_selfsigned should fail.
EXPECT_THAT(
VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf().WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
} else if (verify_proc_type() == CERT_VERIFY_PROC_IOS) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedLeafTest, UnknownExtension) {
for (bool critical : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(critical);
chain_[0]->SetExtension(TestOid0(), "hello world", critical);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
if (critical) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
// A set of tests that check how various constraints are enforced when they
// are applied to a directly trusted self-signed leaf certificate.
class CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest
: public CertVerifyProcInternalTest {
protected:
void SetUp() override {
CertVerifyProcInternalTest::SetUp();
cert_ = std::move(CertBuilder::CreateSimpleChain(/*chain_length=*/1)[0]);
}
int VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust trust) {
ScopedTestRoot test_root(cert_->GetX509Certificate().get(), trust);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int flags = 0;
return CertVerifyProcInternalTest::Verify(
cert_->GetX509Certificate().get(), "www.example.com", flags,
CertificateList(), &verify_result);
}
int Verify() { return VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor()); }
int VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf() {
return VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf().WithRequireLeafSelfSigned());
}
std::unique_ptr<CertBuilder> cert_;
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(All,
CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kAllCertVerifiers),
VerifyProcTypeToName);
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, BaseCase) {
// Without changing anything on the test cert, it should validate
// successfully. If this is not true then the rest of the tests in this class
// are unlikely to be useful.
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Should succeed when verified as a trusted leaf.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf()), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()),
IsOk());
// Should also be allowed by verifying as anchor for itself.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
// Should fail if verified as anchor of itself with constraints enabled,
// enforcing the basicConstraints on the anchor will fail since the cert
// has CA=false.
EXPECT_THAT(
VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor().WithEnforceAnchorConstraints()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
// Should be allowed since it will be evaluated as a trusted leaf, so
// anchor constraints being enabled doesn't matter.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithEnforceAnchorConstraints()),
IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, BasicConstraintsIsCa) {
for (bool has_key_usage_cert_sign : {false, true}) {
cert_->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/-1);
if (has_key_usage_cert_sign) {
cert_->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
} else {
cert_->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
}
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
BasicConstraintsNotCaPathlen) {
cert_->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/false, /*path_len=*/0);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
BasicConstraintsIsCaPathlen) {
cert_->SetBasicConstraints(/*is_ca=*/true, /*path_len=*/0);
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
BasicConstraintsMissing) {
cert_->EraseExtension(der::Input(kBasicConstraintsOid));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
NameConstraintsNotMatching) {
cert_->SetNameConstraintsDnsNames(/*permitted_dns_names=*/{"example.org"},
/*excluded_dns_names=*/{});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, ValidityExpired) {
cert_->SetValidity(base::Time::Now() - base::Days(14),
base::Time::Now() - base::Days(7));
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_DATE_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, PolicyConstraints) {
static const char kPolicy1[] = "1.2.3.4";
for (bool leaf_has_policy : {false, true}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(leaf_has_policy);
cert_->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
if (leaf_has_policy) {
cert_->SetCertificatePolicies({kPolicy1});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
} else {
cert_->SetCertificatePolicies({});
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, InhibitAnyPolicy) {
static const char kAnyPolicy[] = "2.5.29.32.0";
cert_->SetPolicyConstraints(
/*require_explicit_policy=*/0,
/*inhibit_policy_mapping=*/absl::nullopt);
cert_->SetInhibitAnyPolicy(0);
cert_->SetCertificatePolicies({kAnyPolicy});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
KeyUsageNoDigitalSignature) {
// This test is mostly uninteresting since keyUsage on the end-entity is only
// checked at the TLS layer, not during cert verification.
cert_->SetKeyUsages({KEY_USAGE_BIT_CRL_SIGN});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, KeyUsageCertSignLeaf) {
// Test a leaf that has keyUsage asserting keyCertSign with basicConstraints
// CA=false, which is an error according to 5280 (4.2.1.3 and 4.2.1.9).
cert_->SetKeyUsages(
{KEY_USAGE_BIT_KEY_CERT_SIGN, KEY_USAGE_BIT_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(
VerifyWithTrust(
CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchor().WithEnforceAnchorConstraints()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithEnforceAnchorConstraints()
.WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
ExtendedKeyUsageNoServerAuth) {
cert_->SetExtendedKeyUsages({der::Input(kCodeSigning)});
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest,
UnknownSignatureAlgorithm) {
cert_->SetSignatureAlgorithmTLV(TestOid0SignatureAlgorithmTLV());
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Attempts to verify as anchor of itself, which fails when verifying the
// signature.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
// Signature not checked when verified as a directly trusted leaf without
// require_leaf_selfsigned.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf()), IsOk());
// PathBuilder override ignores require_leaf_selfsigned due to the
// self-signed check returning false (due to the invalid signature
// algorithm), thus this fails with AUTHORITY_INVALID due to failing to
// find a chain to another root.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(),
IsError(ERR_CERT_AUTHORITY_INVALID));
// PathBuilder override ignores require_leaf_selfsigned due to the invalid
// signature algorithm, thus this tries to verify as anchor of itself,
// which fails when verifying the signature.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, WeakSignatureAlgorithm) {
cert_->SetSignatureAlgorithm(SignatureAlgorithm::kEcdsaSha1);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
// Attempts to verify as anchor of itself, which fails due to the weak
// signature algorithm.
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
// Signature not checked when verified as a directly trusted leaf without
// require_leaf_selfsigned.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustedLeaf()), IsOk());
// require_leaf_selfsigned allows any supported signature algorithm when
// doing the self-signed check, so this is okay.
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyWithTrust(CertificateTrust::ForTrustAnchorOrLeaf()
.WithRequireLeafSelfSigned()),
IsOk());
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcConstraintsTrustedSelfSignedTest, UnknownExtension) {
for (bool critical : {true, false}) {
SCOPED_TRACE(critical);
cert_->SetExtension(TestOid0(), "hello world", critical);
if (VerifyProcTypeIsBuiltin()) {
if (critical) {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsError(ERR_CERT_INVALID));
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
EXPECT_THAT(VerifyAsTrustedSelfSignedLeaf(), IsOk());
}
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(Verify(), IsOk());
}
}
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsPublicSHA1) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_sha1 = true;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
// VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS should not impact this.
flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
verify_result.Reset();
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, RejectsPrivateSHA1UnlessFlag) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.has_sha1 = true;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
// SHA-1 should be rejected by default for private roots...
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_WEAK_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
// ... unless VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS was supplied.
flags = CertVerifyProc::VERIFY_ENABLE_SHA1_LOCAL_ANCHORS;
verify_result.Reset();
error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_SHA1_SIGNATURE_PRESENT);
}
enum ExpectedAlgorithms {
EXPECT_SHA1 = 1 << 0,
EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID = 1 << 1,
};
struct WeakDigestTestData {
const char* root_cert_filename;
const char* intermediate_cert_filename;
const char* ee_cert_filename;
int expected_algorithms;
};
const char* StringOrDefault(const char* str, const char* default_value) {
if (!str)
return default_value;
return str;
}
// GTest 'magic' pretty-printer, so that if/when a test fails, it knows how
// to output the parameter that was passed. Without this, it will simply
// attempt to print out the first twenty bytes of the object, which depending
// on platform and alignment, may result in an invalid read.
void PrintTo(const WeakDigestTestData& data, std::ostream* os) {
*os << "root: " << StringOrDefault(data.root_cert_filename, "none")
<< "; intermediate: "
<< StringOrDefault(data.intermediate_cert_filename, "none")
<< "; end-entity: " << data.ee_cert_filename;
}
class CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest
: public testing::TestWithParam<WeakDigestTestData> {
public:
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() = default;
~CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest() override = default;
};
// Tests that the CertVerifyProc::Verify() properly surfaces the (weak) hash
// algorithms used in the chain.
TEST_P(CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest, VerifyDetectsAlgorithm) {
WeakDigestTestData data = GetParam();
base::FilePath certs_dir = GetTestCertsDirectory();
// Build |intermediates| as the full chain (including trust anchor).
std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates;
if (data.intermediate_cert_filename) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> intermediate_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.intermediate_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(intermediate_cert);
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(intermediate_cert->cert_buffer()));
}
if (data.root_cert_filename) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> root_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.root_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(root_cert);
intermediates.push_back(bssl::UpRef(root_cert->cert_buffer()));
}
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_cert =
ImportCertFromFile(certs_dir, data.ee_cert_filename);
ASSERT_TRUE(ee_cert);
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> ee_chain = X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer(
bssl::UpRef(ee_cert->cert_buffer()), std::move(intermediates));
ASSERT_TRUE(ee_chain);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
// Use a mock CertVerifyProc that returns success with a verified_cert of
// |ee_chain|.
//
// This is sufficient for the purposes of this test, as the checking for weak
// hash algorithms is done by CertVerifyProc::Verify().
auto proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(CertVerifyResult());
int error = proc->Verify(ee_chain.get(), "127.0.0.1",
/*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_SHA1), verify_result.has_sha1);
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID),
!!(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_INVALID));
EXPECT_EQ(!!(data.expected_algorithms & EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID),
error == ERR_CERT_INVALID);
}
// The signature algorithm of the root CA should not matter.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyRootCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_md5_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_md4_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_md2_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_SHA1},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyRoot,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyRootCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of intermediates should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIntermediateCATestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID | EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID | EXPECT_SHA1},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID | EXPECT_SHA1},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIntermediateCATestData));
// The signature algorithm of end-entity should be properly detected.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyEndEntityTestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md4_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyEndEntityTestData));
// Incomplete chains do not report the status of the intermediate.
// Note: really each of these tests should also expect the digest algorithm of
// the intermediate (included as a comment). However CertVerifyProc::Verify() is
// unable to distinguish that this is an intermediate and not a trust anchor, so
// this intermediate is treated like a trust anchor.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData[] = {
{nullptr, "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_SHA1},
{nullptr, "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_SHA1},
{nullptr, "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem",
EXPECT_SHA1},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(
MAYBE_VerifyIncompleteIntermediate,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteIntermediateTestData));
// Incomplete chains should report the status of the end-entity.
// since the intermediate is treated as a trust anchor these should
// be still simply be invalid.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyIncompleteEETestData[] = {
{nullptr, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md5_ee.pem",
EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{nullptr, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md4_ee.pem",
EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{nullptr, "weak_digest_sha1_intermediate.pem", "weak_digest_md2_ee.pem",
EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyIncompleteEndEntity,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyIncompleteEETestData));
// Md2, Md4, and Md5 are all considered invalid.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyMixedTestData[] = {
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md5_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md2_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
{"weak_digest_sha1_root.pem", "weak_digest_md4_intermediate.pem",
"weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", EXPECT_STATUS_INVALID},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyMixed,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyMixedTestData));
// The EE is a trusted certificate. Even though it uses weak hashes, these
// should not be reported.
const WeakDigestTestData kVerifyTrustedEETestData[] = {
{nullptr, nullptr, "weak_digest_md5_ee.pem", 0},
{nullptr, nullptr, "weak_digest_md4_ee.pem", 0},
{nullptr, nullptr, "weak_digest_md2_ee.pem", 0},
{nullptr, nullptr, "weak_digest_sha1_ee.pem", 0},
};
INSTANTIATE_TEST_SUITE_P(VerifyTrustedEE,
CertVerifyProcWeakDigestTest,
testing::ValuesIn(kVerifyTrustedEETestData));
// Test fixture for verifying certificate names.
class CertVerifyProcNameTest : public ::testing::Test {
protected:
void VerifyCertName(const char* hostname, bool valid) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "subjectAltName_sanity_check.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
result.is_issued_by_known_root = false;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), hostname, /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), 0, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
if (valid) {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsOk());
EXPECT_FALSE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
} else {
EXPECT_THAT(error, IsError(ERR_CERT_COMMON_NAME_INVALID));
EXPECT_TRUE(verify_result.cert_status & CERT_STATUS_COMMON_NAME_INVALID);
}
}
};
// Don't match the common name
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DontMatchCommonName) {
VerifyCertName("127.0.0.1", false);
}
// Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv4)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanIpv4) {
VerifyCertName("127.0.0.2", true);
}
// Matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1", true);
}
// Should not match the iPAddress SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchIpSanIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("[FE80:0:0:0:0:0:0:1]", false);
}
// Compressed form matches the iPAddress SAN (IPv6)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesIpSanCompressedIpv6) {
VerifyCertName("FE80::1", true);
}
// IPv6 mapped form should NOT match iPAddress SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchIpSanIPv6Mapped) {
VerifyCertName("::127.0.0.2", false);
}
// Matches the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesDnsSan) {
VerifyCertName("test.example", true);
}
// Matches the dNSName SAN (trailing . ignored)
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, MatchesDnsSanTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName("test.example.", true);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSan) {
VerifyCertName("www.test.example", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanInvalid) {
VerifyCertName("test..example", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanTwoTrailingDots) {
VerifyCertName("test.example..", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanLeadingAndTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName(".test.example.", false);
}
// Should not match the dNSName SAN
TEST_F(CertVerifyProcNameTest, DoesntMatchDnsSanTrailingDot) {
VerifyCertName(".test.example", false);
}
// Test that trust anchors are appropriately recorded via UMA.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTrustAnchorVerifyUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a certificate chain issued by "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC,
// CN=GTS Root R4". This publicly-trusted root was chosen as it was included
// in 2017 and is not anticipated to be removed from all supported platforms
// for a few decades.
// Note: The actual cert in |cert| does not matter for this testing, so long
// as it's not violating any CertVerifyProc::Verify() policies.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue root_hash = {
{0x98, 0x47, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x3e, 0x5e, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5,
0xcb, 0x81, 0x86, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x44, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0xe6, 0x7f,
0xd7, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x69, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xd8, 0x43, 0x47}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(root_hash));
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kGTSRootR4HistogramID = 486;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kGTSRootR4HistogramID, 1);
}
// Test that certificates with multiple trust anchors present result in
// only a single trust anchor being recorded, and that being the most specific
// trust anchor.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, LogsOnlyMostSpecificTrustAnchorUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(
ImportCertFromFile(GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a chain of "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R4"
// signing "C=US, O=Google Trust Services LLC, CN=GTS Root R3" signing an
// intermediate and a leaf.
// Note: The actual cert in |cert| does not matter for this testing, so long
// as it's not violating any CertVerifyProc::Verify() policies.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue gts_root_r3_hash = {
{0x41, 0x79, 0xed, 0xd9, 0x81, 0xef, 0x74, 0x74, 0x77, 0xb4, 0x96,
0x26, 0x40, 0x8a, 0xf4, 0x3d, 0xaa, 0x2c, 0xa7, 0xab, 0x7f, 0x9e,
0x08, 0x2c, 0x10, 0x60, 0xf8, 0x40, 0x96, 0x77, 0x43, 0x48}};
SHA256HashValue gts_root_r4_hash = {
{0x98, 0x47, 0xe5, 0x65, 0x3e, 0x5e, 0x9e, 0x84, 0x75, 0x16, 0xe5,
0xcb, 0x81, 0x86, 0x06, 0xaa, 0x75, 0x44, 0xa1, 0x9b, 0xe6, 0x7f,
0xd7, 0x36, 0x6d, 0x50, 0x69, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xd8, 0x43, 0x47}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(gts_root_r3_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(gts_root_r4_hash));
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kGTSRootR3HistogramID = 485;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
// Only GTS Root R3 should be recorded.
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kGTSRootR3HistogramID, 1);
}
// Test that trust anchors histograms record whether or not
// is_issued_by_known_root was derived from the OS.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, HasTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateUMA) {
base::HistogramTester histograms;
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert(ImportCertFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "39_months_based_on_last_day.pem"));
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
CertVerifyResult result;
// Simulate a certificate chain that is recognized as trusted (from a known
// root), but no certificates in the chain are tracked as known trust
// anchors.
SHA256HashValue leaf_hash = {{0}};
SHA256HashValue intermediate_hash = {{1}};
SHA256HashValue root_hash = {{2}};
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(leaf_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(intermediate_hash));
result.public_key_hashes.push_back(HashValue(root_hash));
result.is_issued_by_known_root = true;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram, 0);
histograms.ExpectTotalCount(kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram, 0);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/std::string(),
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
const base::HistogramBase::Sample kUnknownRootHistogramID = 0;
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyHistogram,
kUnknownRootHistogramID, 1);
histograms.ExpectUniqueSample(kTrustAnchorVerifyOutOfDateHistogram, true, 1);
}
// If the CertVerifyProc::VerifyInternal implementation calculated the stapled
// OCSP results in the CertVerifyResult, CertVerifyProc::Verify should not
// re-calculate them.
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, DoesNotRecalculateStapledOCSPResult) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult result;
result.ocsp_result.response_status = OCSPVerifyResult::PROVIDED;
result.ocsp_result.revocation_status = OCSPRevocationStatus::GOOD;
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error =
verify_proc->Verify(cert.get(), "127.0.0.1",
/*ocsp_response=*/"invalid OCSP data",
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(),
&verify_result, NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPVerifyResult::PROVIDED,
verify_result.ocsp_result.response_status);
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPRevocationStatus::GOOD,
verify_result.ocsp_result.revocation_status);
}
TEST(CertVerifyProcTest, CalculateStapledOCSPResultIfNotAlreadyDone) {
scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateCertificateChainFromFile(
GetTestCertsDirectory(), "ok_cert_by_intermediate.pem",
X509Certificate::FORMAT_AUTO);
ASSERT_TRUE(cert);
ASSERT_EQ(1U, cert->intermediate_buffers().size());
CertVerifyResult result;
// Confirm the default-constructed values are as expected.
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPVerifyResult::NOT_CHECKED, result.ocsp_result.response_status);
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN,
result.ocsp_result.revocation_status);
auto verify_proc = base::MakeRefCounted<MockCertVerifyProc>(result);
int flags = 0;
CertVerifyResult verify_result;
int error = verify_proc->Verify(
cert.get(), "127.0.0.1", /*ocsp_response=*/"invalid OCSP data",
/*sct_list=*/std::string(), flags, CertificateList(), &verify_result,
NetLogWithSource());
EXPECT_EQ(OK, error);
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPVerifyResult::PARSE_RESPONSE_ERROR,
verify_result.ocsp_result.response_status);
EXPECT_EQ(OCSPRevocationStatus::UNKNOWN,
verify_result.ocsp_result.revocation_status);
}
} // namespace net