| // Copyright 2011 The Chromium Authors |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #ifndef NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_ |
| #define NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_ |
| |
| #include "base/memory/scoped_refptr.h" |
| #include "base/supports_user_data.h" |
| #include "base/values.h" |
| #include "net/base/hash_value.h" |
| #include "net/base/net_export.h" |
| #include "net/cert/cert_status_flags.h" |
| #include "net/cert/ct_policy_status.h" |
| #include "net/cert/ocsp_verify_result.h" |
| #include "net/cert/signed_certificate_timestamp_and_status.h" |
| |
| namespace ct { |
| enum class CTPolicyCompliance; |
| } // namespace ct |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| class X509Certificate; |
| |
| // The result of certificate verification. |
| // |
| // Additional debugging or purely informational data may be added through |
| // SupportsUserData, but such data must not be used for anything that changes |
| // how the results are interpreted or acted upon: any data that changes the |
| // meaning of the result must be added as a member in this class, not through |
| // SupportsUserData. |
| // Any Data added through SupportsUserData must implement Clone(). |
| class NET_EXPORT CertVerifyResult : public base::SupportsUserData { |
| public: |
| CertVerifyResult(); |
| CertVerifyResult(const CertVerifyResult& other); |
| ~CertVerifyResult() override; |
| |
| CertVerifyResult& operator=(const CertVerifyResult& other); |
| |
| void Reset(); |
| |
| // Creates NetLog parameter to describe the CertVerifyResult. |net_error| is |
| // a net error code to include in the params, if non-zero. It must not be |
| // ERR_IO_PENDING, as that is not a true error. |
| base::Value::Dict NetLogParams(int net_error) const; |
| |
| // The certificate chain that was constructed during verification. |
| // |
| // Note: Although |verified_cert| will match the originally supplied |
| // certificate to be validated, the results of intermediate_buffers() |
| // may be substantially different, both in order and in content, then the |
| // originally supplied intermediates. |
| // |
| // In the event of validation failures, this may contain the originally |
| // supplied certificate chain or a partially constructed path, depending on |
| // the implementation. |
| // |
| // In the event of validation success, the trust anchor will be |
| // |verified_cert->intermediate_buffers().back()| if |
| // there was a certificate chain to the trust anchor, and will |
| // be |verified_cert->cert_buffer()| if the certificate was |
| // the trust anchor. |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> verified_cert; |
| |
| // Bitmask of CERT_STATUS_* from net/cert/cert_status_flags.h. Note that |
| // these status flags apply to the certificate chain returned in |
| // |verified_cert|, rather than the originally supplied certificate |
| // chain. |
| CertStatus cert_status; |
| |
| // Hash algorithms used by the certificate chain, excluding the trust |
| // anchor. |
| bool has_sha1; |
| |
| // If the certificate was successfully verified then this contains the |
| // hashes for all of the SubjectPublicKeyInfos of the chain (target, |
| // intermediates, and trust anchor) |
| // |
| // The ordering of the hashes in this vector is unspecified. Both the SHA1 |
| // and SHA256 hash will be present for each certificate. |
| HashValueVector public_key_hashes; |
| |
| // is_issued_by_known_root is true if we recognise the root CA as a standard |
| // root. If it isn't then it's probably the case that this certificate was |
| // generated by a MITM proxy whose root has been installed locally. This is |
| // meaningless if the certificate was not trusted. |
| bool is_issued_by_known_root; |
| |
| // is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor is true if the root CA used for this |
| // verification came from the list of additional trust anchors. |
| bool is_issued_by_additional_trust_anchor; |
| |
| // Verification of stapled OCSP response, if present. |
| OCSPVerifyResult ocsp_result; |
| |
| // `scts` contains the result of verifying any provided or embedded SCTs for |
| // this certificate against the set of known logs. Consumers should not simply |
| // check this for the presence of a successfully verified SCT to determine CT |
| // compliance. Instead look at `policy_compliance`. |
| SignedCertificateTimestampAndStatusList scts; |
| |
| // The result of evaluating whether the certificate complies with the |
| // Certificate Transparency policy. |
| ct::CTPolicyCompliance policy_compliance; |
| }; |
| |
| } // namespace net |
| |
| #endif // NET_CERT_CERT_VERIFY_RESULT_H_ |