| // Copyright 2012 The Chromium Authors |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
| // found in the LICENSE file. |
| |
| #include "net/cert/x509_certificate.h" |
| |
| #include <limits.h> |
| #include <stdlib.h> |
| |
| #include <memory> |
| #include <string> |
| #include <vector> |
| |
| #include "base/base64.h" |
| #include "base/containers/contains.h" |
| #include "base/containers/span.h" |
| #include "base/logging.h" |
| #include "base/numerics/safe_conversions.h" |
| #include "base/pickle.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_piece.h" |
| #include "base/strings/string_util.h" |
| #include "base/time/time.h" |
| #include "build/build_config.h" |
| #include "crypto/openssl_util.h" |
| #include "net/base/ip_address.h" |
| #include "net/base/registry_controlled_domains/registry_controlled_domain.h" |
| #include "net/base/tracing.h" |
| #include "net/base/url_util.h" |
| #include "net/cert/asn1_util.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pem.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/cert_errors.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/name_constraints.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/parsed_certificate.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/signature_algorithm.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/verify_certificate_chain.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/verify_name_match.h" |
| #include "net/cert/pki/verify_signed_data.h" |
| #include "net/cert/x509_util.h" |
| #include "net/der/encode_values.h" |
| #include "net/der/parser.h" |
| #include "net/dns/dns_util.h" |
| #include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/evp.h" |
| #include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/pool.h" |
| #include "third_party/boringssl/src/include/openssl/sha.h" |
| #include "url/url_canon.h" |
| |
| namespace net { |
| |
| namespace { |
| |
| // Indicates the order to use when trying to decode binary data, which is |
| // based on (speculation) as to what will be most common -> least common |
| const X509Certificate::Format kFormatDecodePriority[] = { |
| X509Certificate::FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE, |
| X509Certificate::FORMAT_PKCS7 |
| }; |
| |
| // The PEM block header used for DER certificates |
| const char kCertificateHeader[] = "CERTIFICATE"; |
| // The PEM block header used for PKCS#7 data |
| const char kPKCS7Header[] = "PKCS7"; |
| |
| // Utility to split |src| on the first occurrence of |c|, if any. |right| will |
| // either be empty if |c| was not found, or will contain the remainder of the |
| // string including the split character itself. |
| void SplitOnChar(base::StringPiece src, |
| char c, |
| base::StringPiece* left, |
| base::StringPiece* right) { |
| size_t pos = src.find(c); |
| if (pos == base::StringPiece::npos) { |
| *left = src; |
| *right = base::StringPiece(); |
| } else { |
| *left = src.substr(0, pos); |
| *right = src.substr(pos); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Sets |value| to the Value from a DER Sequence Tag-Length-Value and return |
| // true, or return false if the TLV was not a valid DER Sequence. |
| [[nodiscard]] bool ParseSequenceValue(const der::Input& tlv, |
| der::Input* value) { |
| der::Parser parser(tlv); |
| return parser.ReadTag(der::kSequence, value) && !parser.HasMore(); |
| } |
| |
| // Normalize |cert|'s Issuer and store it in |out_normalized_issuer|, returning |
| // true on success or false if there was a parsing error. |
| bool GetNormalizedCertIssuer(CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert, |
| std::string* out_normalized_issuer) { |
| der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv; |
| der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv; |
| der::BitString signature_value; |
| if (!ParseCertificate( |
| der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert)), |
| &tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, &signature_value, |
| nullptr)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
| if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv, |
| x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs, |
| nullptr)) |
| return false; |
| |
| der::Input issuer_value; |
| if (!ParseSequenceValue(tbs.issuer_tlv, &issuer_value)) |
| return false; |
| |
| CertErrors errors; |
| return NormalizeName(issuer_value, out_normalized_issuer, &errors); |
| } |
| |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck( |
| base::span<const uint8_t> data) { |
| der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv; |
| der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv; |
| der::BitString signature_value; |
| // Do a bare minimum of DER parsing here to see if the input looks |
| // certificate-ish. |
| if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(data.data(), data.size()), |
| &tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, |
| &signature_value, nullptr)) { |
| return nullptr; |
| } |
| return x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(data); |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBuffer( |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer, |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates) { |
| DCHECK(cert_buffer); |
| auto cert = base::WrapRefCounted( |
| new X509Certificate(std::move(cert_buffer), std::move(intermediates))); |
| if (!cert->cert_buffer()) |
| return nullptr; // Initialize() failed. |
| return cert; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions( |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer, |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates, |
| UnsafeCreateOptions options) { |
| DCHECK(cert_buffer); |
| auto cert = base::WrapRefCounted(new X509Certificate( |
| std::move(cert_buffer), std::move(intermediates), options)); |
| if (!cert->cert_buffer()) |
| return nullptr; // Initialize() failed. |
| return cert; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain( |
| const std::vector<base::StringPiece>& der_certs) { |
| return CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions(der_certs, {}); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> |
| X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions( |
| const std::vector<base::StringPiece>& der_certs, |
| UnsafeCreateOptions options) { |
| TRACE_EVENT0("io", "X509Certificate::CreateFromDERCertChain"); |
| if (der_certs.empty()) |
| return nullptr; |
| |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediate_ca_certs; |
| intermediate_ca_certs.reserve(der_certs.size() - 1); |
| for (size_t i = 1; i < der_certs.size(); i++) { |
| intermediate_ca_certs.push_back( |
| x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(der_certs[i])); |
| } |
| |
| return CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions( |
| x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(der_certs[0]), |
| std::move(intermediate_ca_certs), options); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytes( |
| base::span<const uint8_t> data) { |
| return CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions(data, {}); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromBytesUnsafeOptions( |
| base::span<const uint8_t> data, |
| UnsafeCreateOptions options) { |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateFromBufferUnsafeOptions( |
| x509_util::CreateCryptoBuffer(data), {}, options); |
| return cert; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromPickle( |
| base::PickleIterator* pickle_iter) { |
| return CreateFromPickleUnsafeOptions(pickle_iter, {}); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> X509Certificate::CreateFromPickleUnsafeOptions( |
| base::PickleIterator* pickle_iter, |
| UnsafeCreateOptions options) { |
| size_t chain_length = 0; |
| if (!pickle_iter->ReadLength(&chain_length)) |
| return nullptr; |
| |
| std::vector<base::StringPiece> cert_chain; |
| const char* data = nullptr; |
| size_t data_length = 0; |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < chain_length; ++i) { |
| if (!pickle_iter->ReadData(&data, &data_length)) |
| return nullptr; |
| cert_chain.emplace_back(data, data_length); |
| } |
| return CreateFromDERCertChainUnsafeOptions(cert_chain, options); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| CertificateList X509Certificate::CreateCertificateListFromBytes( |
| base::span<const uint8_t> data, |
| int format) { |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> certificates; |
| |
| // Check to see if it is in a PEM-encoded form. This check is performed |
| // first, as both OS X and NSS will both try to convert if they detect |
| // PEM encoding, except they don't do it consistently between the two. |
| base::StringPiece data_string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(data.data()), |
| data.size()); |
| std::vector<std::string> pem_headers; |
| |
| // To maintain compatibility with NSS/Firefox, CERTIFICATE is a universally |
| // valid PEM block header for any format. |
| pem_headers.push_back(kCertificateHeader); |
| if (format & FORMAT_PKCS7) |
| pem_headers.push_back(kPKCS7Header); |
| |
| PEMTokenizer pem_tokenizer(data_string, pem_headers); |
| while (pem_tokenizer.GetNext()) { |
| std::string decoded(pem_tokenizer.data()); |
| |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> handle; |
| if (format & FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE) { |
| handle = CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck( |
| base::as_bytes(base::make_span(decoded))); |
| } |
| if (handle) { |
| // Parsed a DER encoded certificate. All PEM blocks that follow must |
| // also be DER encoded certificates wrapped inside of PEM blocks. |
| format = FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE; |
| certificates.push_back(std::move(handle)); |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| // If the first block failed to parse as a DER certificate, and |
| // formats other than PEM are acceptable, check to see if the decoded |
| // data is one of the accepted formats. |
| if (format & ~FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE) { |
| for (size_t i = 0; |
| certificates.empty() && i < std::size(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) { |
| if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i]) { |
| certificates = CreateCertBuffersFromBytes( |
| base::as_bytes(base::make_span(decoded)), |
| kFormatDecodePriority[i]); |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| // Stop parsing after the first block for any format but a sequence of |
| // PEM-encoded DER certificates. The case of FORMAT_PEM_CERT_SEQUENCE |
| // is handled above, and continues processing until a certificate fails |
| // to parse. |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| // Try each of the formats, in order of parse preference, to see if |data| |
| // contains the binary representation of a Format, if it failed to parse |
| // as a PEM certificate/chain. |
| for (size_t i = 0; |
| certificates.empty() && i < std::size(kFormatDecodePriority); ++i) { |
| if (format & kFormatDecodePriority[i]) |
| certificates = CreateCertBuffersFromBytes(data, kFormatDecodePriority[i]); |
| } |
| |
| CertificateList results; |
| // No certificates parsed. |
| if (certificates.empty()) |
| return results; |
| |
| for (auto& it : certificates) { |
| scoped_refptr<X509Certificate> cert = CreateFromBuffer(std::move(it), {}); |
| if (cert) |
| results.push_back(std::move(cert)); |
| } |
| |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| void X509Certificate::Persist(base::Pickle* pickle) const { |
| DCHECK(cert_buffer_); |
| // This would be an absolutely insane number of intermediates. |
| if (intermediate_ca_certs_.size() > static_cast<size_t>(INT_MAX) - 1) { |
| NOTREACHED(); |
| return; |
| } |
| pickle->WriteInt(static_cast<int>(intermediate_ca_certs_.size() + 1)); |
| pickle->WriteString(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_buffer_.get())); |
| for (const auto& intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_) { |
| pickle->WriteString( |
| x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(intermediate.get())); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::GetSubjectAltName( |
| std::vector<std::string>* dns_names, |
| std::vector<std::string>* ip_addrs) const { |
| if (dns_names) |
| dns_names->clear(); |
| if (ip_addrs) |
| ip_addrs->clear(); |
| |
| der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv; |
| der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv; |
| der::BitString signature_value; |
| if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buffer_.get()), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buffer_.get())), |
| &tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, |
| &signature_value, nullptr)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
| if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv, |
| x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs, |
| nullptr)) |
| return false; |
| if (!tbs.extensions_tlv) |
| return false; |
| |
| std::map<der::Input, ParsedExtension> extensions; |
| if (!ParseExtensions(tbs.extensions_tlv.value(), &extensions)) |
| return false; |
| |
| ParsedExtension subject_alt_names_extension; |
| if (!ConsumeExtension(der::Input(kSubjectAltNameOid), &extensions, |
| &subject_alt_names_extension)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| CertErrors errors; |
| std::unique_ptr<GeneralNames> subject_alt_names = |
| GeneralNames::Create(subject_alt_names_extension.value, &errors); |
| if (!subject_alt_names) |
| return false; |
| |
| if (dns_names) { |
| for (const auto& dns_name : subject_alt_names->dns_names) |
| dns_names->push_back(std::string(dns_name)); |
| } |
| if (ip_addrs) { |
| for (const IPAddress& addr : subject_alt_names->ip_addresses) { |
| ip_addrs->push_back( |
| std::string(reinterpret_cast<const char*>(addr.bytes().data()), |
| addr.bytes().size())); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return !subject_alt_names->dns_names.empty() || |
| !subject_alt_names->ip_addresses.empty(); |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::HasExpired() const { |
| return base::Time::Now() > valid_expiry(); |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::EqualsExcludingChain(const X509Certificate* other) const { |
| return x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(cert_buffer_.get(), |
| other->cert_buffer_.get()); |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::EqualsIncludingChain(const X509Certificate* other) const { |
| if (intermediate_ca_certs_.size() != other->intermediate_ca_certs_.size() || |
| !EqualsExcludingChain(other)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| for (size_t i = 0; i < intermediate_ca_certs_.size(); ++i) { |
| if (!x509_util::CryptoBufferEqual(intermediate_ca_certs_[i].get(), |
| other->intermediate_ca_certs_[i].get())) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| } |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::IsIssuedByEncoded( |
| const std::vector<std::string>& valid_issuers) const { |
| std::vector<std::string> normalized_issuers; |
| CertErrors errors; |
| for (const auto& raw_issuer : valid_issuers) { |
| der::Input issuer_value; |
| std::string normalized_issuer; |
| if (!ParseSequenceValue(der::Input(&raw_issuer), &issuer_value) || |
| !NormalizeName(issuer_value, &normalized_issuer, &errors)) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| normalized_issuers.push_back(std::move(normalized_issuer)); |
| } |
| |
| std::string normalized_cert_issuer; |
| if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(cert_buffer_.get(), &normalized_cert_issuer)) |
| return false; |
| if (base::Contains(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer)) |
| return true; |
| |
| for (const auto& intermediate : intermediate_ca_certs_) { |
| if (!GetNormalizedCertIssuer(intermediate.get(), &normalized_cert_issuer)) |
| return false; |
| if (base::Contains(normalized_issuers, normalized_cert_issuer)) |
| return true; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::VerifyHostname( |
| const std::string& hostname, |
| const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_dns_names, |
| const std::vector<std::string>& cert_san_ip_addrs) { |
| DCHECK(!hostname.empty()); |
| |
| if (cert_san_dns_names.empty() && cert_san_ip_addrs.empty()) { |
| // Either a dNSName or iPAddress subjectAltName MUST be present in order |
| // to match, so fail quickly if not. |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| // Perform name verification following http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125. |
| // The terminology used in this method is as per that RFC:- |
| // Reference identifier == the host the local user/agent is intending to |
| // access, i.e. the thing displayed in the URL bar. |
| // Presented identifier(s) == name(s) the server knows itself as, in its cert. |
| |
| // CanonicalizeHost requires surrounding brackets to parse an IPv6 address. |
| const std::string host_or_ip = hostname.find(':') != std::string::npos ? |
| "[" + hostname + "]" : hostname; |
| url::CanonHostInfo host_info; |
| std::string reference_name = CanonicalizeHost(host_or_ip, &host_info); |
| |
| // If the host cannot be canonicalized, fail fast. |
| if (reference_name.empty()) |
| return false; |
| |
| // Fully handle all cases where |hostname| contains an IP address. |
| if (host_info.IsIPAddress()) { |
| base::StringPiece ip_addr_string( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(host_info.address), |
| host_info.AddressLength()); |
| return base::Contains(cert_san_ip_addrs, ip_addr_string); |
| } |
| |
| // The host portion of a URL may support a variety of name resolution formats |
| // and services. However, the only supported name types in this code are IP |
| // addresses, which have been handled above via iPAddress subjectAltNames, |
| // and DNS names, via dNSName subjectAltNames. |
| // Validate that the host conforms to the DNS preferred name syntax, in |
| // either relative or absolute form, and exclude the "root" label for DNS. |
| if (reference_name == "." || !IsCanonicalizedHostCompliant(reference_name)) |
| return false; |
| |
| // CanonicalizeHost does not normalize absolute vs relative DNS names. If |
| // the input name was absolute (included trailing .), normalize it as if it |
| // was relative. |
| if (reference_name.back() == '.') |
| reference_name.pop_back(); |
| |
| // |reference_domain| is the remainder of |host| after the leading host |
| // component is stripped off, but includes the leading dot e.g. |
| // "www.f.com" -> ".f.com". |
| // If there is no meaningful domain part to |host| (e.g. it contains no dots) |
| // then |reference_domain| will be empty. |
| base::StringPiece reference_host, reference_domain; |
| SplitOnChar(reference_name, '.', &reference_host, &reference_domain); |
| bool allow_wildcards = false; |
| if (!reference_domain.empty()) { |
| DCHECK(base::StartsWith(reference_domain, ".")); |
| |
| // Do not allow wildcards for public/ICANN registry controlled domains - |
| // that is, prevent *.com or *.co.uk as valid presented names, but do not |
| // prevent *.appspot.com (a private registry controlled domain). |
| // In addition, unknown top-level domains (such as 'intranet' domains or |
| // new TLDs/gTLDs not yet added to the registry controlled domain dataset) |
| // are also implicitly prevented. |
| // Because |reference_domain| must contain at least one name component that |
| // is not registry controlled, this ensures that all reference domains |
| // contain at least three domain components when using wildcards. |
| size_t registry_length = |
| registry_controlled_domains::GetCanonicalHostRegistryLength( |
| reference_name, |
| registry_controlled_domains::INCLUDE_UNKNOWN_REGISTRIES, |
| registry_controlled_domains::EXCLUDE_PRIVATE_REGISTRIES); |
| |
| // Because |reference_name| was already canonicalized, the following |
| // should never happen. |
| CHECK_NE(std::string::npos, registry_length); |
| |
| // Account for the leading dot in |reference_domain|. |
| bool is_registry_controlled = |
| registry_length != 0 && |
| registry_length == (reference_domain.size() - 1); |
| |
| // Additionally, do not attempt wildcard matching for purely numeric |
| // hostnames. |
| allow_wildcards = |
| !is_registry_controlled && |
| reference_name.find_first_not_of("0123456789.") != std::string::npos; |
| } |
| |
| // Now step through the DNS names doing wild card comparison (if necessary) |
| // on each against the reference name. |
| for (const auto& cert_san_dns_name : cert_san_dns_names) { |
| // Catch badly corrupt cert names up front. |
| if (cert_san_dns_name.empty() || |
| cert_san_dns_name.find('\0') != std::string::npos) { |
| continue; |
| } |
| std::string presented_name(base::ToLowerASCII(cert_san_dns_name)); |
| |
| // Remove trailing dot, if any. |
| if (*presented_name.rbegin() == '.') |
| presented_name.resize(presented_name.length() - 1); |
| |
| // The hostname must be at least as long as the cert name it is matching, |
| // as we require the wildcard (if present) to match at least one character. |
| if (presented_name.length() > reference_name.length()) |
| continue; |
| |
| base::StringPiece presented_host, presented_domain; |
| SplitOnChar(presented_name, '.', &presented_host, &presented_domain); |
| |
| if (presented_domain != reference_domain) |
| continue; |
| |
| if (presented_host != "*") { |
| if (presented_host == reference_host) |
| return true; |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (!allow_wildcards) |
| continue; |
| |
| return true; |
| } |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::VerifyNameMatch(const std::string& hostname) const { |
| std::vector<std::string> dns_names, ip_addrs; |
| GetSubjectAltName(&dns_names, &ip_addrs); |
| return VerifyHostname(hostname, dns_names, ip_addrs); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedFromDER(base::StringPiece der_encoded, |
| std::string* pem_encoded) { |
| if (der_encoded.empty()) |
| return false; |
| |
| *pem_encoded = PEMEncode(der_encoded, "CERTIFICATE"); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncoded(const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer, |
| std::string* pem_encoded) { |
| return GetPEMEncodedFromDER(x509_util::CryptoBufferAsStringPiece(cert_buffer), |
| pem_encoded); |
| } |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::GetPEMEncodedChain( |
| std::vector<std::string>* pem_encoded) const { |
| std::vector<std::string> encoded_chain; |
| std::string pem_data; |
| if (!GetPEMEncoded(cert_buffer(), &pem_data)) |
| return false; |
| encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data); |
| for (const auto& intermediate_ca_cert : intermediate_ca_certs_) { |
| if (!GetPEMEncoded(intermediate_ca_cert.get(), &pem_data)) |
| return false; |
| encoded_chain.push_back(pem_data); |
| } |
| pem_encoded->swap(encoded_chain); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| void X509Certificate::GetPublicKeyInfo(const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer, |
| size_t* size_bits, |
| PublicKeyType* type) { |
| *type = kPublicKeyTypeUnknown; |
| *size_bits = 0; |
| |
| base::StringPiece spki; |
| if (!asn1::ExtractSPKIFromDERCert( |
| base::StringPiece( |
| reinterpret_cast<const char*>(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buffer)), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buffer)), |
| &spki)) { |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| bssl::UniquePtr<EVP_PKEY> pkey; |
| crypto::OpenSSLErrStackTracer err_tracer(FROM_HERE); |
| CBS cbs; |
| CBS_init(&cbs, reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(spki.data()), spki.size()); |
| pkey.reset(EVP_parse_public_key(&cbs)); |
| if (!pkey) |
| return; |
| |
| switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey.get())) { |
| case EVP_PKEY_RSA: |
| *type = kPublicKeyTypeRSA; |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_DSA: |
| *type = kPublicKeyTypeDSA; |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_EC: |
| *type = kPublicKeyTypeECDSA; |
| break; |
| case EVP_PKEY_DH: |
| *type = kPublicKeyTypeDH; |
| break; |
| } |
| *size_bits = base::saturated_cast<size_t>(EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey.get())); |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> |
| X509Certificate::CreateCertBuffersFromBytes(base::span<const uint8_t> data, |
| Format format) { |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> results; |
| |
| switch (format) { |
| case FORMAT_SINGLE_CERTIFICATE: { |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> handle = |
| CreateCertBufferFromBytesWithSanityCheck(data); |
| if (handle) |
| results.push_back(std::move(handle)); |
| break; |
| } |
| case FORMAT_PKCS7: { |
| x509_util::CreateCertBuffersFromPKCS7Bytes(data, &results); |
| break; |
| } |
| default: { |
| NOTREACHED() << "Certificate format " << format << " unimplemented"; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return results; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateFingerprint256( |
| const CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert) { |
| SHA256HashValue sha256; |
| |
| SHA256(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert), CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert), sha256.data); |
| return sha256; |
| } |
| |
| SHA256HashValue X509Certificate::CalculateChainFingerprint256() const { |
| SHA256HashValue sha256; |
| memset(sha256.data, 0, sizeof(sha256.data)); |
| |
| SHA256_CTX sha256_ctx; |
| SHA256_Init(&sha256_ctx); |
| SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buffer_.get()), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buffer_.get())); |
| for (const auto& cert : intermediate_ca_certs_) { |
| SHA256_Update(&sha256_ctx, CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert.get()), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert.get())); |
| } |
| SHA256_Final(sha256.data, &sha256_ctx); |
| |
| return sha256; |
| } |
| |
| // static |
| bool X509Certificate::IsSelfSigned(CRYPTO_BUFFER* cert_buffer) { |
| std::shared_ptr<const ParsedCertificate> parsed_cert = |
| ParsedCertificate::Create(bssl::UpRef(cert_buffer), |
| x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), |
| /*errors=*/nullptr); |
| if (!parsed_cert) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| return VerifyCertificateIsSelfSigned(*parsed_cert, /*cache=*/nullptr, |
| /*errors=*/nullptr); |
| } |
| |
| X509Certificate::X509Certificate( |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer, |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates) |
| : X509Certificate(std::move(cert_buffer), std::move(intermediates), {}) {} |
| |
| X509Certificate::X509Certificate( |
| bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER> cert_buffer, |
| std::vector<bssl::UniquePtr<CRYPTO_BUFFER>> intermediates, |
| UnsafeCreateOptions options) |
| : cert_buffer_(std::move(cert_buffer)), |
| intermediate_ca_certs_(std::move(intermediates)) { |
| // Platform-specific initialization. |
| if (!Initialize(options) && cert_buffer_) { |
| // Signal initialization failure by clearing cert_buffer_. |
| cert_buffer_.reset(); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| X509Certificate::~X509Certificate() = default; |
| |
| bool X509Certificate::Initialize(UnsafeCreateOptions options) { |
| der::Input tbs_certificate_tlv; |
| der::Input signature_algorithm_tlv; |
| der::BitString signature_value; |
| |
| if (!ParseCertificate(der::Input(CRYPTO_BUFFER_data(cert_buffer_.get()), |
| CRYPTO_BUFFER_len(cert_buffer_.get())), |
| &tbs_certificate_tlv, &signature_algorithm_tlv, |
| &signature_value, nullptr)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| ParsedTbsCertificate tbs; |
| if (!ParseTbsCertificate(tbs_certificate_tlv, |
| x509_util::DefaultParseCertificateOptions(), &tbs, |
| nullptr)) |
| return false; |
| |
| CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling printable_string_handling = |
| options.printable_string_is_utf8 |
| ? CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kAsUTF8Hack |
| : CertPrincipal::PrintableStringHandling::kDefault; |
| if (!subject_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.subject_tlv, |
| printable_string_handling) || |
| !issuer_.ParseDistinguishedName(tbs.issuer_tlv, |
| printable_string_handling)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| |
| if (!der::GeneralizedTimeToTime(tbs.validity_not_before, &valid_start_) || |
| !der::GeneralizedTimeToTime(tbs.validity_not_after, &valid_expiry_)) { |
| return false; |
| } |
| serial_number_ = tbs.serial_number.AsString(); |
| return true; |
| } |
| |
| } // namespace net |