blob: 53b7e9071d1399c05ac052f746a305b9f535a279 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "components/client_update_protocol/ecdsa.h"
#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
#include "base/stl_util.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "crypto/signature_verifier.h"
namespace client_update_protocol {
namespace {
std::vector<uint8_t> SHA256HashStr(const base::StringPiece& str) {
std::vector<uint8_t> result(crypto::kSHA256Length);
crypto::SHA256HashString(str, &result.front(), result.size());
return result;
std::vector<uint8_t> SHA256HashVec(const std::vector<uint8_t>& vec) {
if (vec.empty())
return SHA256HashStr(base::StringPiece());
return SHA256HashStr(base::StringPiece(
reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&vec.front()), vec.size()));
bool ParseETagHeader(const base::StringPiece& etag_header_value_in,
std::vector<uint8_t>* ecdsa_signature_out,
std::vector<uint8_t>* request_hash_out) {
// The ETag value is a UTF-8 string, formatted as "S:H", where:
// * S is the ECDSA signature in DER-encoded ASN.1 form, converted to hex.
// * H is the SHA-256 hash of the observed request body, standard hex format.
// A Weak ETag is formatted as W/"S:H". This function treats it the same as a
// strong ETag.
base::StringPiece etag_header_value(etag_header_value_in);
// Remove the weak prefix, then remove the begin and the end quotes.
const char kWeakETagPrefix[] = "W/";
if (etag_header_value.starts_with(kWeakETagPrefix))
etag_header_value.remove_prefix(base::size(kWeakETagPrefix) - 1);
if (etag_header_value.size() >= 2 && etag_header_value.starts_with("\"") &&
etag_header_value.ends_with("\"")) {
const base::StringPiece::size_type delim_pos = etag_header_value.find(':');
if (delim_pos == base::StringPiece::npos || delim_pos == 0 ||
delim_pos == etag_header_value.size() - 1)
return false;
const base::StringPiece sig_hex = etag_header_value.substr(0, delim_pos);
const base::StringPiece hash_hex = etag_header_value.substr(delim_pos + 1);
// Decode the ECDSA signature. Don't bother validating the contents of it;
// the SignatureValidator class will handle the actual DER decoding and
// ASN.1 parsing. Check for an expected size range only -- valid ECDSA
// signatures are between 8 and 72 bytes.
if (!base::HexStringToBytes(sig_hex, ecdsa_signature_out))
return false;
if (ecdsa_signature_out->size() < 8 || ecdsa_signature_out->size() > 72)
return false;
// Decode the SHA-256 hash; it should be exactly 32 bytes, no more or less.
if (!base::HexStringToBytes(hash_hex, request_hash_out))
return false;
if (request_hash_out->size() != crypto::kSHA256Length)
return false;
return true;
} // namespace
Ecdsa::Ecdsa(int key_version, const base::StringPiece& public_key)
: pub_key_version_(key_version),
public_key_(public_key.begin(), public_key.end()) {}
Ecdsa::~Ecdsa() {}
std::unique_ptr<Ecdsa> Ecdsa::Create(int key_version,
const base::StringPiece& public_key) {
DCHECK_GT(key_version, 0);
return base::WrapUnique(new Ecdsa(key_version, public_key));
void Ecdsa::OverrideNonceForTesting(int key_version, uint32_t nonce) {
request_query_cup2key_ = base::StringPrintf("%d:%u", pub_key_version_, nonce);
void Ecdsa::SignRequest(const base::StringPiece& request_body,
std::string* query_params) {
// Generate a random nonce to use for freshness, build the cup2key query
// string, and compute the SHA-256 hash of the request body. Set these
// two pieces of data aside to use during ValidateResponse().
uint32_t nonce = 0;
crypto::RandBytes(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
request_query_cup2key_ = base::StringPrintf("%d:%u", pub_key_version_, nonce);
request_hash_ = SHA256HashStr(request_body);
// Return the query string for the user to send with the request.
std::string request_hash_hex =
base::HexEncode(&request_hash_.front(), request_hash_.size());
request_hash_hex = base::ToLowerASCII(request_hash_hex);
*query_params = base::StringPrintf("cup2key=%s&cup2hreq=%s",
bool Ecdsa::ValidateResponse(const base::StringPiece& response_body,
const base::StringPiece& server_etag) {
if (response_body.empty() || server_etag.empty())
return false;
// Break the ETag into its two components (the ECDSA signature, and the
// hash of the request that the server observed) and decode to byte buffers.
std::vector<uint8_t> signature;
std::vector<uint8_t> observed_request_hash;
if (!ParseETagHeader(server_etag, &signature, &observed_request_hash))
return false;
// Check that the server's observed request hash is equal to the original
// request hash. (This is a quick rejection test; the signature test is
// authoritative, but slower.)
DCHECK_EQ(request_hash_.size(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
if (observed_request_hash.size() != crypto::kSHA256Length)
return false;
if (!std::equal(observed_request_hash.begin(), observed_request_hash.end(),
return false;
// Next, build the buffer that the server will have signed on its end:
// hash( hash(request) | hash(response) | cup2key_query_string )
// When building the client's version of the buffer, it's important to use
// the original request hash that it attempted to send, and not the observed
// request hash that the server sent back to us.
const std::vector<uint8_t> response_hash = SHA256HashStr(response_body);
std::vector<uint8_t> signed_message;
signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), request_hash_.begin(),
signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), response_hash.begin(),
signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), request_query_cup2key_.begin(),
const std::vector<uint8_t> signed_message_hash =
// Initialize the signature verifier.
crypto::SignatureVerifier verifier;
if (!verifier.VerifyInit(crypto::SignatureVerifier::ECDSA_SHA256, signature,
public_key_)) {
DVLOG(1) << "Couldn't init SignatureVerifier.";
return false;
// If the verification fails, that implies one of two outcomes:
// * The signature was modified
// * The buffer that the server signed does not match the buffer that the
// client assembled -- implying that either request body or response body
// was modified, or a different nonce value was used.
return verifier.VerifyFinal();
} // namespace client_update_protocol