| /* ssl/d1_srvr.c */ |
| /* |
| * DTLS implementation written by Nagendra Modadugu |
| * (nagendra@cs.stanford.edu) for the OpenSSL project 2005. |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1999-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@OpenSSL.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| #include <openssl/buffer.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/x509.h> |
| #include <openssl/md5.h> |
| #include <openssl/bn.h> |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| # include <openssl/dh.h> |
| #endif |
| |
| static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver); |
| static int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s); |
| |
| static const SSL_METHOD *dtls1_get_server_method(int ver) |
| { |
| if (ver == DTLS1_VERSION) |
| return (DTLSv1_server_method()); |
| else |
| return (NULL); |
| } |
| |
| IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(DTLSv1_server_method, |
| dtls1_accept, |
| ssl_undefined_function, dtls1_get_server_method) |
| |
| int dtls1_accept(SSL *s) |
| { |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| unsigned long Time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); |
| void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; |
| unsigned long alg_k; |
| int ret = -1; |
| int new_state, state, skip = 0; |
| int listen; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; |
| char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; |
| #endif |
| |
| RAND_add(&Time, sizeof(Time), 0); |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| clear_sys_error(); |
| |
| if (s->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = s->info_callback; |
| else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) |
| cb = s->ctx->info_callback; |
| |
| listen = s->d1->listen; |
| |
| /* init things to blank */ |
| s->in_handshake++; |
| if (!SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) |
| SSL_clear(s); |
| |
| s->d1->listen = listen; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * Notify SCTP BIO socket to enter handshake mode and prevent stream |
| * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. |
| */ |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, |
| s->in_handshake, NULL); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (s->cert == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_SET); |
| return (-1); |
| } |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| /* |
| * If we're awaiting a HeartbeatResponse, pretend we already got and |
| * don't await it anymore, because Heartbeats don't make sense during |
| * handshakes anyway. |
| */ |
| if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { |
| dtls1_stop_timer(s); |
| s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; |
| s->tlsext_hb_seq++; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| for (;;) { |
| state = s->state; |
| |
| switch (s->state) { |
| case SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE: |
| s->renegotiate = 1; |
| /* s->state=SSL_ST_ACCEPT; */ |
| |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE: |
| case SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| case SSL_ST_BEFORE | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| case SSL_ST_OK | SSL_ST_ACCEPT: |
| |
| s->server = 1; |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START, 1); |
| |
| if ((s->version & 0xff00) != (DTLS1_VERSION & 0xff00)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->type = SSL_ST_ACCEPT; |
| |
| if (s->init_buf == NULL) { |
| if ((buf = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(buf, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) { |
| BUF_MEM_free(buf); |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_buf = buf; |
| } |
| |
| if (!ssl3_setup_buffers(s)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 0; |
| /* |
| * Should have been reset by ssl3_get_finished, too. |
| */ |
| s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; |
| |
| if (s->state != SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) { |
| /* |
| * Ok, we now need to push on a buffering BIO so that the |
| * output is sent in a way that TCP likes :-) ...but not with |
| * SCTP :-) |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) |
| #endif |
| if (!ssl_init_wbio_buffer(s, 1)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept++; |
| } else if (!s->s3->send_connection_binding && |
| !(s->options & |
| SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
| /* |
| * Server attempting to renegotiate with client that doesn't |
| * support secure renegotiation. |
| */ |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, |
| SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE); |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } else { |
| /* |
| * s->state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE, we will just send a |
| * HelloRequest |
| */ |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate++; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B: |
| |
| s->shutdown = 0; |
| dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_hello_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C: |
| s->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C: |
| |
| s->shutdown = 0; |
| ret = ssl3_get_client_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| dtls1_stop_timer(s); |
| |
| if (ret == 1 && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) |
| s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A; |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A; |
| |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * Reflect ClientHello sequence to remain stateless while |
| * listening |
| */ |
| if (listen) { |
| memcpy(s->s3->write_sequence, s->s3->read_sequence, |
| sizeof(s->s3->write_sequence)); |
| } |
| |
| /* If we're just listening, stop here */ |
| if (listen && s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { |
| ret = 2; |
| s->d1->listen = 0; |
| /* |
| * Set expected sequence numbers to continue the handshake. |
| */ |
| s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 2; |
| s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 1; |
| s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| break; |
| |
| case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A: |
| case DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B: |
| |
| ret = dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_A; |
| |
| /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ |
| if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) |
| ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); |
| break; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK: |
| |
| if (BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { |
| s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| break; |
| |
| case DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK: |
| ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(SSL_get_wbio(s)); |
| if (ret < 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (ret == 0) { |
| if (s->d1->next_state != SSL_ST_OK) { |
| s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; |
| s->rwstate = SSL_READING; |
| BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| s->state = s->d1->next_state; |
| break; |
| #endif |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B: |
| s->renegotiate = 2; |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_server_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| if (s->hit) { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no |
| * SCTP used. |
| */ |
| snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), |
| DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); |
| |
| if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
| sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
| sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
| sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| #else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| #endif |
| } else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B: |
| /* Check if it is anon DH or normal PSK */ |
| if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
| && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_server_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A; |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } else { |
| skip = 1; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| #else |
| } else |
| skip = 1; |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| #endif |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| |
| /* |
| * clear this, it may get reset by |
| * send_server_key_exchange |
| */ |
| s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * only send if a DH key exchange or RSA but we have a sign only |
| * certificate |
| */ |
| if (0 |
| /* |
| * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if |
| * provided |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| || ((alg_k & SSL_kPSK) && s->ctx->psk_identity_hint) |
| #endif |
| || (alg_k & SSL_kEDH) |
| || (alg_k & SSL_kEECDH) |
| || ((alg_k & SSL_kRSA) |
| && (s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey == NULL |
| || (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) |
| && EVP_PKEY_size(s->cert->pkeys |
| [SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey) * |
| 8 > SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) |
| ) |
| ) |
| ) |
| ) { |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } else |
| skip = 1; |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B: |
| if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ |
| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) || |
| /* |
| * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert |
| * during re-negotiation: |
| */ |
| ((s->session->peer != NULL) && |
| (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) || |
| /* |
| * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see |
| * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in |
| * RFC 2246): |
| */ |
| ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) && |
| /* |
| * ... except when the application insists on |
| * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts |
| * this for SSL 3) |
| */ |
| !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) || |
| /* |
| * never request cert in Kerberos ciphersuites |
| */ |
| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aKRB5) |
| /* |
| * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests |
| * are omitted |
| */ |
| || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| /* no cert request */ |
| skip = 1; |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
| s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } else { |
| s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_certificate_request(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| #ifndef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
| s->d1->next_state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A; |
| s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; |
| } |
| # endif |
| #else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
| s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; |
| } |
| # endif |
| #endif |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B: |
| dtls1_start_timer(s); |
| ret = dtls1_send_server_done(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH: |
| s->rwstate = SSL_WRITING; |
| if (BIO_flush(s->wbio) <= 0) { |
| /* |
| * If the write error was fatal, stop trying |
| */ |
| if (!BIO_should_retry(s->wbio)) { |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| } |
| |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; |
| s->state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_B: |
| /* Check for second client hello (MS SGC) */ |
| ret = ssl3_check_client_hello(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| if (ret == 2) { |
| dtls1_stop_timer(s); |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_C; |
| } else { |
| if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { |
| ret = ssl3_get_client_certificate(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP |
| * used. |
| */ |
| snprintf((char *)labelbuffer, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL), |
| DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL); |
| |
| if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, |
| sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, |
| sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, |
| sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); |
| #endif |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| if (ret == 2) { |
| /* |
| * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH |
| * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is |
| * not sent. |
| */ |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| } else { |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * We need to get hashes here so if there is a client cert, |
| * it can be verified |
| */ |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, |
| NID_md5, |
| &(s->s3-> |
| tmp.cert_verify_md |
| [0])); |
| s->method->ssl3_enc->cert_verify_mac(s, NID_sha1, |
| &(s->s3-> |
| tmp.cert_verify_md |
| [MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH])); |
| } |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY_B: |
| ret = ssl3_get_cert_verify(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) && |
| state == SSL_ST_RENEGOTIATE) |
| s->state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SR_READ_SOCK; |
| else |
| #endif |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B: |
| /* |
| * Enable CCS. Receiving a CCS clears the flag, so make |
| * sure not to re-enable it to ban duplicates. This *should* be the |
| * first time we have received one - but we check anyway to be |
| * cautious. |
| * s->s3->change_cipher_spec is set when a CCS is |
| * processed in d1_pkt.c, and remains set until |
| * the client's Finished message is read. |
| */ |
| if (!s->s3->change_cipher_spec) |
| s->d1->change_cipher_spec_ok = 1; |
| ret = ssl3_get_finished(s, SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_B); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| dtls1_stop_timer(s); |
| if (s->hit) |
| s->state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A; |
| #endif |
| else |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B: |
| ret = dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS_B: |
| ret = ssl3_send_cert_status(s); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B: |
| |
| s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| ret = dtls1_send_change_cipher_spec(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_CHANGE_B); |
| |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| /* |
| * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if |
| * no SCTP used. |
| */ |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, |
| 0, NULL); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A; |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, |
| SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) |
| { |
| ret = -1; |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A: |
| case SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B: |
| ret = dtls1_send_finished(s, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_A, |
| SSL3_ST_SW_FINISHED_B, |
| s->method-> |
| ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, |
| s->method-> |
| ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); |
| if (ret <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_FLUSH; |
| if (s->hit) { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL3_ST_SR_FINISHED_A; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if |
| * no SCTP used. |
| */ |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, |
| 0, NULL); |
| #endif |
| } else { |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = SSL_ST_OK; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| if (BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) { |
| s->d1->next_state = s->s3->tmp.next_state; |
| s->s3->tmp.next_state = DTLS1_SCTP_ST_SW_WRITE_SOCK; |
| } |
| #endif |
| } |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| break; |
| |
| case SSL_ST_OK: |
| /* clean a few things up */ |
| ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); |
| |
| #if 0 |
| BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); |
| s->init_buf = NULL; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* remove buffering on output */ |
| ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); |
| |
| s->init_num = 0; |
| |
| if (s->renegotiate == 2) { /* skipped if we just sent a |
| * HelloRequest */ |
| s->renegotiate = 0; |
| s->new_session = 0; |
| |
| ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); |
| |
| s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good++; |
| /* s->server=1; */ |
| s->handshake_func = dtls1_accept; |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); |
| } |
| |
| ret = 1; |
| |
| /* done handshaking, next message is client hello */ |
| s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; |
| /* next message is server hello */ |
| s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; |
| s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| |
| case SSL_ST_ERR: |
| default: |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_ACCEPT, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE); |
| ret = -1; |
| goto end; |
| /* break; */ |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->s3->tmp.reuse_message && !skip) { |
| if (s->debug) { |
| if ((ret = BIO_flush(s->wbio)) <= 0) |
| goto end; |
| } |
| |
| if ((cb != NULL) && (s->state != state)) { |
| new_state = s->state; |
| s->state = state; |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_LOOP, 1); |
| s->state = new_state; |
| } |
| } |
| skip = 0; |
| } |
| end: |
| /* BIO_flush(s->wbio); */ |
| |
| s->in_handshake--; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP |
| /* |
| * Notify SCTP BIO socket to leave handshake mode and prevent stream |
| * identifier other than 0. Will be ignored if no SCTP is used. |
| */ |
| BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE, |
| s->in_handshake, NULL); |
| #endif |
| |
| if (cb != NULL) |
| cb(s, SSL_CB_ACCEPT_EXIT, ret); |
| return (ret); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_hello_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_A) { |
| p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0, 0, 0); |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B; |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * no need to buffer this message, since there are no retransmit |
| * requests for it |
| */ |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned int msg_len; |
| unsigned char *msg, *buf, *p; |
| |
| if (s->state == DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_A) { |
| buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| msg = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| *(p++) = s->version >> 8; |
| *(p++) = s->version & 0xFF; |
| |
| if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || |
| s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, |
| &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, |
| ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| s->state = SSL_ST_ERR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| *(p++) = (unsigned char)s->d1->cookie_len; |
| memcpy(p, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); |
| p += s->d1->cookie_len; |
| msg_len = p - msg; |
| |
| dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, |
| DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, |
| msg_len); |
| |
| s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B; |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = p - buf; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| } |
| |
| /* s->state = DTLS1_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_server_hello(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf; |
| unsigned char *p, *d; |
| int i; |
| unsigned int sl; |
| unsigned long l; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_A) { |
| buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| p = s->s3->server_random; |
| ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, p, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| /* Do the message type and length last */ |
| d = p = &(buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| |
| *(p++) = s->version >> 8; |
| *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; |
| |
| /* Random stuff */ |
| memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; |
| |
| /* |
| * now in theory we have 3 options to sending back the session id. |
| * If it is a re-use, we send back the old session-id, if it is a new |
| * session, we send back the new session-id or we send back a 0 |
| * length session-id if we want it to be single use. Currently I will |
| * not implement the '0' length session-id 12-Jan-98 - I'll now |
| * support the '0' length stuff. |
| */ |
| if (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER)) |
| s->session->session_id_length = 0; |
| |
| sl = s->session->session_id_length; |
| if (sl > sizeof s->session->session_id) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| *(p++) = sl; |
| memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); |
| p += sl; |
| |
| /* put the cipher */ |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); |
| p += i; |
| |
| /* put the compression method */ |
| #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP |
| *(p++) = 0; |
| #else |
| if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) |
| *(p++) = 0; |
| else |
| *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if ((p = |
| ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, |
| buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH)) == |
| NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* do the header */ |
| l = (p - d); |
| d = buf; |
| |
| d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l, 0, l); |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B; |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = p - buf; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_server_done(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_A) { |
| p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| |
| /* do the header */ |
| p = dtls1_set_message_header(s, p, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0, 0, 0); |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B; |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| unsigned char *q; |
| int j, num; |
| RSA *rsa; |
| unsigned char md_buf[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned int u; |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| DH *dh = NULL, *dhp; |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| EC_KEY *ecdh = NULL, *ecdhp; |
| unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; |
| int encodedlen = 0; |
| int curve_id = 0; |
| BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL; |
| #endif |
| EVP_PKEY *pkey; |
| unsigned char *p, *d; |
| int al, i; |
| unsigned long type; |
| int n; |
| CERT *cert; |
| BIGNUM *r[4]; |
| int nr[4], kn; |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx; |
| |
| EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md_ctx); |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_A) { |
| type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| cert = s->cert; |
| |
| buf = s->init_buf; |
| |
| r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; |
| n = 0; |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (type & SSL_kRSA) { |
| rsa = cert->rsa_tmp; |
| if ((rsa == NULL) && (s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb != NULL)) { |
| rsa = s->cert->rsa_tmp_cb(s, |
| SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> |
| tmp.new_cipher), |
| SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> |
| tmp.new_cipher)); |
| if (rsa == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_ERROR_GENERATING_TMP_RSA_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| RSA_up_ref(rsa); |
| cert->rsa_tmp = rsa; |
| } |
| if (rsa == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_RSA_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| r[0] = rsa->n; |
| r[1] = rsa->e; |
| s->s3->tmp.use_rsa_tmp = 1; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH |
| if (type & SSL_kEDH) { |
| dhp = cert->dh_tmp; |
| if ((dhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) |
| dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, |
| SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> |
| tmp.new_cipher), |
| SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s->s3-> |
| tmp.new_cipher)); |
| if (dhp == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.dh != NULL) { |
| DH_free(dh); |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if ((dh = DHparams_dup(dhp)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.dh = dh; |
| if ((dhp->pub_key == NULL || |
| dhp->priv_key == NULL || |
| (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE))) { |
| if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else { |
| dh->pub_key = BN_dup(dhp->pub_key); |
| dh->priv_key = BN_dup(dhp->priv_key); |
| if ((dh->pub_key == NULL) || (dh->priv_key == NULL)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_DH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| r[0] = dh->p; |
| r[1] = dh->g; |
| r[2] = dh->pub_key; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { |
| const EC_GROUP *group; |
| |
| ecdhp = cert->ecdh_tmp; |
| if ((ecdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { |
| ecdhp = s->cert->ecdh_tmp_cb(s, |
| SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3-> |
| tmp.new_cipher), |
| SSL_C_EXPORT_PKEYLENGTH(s-> |
| s3->tmp.new_cipher)); |
| } |
| if (ecdhp == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->tmp.ecdh != NULL) { |
| EC_KEY_free(s->s3->tmp.ecdh); |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* Duplicate the ECDH structure. */ |
| if (ecdhp == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if ((ecdh = EC_KEY_dup(ecdhp)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->tmp.ecdh = ecdh; |
| if ((EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (s->options & SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE)) { |
| if (!EC_KEY_generate_key(ecdh)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (((group = EC_KEY_get0_group(ecdh)) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh) == NULL) || |
| (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdh) == NULL)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| if (SSL_C_IS_EXPORT(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher) && |
| (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) > 163)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_ECGROUP_TOO_LARGE_FOR_CIPHER); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * XXX: For now, we only support ephemeral ECDH keys over named |
| * (not generic) curves. For supported named curves, curve_id is |
| * non-zero. |
| */ |
| if ((curve_id = |
| tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group))) |
| == 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Encode the public key. First check the size of encoding and |
| * allocate memory accordingly. |
| */ |
| encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| NULL, 0, NULL); |
| |
| encodedPoint = (unsigned char *) |
| OPENSSL_malloc(encodedlen * sizeof(unsigned char)); |
| bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); |
| if ((encodedPoint == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| encodedlen = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, |
| EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ecdh), |
| POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, |
| encodedPoint, encodedlen, bn_ctx); |
| |
| if (encodedlen == 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_ECDH_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| bn_ctx = NULL; |
| |
| /* |
| * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves in |
| * ECDH ephemeral key exchanges. In this situation, we need four |
| * additional bytes to encode the entire ServerECDHParams |
| * structure. |
| */ |
| n = 4 + encodedlen; |
| |
| /* |
| * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we |
| * can set these to NULLs |
| */ |
| r[0] = NULL; |
| r[1] = NULL; |
| r[2] = NULL; |
| r[3] = NULL; |
| } else |
| #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_ECDH */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| if (type & SSL_kPSK) { |
| /* |
| * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint |
| */ |
| n += 2 + strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| } else |
| #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ |
| { |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
| nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); |
| n += 2 + nr[i]; |
| } |
| |
| if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) |
| && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kPSK)) { |
| if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, NULL)) |
| == NULL) { |
| al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); |
| } else { |
| pkey = NULL; |
| kn = 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + kn)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| d = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| p = &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| |
| for (i = 0; r[i] != NULL; i++) { |
| s2n(nr[i], p); |
| BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); |
| p += nr[i]; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (type & SSL_kEECDH) { |
| /* |
| * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In |
| * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte |
| * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded |
| * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself |
| */ |
| *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = 0; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = curve_id; |
| p += 1; |
| *p = encodedlen; |
| p += 1; |
| memcpy((unsigned char *)p, |
| (unsigned char *)encodedPoint, encodedlen); |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| encodedPoint = NULL; |
| p += encodedlen; |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK |
| if (type & SSL_kPSK) { |
| /* copy PSK identity hint */ |
| s2n(strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint), p); |
| strncpy((char *)p, s->ctx->psk_identity_hint, |
| strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint)); |
| p += strlen(s->ctx->psk_identity_hint); |
| } |
| #endif |
| |
| /* not anonymous */ |
| if (pkey != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * n is the length of the params, they start at |
| * &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) and p points to the space at the |
| * end. |
| */ |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_RSA) { |
| q = md_buf; |
| j = 0; |
| for (num = 2; num > 0; num--) { |
| EVP_DigestInit_ex(&md_ctx, (num == 2) |
| ? s->ctx->md5 : s->ctx->sha1, NULL); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), |
| n); |
| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&md_ctx, q, (unsigned int *)&i); |
| q += i; |
| j += i; |
| } |
| if (RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, md_buf, j, |
| &(p[2]), &u, pkey->pkey.rsa) <= 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_RSA); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(u, p); |
| n += u + 2; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { |
| /* lets do DSS */ |
| EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_dss1(), NULL); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n); |
| if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), |
| (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_DSA); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(i, p); |
| n += i + 2; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA) |
| if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { |
| /* let's do ECDSA */ |
| EVP_SignInit_ex(&md_ctx, EVP_ecdsa(), NULL); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), |
| SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); |
| EVP_SignUpdate(&md_ctx, &(d[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]), n); |
| if (!EVP_SignFinal(&md_ctx, &(p[2]), |
| (unsigned int *)&i, pkey)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| ERR_LIB_ECDSA); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s2n(i, p); |
| n += i + 2; |
| } else |
| #endif |
| { |
| /* Is this error check actually needed? */ |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, |
| SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); |
| goto f_err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| d = dtls1_set_message_header(s, d, |
| SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n, 0, n); |
| |
| /* |
| * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off |
| */ |
| s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| } |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B; |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| f_err: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| err: |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDH |
| if (encodedPoint != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); |
| BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); |
| #endif |
| EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md_ctx); |
| return (-1); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_certificate_request(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p, *d; |
| int i, j, nl, off, n; |
| STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; |
| X509_NAME *name; |
| BUF_MEM *buf; |
| unsigned int msg_len; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_A) { |
| buf = s->init_buf; |
| |
| d = p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| |
| /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ |
| p++; |
| n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); |
| d[0] = n; |
| p += n; |
| n++; |
| |
| off = n; |
| p += 2; |
| n += 2; |
| |
| sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); |
| nl = 0; |
| if (sk != NULL) { |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { |
| name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); |
| j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean |
| (buf, DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n + j + 2)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, |
| ERR_R_BUF_LIB); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + n]); |
| if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG)) { |
| s2n(j, p); |
| i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); |
| n += 2 + j; |
| nl += 2 + j; |
| } else { |
| d = p; |
| i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); |
| j -= 2; |
| s2n(j, d); |
| j += 2; |
| n += j; |
| nl += j; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| /* else no CA names */ |
| p = (unsigned char *)&(buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + off]); |
| s2n(nl, p); |
| |
| d = (unsigned char *)buf->data; |
| *(d++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST; |
| l2n3(n, d); |
| s2n(s->d1->handshake_write_seq, d); |
| s->d1->handshake_write_seq++; |
| |
| /* |
| * we should now have things packed up, so lets send it off |
| */ |
| |
| s->init_num = n + DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| #ifdef NETSCAPE_HANG_BUG |
| /* XXX: what to do about this? */ |
| p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data + s->init_num; |
| |
| /* do the header */ |
| *(p++) = SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE; |
| *(p++) = 0; |
| *(p++) = 0; |
| *(p++) = 0; |
| s->init_num += 4; |
| #endif |
| |
| /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ |
| msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, |
| SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, msg_len, 0, |
| msg_len); |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B; |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_REQ_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| err: |
| return (-1); |
| } |
| |
| int dtls1_send_server_certificate(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned long l; |
| X509 *x; |
| |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_A) { |
| x = ssl_get_server_send_cert(s); |
| if (x == NULL) { |
| /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */ |
| if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey != SSL_kKRB5) || |
| (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth != SSL_aKRB5)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, |
| ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| } |
| |
| l = dtls1_output_cert_chain(s, x); |
| if (!l) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS1_SEND_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return (0); |
| } |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B; |
| s->init_num = (int)l; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_CERT_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| int dtls1_send_newsession_ticket(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (s->state == SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_A) { |
| unsigned char *p, *senc, *macstart; |
| int len, slen; |
| unsigned int hlen, msg_len; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; |
| unsigned char key_name[16]; |
| |
| /* get session encoding length */ |
| slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); |
| /* |
| * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too |
| * long |
| */ |
| if (slen > 0xFF00) |
| return -1; |
| /* |
| * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as follows 12 |
| * (DTLS handshake message header) + 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 |
| * (ticket length) + 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + |
| * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session length) |
| * + max_md_size (HMAC). |
| */ |
| if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, |
| DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + |
| EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) |
| return -1; |
| senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen); |
| if (!senc) |
| return -1; |
| p = senc; |
| i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p); |
| |
| p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| /* |
| * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does |
| * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. |
| */ |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, &ctx, |
| &hctx, 1) < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } else { |
| RAND_pseudo_bytes(iv, 16); |
| EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv); |
| HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| tlsext_tick_md(), NULL); |
| memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); |
| } |
| l2n(s->session->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, p); |
| /* Skip ticket length for now */ |
| p += 2; |
| /* Output key name */ |
| macstart = p; |
| memcpy(p, key_name, 16); |
| p += 16; |
| /* output IV */ |
| memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx)); |
| p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| /* Encrypt session data */ |
| EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, p, &len, senc, slen); |
| p += len; |
| EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, p, &len); |
| p += len; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| |
| HMAC_Update(&hctx, macstart, p - macstart); |
| HMAC_Final(&hctx, p, &hlen); |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| |
| p += hlen; |
| /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ |
| /* Total length */ |
| len = p - (unsigned char *)(s->init_buf->data); |
| /* Ticket length */ |
| p = (unsigned char *)&(s->init_buf->data[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]) + 4; |
| s2n(len - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 6, p); |
| |
| /* number of bytes to write */ |
| s->init_num = len; |
| s->state = SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B; |
| s->init_off = 0; |
| OPENSSL_free(senc); |
| |
| /* XDTLS: set message header ? */ |
| msg_len = s->init_num - DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; |
| dtls1_set_message_header(s, (void *)s->init_buf->data, |
| SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, msg_len, 0, |
| msg_len); |
| |
| /* buffer the message to handle re-xmits */ |
| dtls1_buffer_message(s, 0); |
| } |
| |
| /* SSL3_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET_B */ |
| return (dtls1_do_write(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE)); |
| } |
| #endif |