| /* ssl/t1_lib.c */ |
| /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) |
| * All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * This package is an SSL implementation written |
| * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). |
| * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. |
| * |
| * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as |
| * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions |
| * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, |
| * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation |
| * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms |
| * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in |
| * the code are not to be removed. |
| * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution |
| * as the author of the parts of the library used. |
| * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or |
| * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the |
| * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software |
| * must display the following acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes cryptographic software written by |
| * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library |
| * being used are not cryptographic related :-). |
| * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from |
| * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: |
| * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND |
| * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE |
| * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE |
| * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL |
| * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS |
| * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT |
| * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY |
| * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF |
| * SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * |
| * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or |
| * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be |
| * copied and put under another distribution licence |
| * [including the GNU Public Licence.] |
| */ |
| /* ==================================================================== |
| * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. |
| * |
| * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions |
| * are met: |
| * |
| * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. |
| * |
| * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright |
| * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in |
| * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the |
| * distribution. |
| * |
| * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this |
| * software must display the following acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to |
| * endorse or promote products derived from this software without |
| * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact |
| * openssl-core@openssl.org. |
| * |
| * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" |
| * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written |
| * permission of the OpenSSL Project. |
| * |
| * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following |
| * acknowledgment: |
| * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project |
| * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" |
| * |
| * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY |
| * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE |
| * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR |
| * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR |
| * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, |
| * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT |
| * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; |
| * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) |
| * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, |
| * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) |
| * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED |
| * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. |
| * ==================================================================== |
| * |
| * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young |
| * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim |
| * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| #include <openssl/opensslconf.h> |
| #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_STARBOARD) |
| #include <stdio.h> |
| #endif // !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_STARBOARD) |
| #include <openssl/objects.h> |
| #include <openssl/evp.h> |
| #include <openssl/hmac.h> |
| #include <openssl/ocsp.h> |
| #include <openssl/rand.h> |
| #include "ssl_locl.h" |
| |
| const char tls1_version_str[] = "TLSv1" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT; |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *tick, int ticklen, |
| const unsigned char *sess_id, int sesslen, |
| SSL_SESSION **psess); |
| #endif |
| |
| SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data = { |
| tls1_enc, |
| tls1_mac, |
| tls1_setup_key_block, |
| tls1_generate_master_secret, |
| tls1_change_cipher_state, |
| tls1_final_finish_mac, |
| TLS1_FINISH_MAC_LENGTH, |
| tls1_cert_verify_mac, |
| TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_CLIENT_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST, TLS_MD_SERVER_FINISH_CONST_SIZE, |
| tls1_alert_code, |
| tls1_export_keying_material, |
| }; |
| |
| long tls1_default_timeout(void) |
| { |
| /* |
| * 2 hours, the 24 hours mentioned in the TLSv1 spec is way too long for |
| * http, the cache would over fill |
| */ |
| return (60 * 60 * 2); |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_new(SSL *s) |
| { |
| if (!ssl3_new(s)) |
| return (0); |
| s->method->ssl_clear(s); |
| return (1); |
| } |
| |
| void tls1_free(SSL *s) |
| { |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| if (s->tlsext_session_ticket) { |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->tlsext_session_ticket); |
| } |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT */ |
| ssl3_free(s); |
| } |
| |
| void tls1_clear(SSL *s) |
| { |
| ssl3_clear(s); |
| s->version = s->method->version; |
| } |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| |
| static int nid_list[] = { |
| NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| NID_secp521r1 /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| }; |
| |
| static int pref_list[] = { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect571r1, /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| NID_sect571k1, /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp521r1, /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect409k1, /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| NID_sect409r1, /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp384r1, /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect283k1, /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| NID_sect283r1, /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp256k1, /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| NID_X9_62_prime256v1, /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect239k1, /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| NID_sect233k1, /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| NID_sect233r1, /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp224k1, /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| NID_secp224r1, /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect193r1, /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| NID_sect193r2, /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp192k1, /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| NID_X9_62_prime192v1, /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M |
| NID_sect163k1, /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| NID_sect163r1, /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| NID_sect163r2, /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| # endif |
| NID_secp160k1, /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| NID_secp160r1, /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| NID_secp160r2, /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| }; |
| |
| int tls1_ec_curve_id2nid(int curve_id) |
| { |
| /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ |
| if ((curve_id < 1) || ((unsigned int)curve_id > |
| sizeof(nid_list) / sizeof(nid_list[0]))) |
| return 0; |
| return nid_list[curve_id - 1]; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(int nid) |
| { |
| /* ECC curves from RFC 4492 */ |
| switch (nid) { |
| case NID_sect163k1: /* sect163k1 (1) */ |
| return 1; |
| case NID_sect163r1: /* sect163r1 (2) */ |
| return 2; |
| case NID_sect163r2: /* sect163r2 (3) */ |
| return 3; |
| case NID_sect193r1: /* sect193r1 (4) */ |
| return 4; |
| case NID_sect193r2: /* sect193r2 (5) */ |
| return 5; |
| case NID_sect233k1: /* sect233k1 (6) */ |
| return 6; |
| case NID_sect233r1: /* sect233r1 (7) */ |
| return 7; |
| case NID_sect239k1: /* sect239k1 (8) */ |
| return 8; |
| case NID_sect283k1: /* sect283k1 (9) */ |
| return 9; |
| case NID_sect283r1: /* sect283r1 (10) */ |
| return 10; |
| case NID_sect409k1: /* sect409k1 (11) */ |
| return 11; |
| case NID_sect409r1: /* sect409r1 (12) */ |
| return 12; |
| case NID_sect571k1: /* sect571k1 (13) */ |
| return 13; |
| case NID_sect571r1: /* sect571r1 (14) */ |
| return 14; |
| case NID_secp160k1: /* secp160k1 (15) */ |
| return 15; |
| case NID_secp160r1: /* secp160r1 (16) */ |
| return 16; |
| case NID_secp160r2: /* secp160r2 (17) */ |
| return 17; |
| case NID_secp192k1: /* secp192k1 (18) */ |
| return 18; |
| case NID_X9_62_prime192v1: /* secp192r1 (19) */ |
| return 19; |
| case NID_secp224k1: /* secp224k1 (20) */ |
| return 20; |
| case NID_secp224r1: /* secp224r1 (21) */ |
| return 21; |
| case NID_secp256k1: /* secp256k1 (22) */ |
| return 22; |
| case NID_X9_62_prime256v1: /* secp256r1 (23) */ |
| return 23; |
| case NID_secp384r1: /* secp384r1 (24) */ |
| return 24; |
| case NID_secp521r1: /* secp521r1 (25) */ |
| return 25; |
| default: |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT |
| |
| /* |
| * List of supported signature algorithms and hashes. Should make this |
| * customisable at some point, for now include everything we support. |
| */ |
| |
| # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) /* */ |
| # else |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_rsa, |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) /* */ |
| # else |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_dsa, |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) |
| /* */ |
| # else |
| # define tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) md, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa, |
| # endif |
| |
| # define tlsext_sigalg(md) \ |
| tlsext_sigalg_rsa(md) \ |
| tlsext_sigalg_dsa(md) \ |
| tlsext_sigalg_ecdsa(md) |
| |
| static unsigned char tls12_sigalgs[] = { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha512) |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha384) |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha256) |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha224) |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| tlsext_sigalg(TLSEXT_hash_sha1) |
| # endif |
| }; |
| |
| int tls12_get_req_sig_algs(SSL *s, unsigned char *p) |
| { |
| size_t slen = sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
| if (p) |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(p, tls12_sigalgs, slen); |
| return (int)slen; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned char *ssl_add_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *limit) |
| { |
| int extdatalen = 0; |
| unsigned char *orig = buf; |
| unsigned char *ret = buf; |
| |
| /* don't add extensions for SSLv3 unless doing secure renegotiation */ |
| if (s->client_version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| return orig; |
| |
| ret += 2; |
| |
| if (ret >= limit) |
| return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { |
| /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ |
| unsigned long size_str; |
| long lenmax; |
| |
| /*- |
| * check for enough space. |
| * 4 for the servername type and entension length |
| * 2 for servernamelist length |
| * 1 for the hostname type |
| * 2 for hostname length |
| * + hostname length |
| */ |
| |
| if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 9) < 0 |
| || (size_str = |
| OPENSSL_port_strlen(s->tlsext_hostname)) > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* extension type and length */ |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); |
| s2n(size_str + 5, ret); |
| |
| /* length of servername list */ |
| s2n(size_str + 3, ret); |
| |
| /* hostname type, length and hostname */ |
| *(ret++) = (unsigned char)TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; |
| s2n(size_str, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_hostname, size_str); |
| ret += size_str; |
| } |
| |
| /* Add RI if renegotiating */ |
| if (s->renegotiate) { |
| int el; |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
| s2n(el, ret); |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret += el; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| /* Add SRP username if there is one */ |
| if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { /* Add TLS extension SRP username to the |
| * Client Hello message */ |
| |
| int login_len = OPENSSL_port_strlen(s->srp_ctx.login); |
| if (login_len > 255 || login_len == 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * check for enough space. |
| * 4 for the srp type type and entension length |
| * 1 for the srp user identity |
| * + srp user identity length |
| */ |
| if ((limit - ret - 5 - login_len) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| /* fill in the extension */ |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_srp, ret); |
| s2n(login_len + 1, ret); |
| (*ret++) = (unsigned char)login_len; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->srp_ctx.login, login_len); |
| ret += login_len; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message |
| */ |
| long lenmax; |
| |
| if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
| s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); |
| *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| } |
| if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Add TLS extension EllipticCurves to the ClientHello message |
| */ |
| long lenmax; |
| |
| if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 6) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length > 65532) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves, ret); |
| s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length + 2, ret); |
| |
| s2n(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| ret += s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| } |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| if (!(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { |
| int ticklen; |
| if (!s->new_session && s->session && s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| ticklen = s->session->tlsext_ticklen; |
| else if (s->session && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| s->tlsext_session_ticket->data) { |
| ticklen = s->tlsext_session_ticket->length; |
| s->session->tlsext_tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); |
| if (!s->session->tlsext_tick) |
| return NULL; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->session->tlsext_tick, |
| s->tlsext_session_ticket->data, ticklen); |
| s->session->tlsext_ticklen = ticklen; |
| } else |
| ticklen = 0; |
| if (ticklen == 0 && s->tlsext_session_ticket && |
| s->tlsext_session_ticket->data == NULL) |
| goto skip_ext; |
| /* |
| * Check for enough room 2 for extension type, 2 for len rest for |
| * ticket |
| */ |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - ticklen) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); |
| s2n(ticklen, ret); |
| if (ticklen) { |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->session->tlsext_tick, ticklen); |
| ret += ticklen; |
| } |
| } |
| skip_ext: |
| |
| if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| if ((size_t)(limit - ret) < sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 6) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms, ret); |
| s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs) + 2, ret); |
| s2n(sizeof(tls12_sigalgs), ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, tls12_sigalgs, sizeof(tls12_sigalgs)); |
| ret += sizeof(tls12_sigalgs); |
| } |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| size_t col = s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - col < 0)) |
| return NULL; |
| if (col > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| s2n(col + 2, ret); |
| s2n(col, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input, col); |
| ret += col; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp && |
| s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| int i; |
| long extlen, idlen, itmp; |
| OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| |
| idlen = 0; |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { |
| id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); |
| if (itmp <= 0) |
| return NULL; |
| idlen += itmp + 2; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { |
| extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, NULL); |
| if (extlen < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| } else |
| extlen = 0; |
| |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 7 - extlen - idlen) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); |
| if (extlen + idlen > 0xFFF0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(extlen + idlen + 5, ret); |
| *(ret++) = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp; |
| s2n(idlen, ret); |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids); i++) { |
| /* save position of id len */ |
| unsigned char *q = ret; |
| id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, i); |
| /* skip over id len */ |
| ret += 2; |
| itmp = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &ret); |
| /* write id len */ |
| s2n(itmp, q); |
| } |
| s2n(extlen, ret); |
| if (extlen > 0) |
| i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, &ret); |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| /* Add Heartbeat extension */ |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); |
| s2n(1, ret); |
| /*- |
| * Set mode: |
| * 1: peer may send requests |
| * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
| */ |
| if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
| *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| else |
| *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb && !s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len) { |
| /* |
| * The client advertises an emtpy extension to indicate its support |
| * for Next Protocol Negotiation |
| */ |
| if (limit - ret - 4 < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); |
| s2n(0, ret); |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s)) { |
| int el; |
| |
| ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
| |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); |
| s2n(el, ret); |
| |
| if (ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| ret += el; |
| } |
| # endif |
| /* |
| * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See |
| * https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-padding-03 NB: because this |
| * code works out the length of all existing extensions it MUST always |
| * appear last. |
| */ |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) { |
| int hlen = ret - (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; |
| /* |
| * The code in s23_clnt.c to build ClientHello messages includes the |
| * 5-byte record header in the buffer, while the code in s3_clnt.c |
| * does not. |
| */ |
| if (s->state == SSL23_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_A) |
| hlen -= 5; |
| if (hlen > 0xff && hlen < 0x200) { |
| hlen = 0x200 - hlen; |
| if (hlen >= 4) |
| hlen -= 4; |
| else |
| hlen = 0; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_padding, ret); |
| s2n(hlen, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memset(ret, 0, hlen); |
| ret += hlen; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) |
| return orig; |
| |
| s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| unsigned char *ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char *buf, |
| unsigned char *limit) |
| { |
| int extdatalen = 0; |
| unsigned char *orig = buf; |
| unsigned char *ret = buf; |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| int next_proto_neg_seen; |
| # endif |
| |
| /* |
| * don't add extensions for SSLv3, unless doing secure renegotiation |
| */ |
| if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !s->s3->send_connection_binding) |
| return orig; |
| |
| ret += 2; |
| if (ret >= limit) |
| return NULL; /* this really never occurs, but ... */ |
| |
| if (!s->hit && s->servername_done == 1 |
| && s->session->tlsext_hostname != NULL) { |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name, ret); |
| s2n(0, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->send_connection_binding) { |
| int el; |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, 0, &el, 0)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate, ret); |
| s2n(el, ret); |
| |
| if (!ssl_add_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| ret += el; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) { |
| /* |
| * Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ServerHello message |
| */ |
| long lenmax; |
| |
| if ((lenmax = limit - ret - 5) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > (unsigned long)lenmax) |
| return NULL; |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 255) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats, ret); |
| s2n(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length + 1, ret); |
| *(ret++) = (unsigned char)s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| ret += s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; |
| |
| } |
| /* |
| * Currently the server should not respond with a SupportedCurves |
| * extension |
| */ |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected && !(SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET)) { |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket, ret); |
| s2n(0, ret); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request, ret); |
| s2n(0, ret); |
| } |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL && s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| size_t sol = s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 6 - sol) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| if (sol > 0xFFFD) /* can't happen */ |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input, ret); |
| s2n(sol + 2, ret); |
| s2n(sol, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input, sol); |
| ret += sol; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->srtp_profile) { |
| int el; |
| |
| ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, 0, &el, 0); |
| |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - el) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp, ret); |
| s2n(el, ret); |
| |
| if (ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, ret, &el, el)) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| return NULL; |
| } |
| ret += el; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| if (((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x80 |
| || (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->id & 0xFFFF) == 0x81) |
| && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_CRYPTOPRO_TLSEXT_BUG)) { |
| const unsigned char cryptopro_ext[36] = { |
| 0xfd, 0xe8, /* 65000 */ |
| 0x00, 0x20, /* 32 bytes length */ |
| 0x30, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, |
| 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x09, 0x30, 0x08, 0x06, 0x06, |
| 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x16, 0x30, 0x08, |
| 0x06, 0x06, 0x2a, 0x85, 0x03, 0x02, 0x02, 0x17 |
| }; |
| if (limit - ret < 36) |
| return NULL; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, cryptopro_ext, 36); |
| ret += 36; |
| |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| /* Add Heartbeat extension if we've received one */ |
| if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) { |
| if ((limit - ret - 4 - 1) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat, ret); |
| s2n(1, ret); |
| /*- |
| * Set mode: |
| * 1: peer may send requests |
| * 2: peer not allowed to send requests |
| */ |
| if (s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_RECV_REQUESTS) |
| *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| else |
| *(ret++) = SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| next_proto_neg_seen = s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen; |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| if (next_proto_neg_seen && s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb) { |
| const unsigned char *npa; |
| unsigned int npalen; |
| int r; |
| |
| r = s->ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb(s, &npa, &npalen, |
| s-> |
| ctx->next_protos_advertised_cb_arg); |
| if (r == SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { |
| if ((long)(limit - ret - 4 - npalen) < 0) |
| return NULL; |
| s2n(TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg, ret); |
| s2n(npalen, ret); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(ret, npa, npalen); |
| ret += npalen; |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| if ((extdatalen = ret - orig - 2) == 0) |
| return orig; |
| |
| s2n(extdatalen, orig); |
| return ret; |
| } |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| /*- |
| * ssl_check_for_safari attempts to fingerprint Safari using OS X |
| * SecureTransport using the TLS extension block in |d|, of length |n|. |
| * Safari, since 10.6, sends exactly these extensions, in this order: |
| * SNI, |
| * elliptic_curves |
| * ec_point_formats |
| * |
| * We wish to fingerprint Safari because they broke ECDHE-ECDSA support in 10.8, |
| * but they advertise support. So enabling ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers breaks them. |
| * Sadly we cannot differentiate 10.6, 10.7 and 10.8.4 (which work), from |
| * 10.8..10.8.3 (which don't work). |
| */ |
| static void ssl_check_for_safari(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, |
| const unsigned char *limit) |
| { |
| unsigned short type, size; |
| static const unsigned char kSafariExtensionsBlock[] = { |
| 0x00, 0x0a, /* elliptic_curves extension */ |
| 0x00, 0x08, /* 8 bytes */ |
| 0x00, 0x06, /* 6 bytes of curve ids */ |
| 0x00, 0x17, /* P-256 */ |
| 0x00, 0x18, /* P-384 */ |
| 0x00, 0x19, /* P-521 */ |
| |
| 0x00, 0x0b, /* ec_point_formats */ |
| 0x00, 0x02, /* 2 bytes */ |
| 0x01, /* 1 point format */ |
| 0x00, /* uncompressed */ |
| }; |
| |
| /* The following is only present in TLS 1.2 */ |
| static const unsigned char kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock[] = { |
| 0x00, 0x0d, /* signature_algorithms */ |
| 0x00, 0x0c, /* 12 bytes */ |
| 0x00, 0x0a, /* 10 bytes */ |
| 0x05, 0x01, /* SHA-384/RSA */ |
| 0x04, 0x01, /* SHA-256/RSA */ |
| 0x02, 0x01, /* SHA-1/RSA */ |
| 0x04, 0x03, /* SHA-256/ECDSA */ |
| 0x02, 0x03, /* SHA-1/ECDSA */ |
| }; |
| |
| if (data >= (limit - 2)) |
| return; |
| data += 2; |
| |
| if (data > (limit - 4)) |
| return; |
| n2s(data, type); |
| n2s(data, size); |
| |
| if (type != TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) |
| return; |
| |
| if (data + size > limit) |
| return; |
| data += size; |
| |
| if (TLS1_get_client_version(s) >= TLS1_2_VERSION) { |
| const size_t len1 = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); |
| const size_t len2 = sizeof(kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock); |
| |
| if (data + len1 + len2 != limit) |
| return; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len1) != 0) |
| return; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(data + len1, kSafariTLS12ExtensionsBlock, len2) != 0) |
| return; |
| } else { |
| const size_t len = sizeof(kSafariExtensionsBlock); |
| |
| if (data + len != limit) |
| return; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(data, kSafariExtensionsBlock, len) != 0) |
| return; |
| } |
| |
| s->s3->is_probably_safari = 1; |
| } |
| # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| int ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, |
| unsigned char *limit, int *al) |
| { |
| unsigned short type; |
| unsigned short size; |
| unsigned short len; |
| unsigned char *data = *p; |
| int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
| int sigalg_seen = 0; |
| |
| s->servername_done = 0; |
| s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
| SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| if (s->options & SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG) |
| ssl_check_for_safari(s, data, limit); |
| # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) { |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->srp_ctx.login); |
| s->srp_ctx.login = NULL; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| s->srtp_profile = NULL; |
| |
| if (data == limit) |
| goto ri_check; |
| |
| if (data > (limit - 2)) |
| goto err; |
| |
| n2s(data, len); |
| |
| if (data + len != limit) |
| goto err; |
| |
| while (data <= (limit - 4)) { |
| n2s(data, type); |
| n2s(data, size); |
| |
| if (data + size > (limit)) |
| goto err; |
| # if 0 |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("Received extension type %d size %d\n", type, size); |
| # endif |
| if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 0, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| /*- |
| * The servername extension is treated as follows: |
| * |
| * - Only the hostname type is supported with a maximum length of 255. |
| * - The servername is rejected if too long or if it contains zeros, |
| * in which case an fatal alert is generated. |
| * - The servername field is maintained together with the session cache. |
| * - When a session is resumed, the servername call back invoked in order |
| * to allow the application to position itself to the right context. |
| * - The servername is acknowledged if it is new for a session or when |
| * it is identical to a previously used for the same session. |
| * Applications can control the behaviour. They can at any time |
| * set a 'desirable' servername for a new SSL object. This can be the |
| * case for example with HTTPS when a Host: header field is received and |
| * a renegotiation is requested. In this case, a possible servername |
| * presented in the new client hello is only acknowledged if it matches |
| * the value of the Host: field. |
| * - Applications must use SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION |
| * if they provide for changing an explicit servername context for the |
| * session, i.e. when the session has been established with a servername |
| * extension. |
| * - On session reconnect, the servername extension may be absent. |
| * |
| */ |
| |
| if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { |
| unsigned char *sdata; |
| int servname_type; |
| int dsize; |
| |
| if (size < 2) |
| goto err; |
| n2s(data, dsize); |
| size -= 2; |
| if (dsize > size) |
| goto err; |
| |
| sdata = data; |
| while (dsize > 3) { |
| servname_type = *(sdata++); |
| n2s(sdata, len); |
| dsize -= 3; |
| |
| if (len > dsize) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (s->servername_done == 0) |
| switch (servname_type) { |
| case TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name: |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| if (s->session->tlsext_hostname) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (len > TLSEXT_MAXLEN_host_name) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((s->session->tlsext_hostname = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->session->tlsext_hostname, sdata, len); |
| s->session->tlsext_hostname[len] = '\0'; |
| if (OPENSSL_port_strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) != len) { |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->session->tlsext_hostname); |
| s->session->tlsext_hostname = NULL; |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->servername_done = 1; |
| |
| } else |
| s->servername_done = s->session->tlsext_hostname |
| && OPENSSL_port_strlen(s->session->tlsext_hostname) == len |
| && OPENSSL_port_strncmp(s->session->tlsext_hostname, |
| (char *)sdata, len) == 0; |
| |
| break; |
| |
| default: |
| break; |
| } |
| |
| dsize -= len; |
| } |
| if (dsize != 0) |
| goto err; |
| |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) { |
| if (size == 0 || ((len = data[0])) != (size - 1)) |
| goto err; |
| if (s->srp_ctx.login != NULL) |
| goto err; |
| if ((s->srp_ctx.login = OPENSSL_malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) |
| return -1; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->srp_ctx.login, &data[1], len); |
| s->srp_ctx.login[len] = '\0'; |
| |
| if (OPENSSL_port_strlen(s->srp_ctx.login) != len) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { |
| unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| |
| if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1) |
| goto err; |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist) { |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = NULL; |
| } |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = |
| OPENSSL_port_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = |
| ecpointformatlist_length; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, |
| ecpointformatlist_length); |
| } |
| # if 0 |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist (length=%i) ", |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length); |
| sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%i ", *(sdata++)); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| # endif |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_elliptic_curves) { |
| unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| int ellipticcurvelist_length = (*(sdata++) << 8); |
| ellipticcurvelist_length += (*(sdata++)); |
| |
| if (ellipticcurvelist_length != size - 2 || |
| ellipticcurvelist_length < 1 || |
| /* Each NamedCurve is 2 bytes. */ |
| ellipticcurvelist_length & 1) |
| goto err; |
| |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| if (s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist) |
| goto err; |
| |
| s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| if ((s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = |
| OPENSSL_malloc(ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = |
| ellipticcurvelist_length; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist, sdata, |
| ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| } |
| # if 0 |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist (length=%i) ", |
| s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length); |
| sdata = s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%i ", *(sdata++)); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| # endif |
| } |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| |
| if (size < 2) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| n2s(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| } |
| |
| /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); |
| else |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = |
| BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { |
| if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, |
| s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { |
| if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| return 0; |
| renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) { |
| int dsize; |
| if (sigalg_seen || size < 2) |
| goto err; |
| sigalg_seen = 1; |
| n2s(data, dsize); |
| size -= 2; |
| if (dsize != size || dsize & 1) |
| goto err; |
| if (!tls1_process_sigalgs(s, data, dsize)) |
| goto err; |
| } else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| |
| if (size < 5) |
| goto err; |
| |
| s->tlsext_status_type = *data++; |
| size--; |
| if (s->tlsext_status_type == TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { |
| const unsigned char *sdata; |
| int dsize; |
| /* Read in responder_id_list */ |
| n2s(data, dsize); |
| size -= 2; |
| if (dsize > size) |
| goto err; |
| while (dsize > 0) { |
| OCSP_RESPID *id; |
| int idsize; |
| if (dsize < 4) |
| goto err; |
| n2s(data, idsize); |
| dsize -= 2 + idsize; |
| size -= 2 + idsize; |
| if (dsize < 0) |
| goto err; |
| sdata = data; |
| data += idsize; |
| id = d2i_OCSP_RESPID(NULL, &sdata, idsize); |
| if (!id) |
| goto err; |
| if (data != sdata) { |
| OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_ids |
| && !(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids = |
| sk_OCSP_RESPID_new_null())) { |
| OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!sk_OCSP_RESPID_push(s->tlsext_ocsp_ids, id)) { |
| OCSP_RESPID_free(id); |
| *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Read in request_extensions */ |
| if (size < 2) |
| goto err; |
| n2s(data, dsize); |
| size -= 2; |
| if (dsize != size) |
| goto err; |
| sdata = data; |
| if (dsize > 0) { |
| if (s->tlsext_ocsp_exts) { |
| sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_exts, |
| X509_EXTENSION_free); |
| } |
| |
| s->tlsext_ocsp_exts = |
| d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS(NULL, &sdata, dsize); |
| if (!s->tlsext_ocsp_exts || (data + dsize != sdata)) |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| /* |
| * We don't know what to do with any other type * so ignore it. |
| */ |
| else |
| s->tlsext_status_type = -1; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { |
| switch (data[0]) { |
| case 0x01: /* Client allows us to send HB requests */ |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| break; |
| case 0x02: /* Client doesn't accept HB requests */ |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| break; |
| default: |
| *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { |
| /*- |
| * We shouldn't accept this extension on a |
| * renegotiation. |
| * |
| * s->new_session will be set on renegotiation, but we |
| * probably shouldn't rely that it couldn't be set on |
| * the initial renegotation too in certain cases (when |
| * there's some other reason to disallow resuming an |
| * earlier session -- the current code won't be doing |
| * anything like that, but this might change). |
| * |
| * A valid sign that there's been a previous handshake |
| * in this connection is if s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len > |
| * 0. (We are talking about a check that will happen |
| * in the Hello protocol round, well before a new |
| * Finished message could have been computed.) |
| */ |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| /* session ticket processed earlier */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s) |
| && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { |
| if (ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| data += size; |
| } |
| |
| /* Spurious data on the end */ |
| if (data != limit) |
| goto err; |
| |
| *p = data; |
| |
| ri_check: |
| |
| /* Need RI if renegotiating */ |
| |
| if (!renegotiate_seen && s->renegotiate && |
| !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| err: |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| /* |
| * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No |
| * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly |
| * fill the length of the block. |
| */ |
| static char ssl_next_proto_validate(unsigned char *d, unsigned len) |
| { |
| unsigned int off = 0; |
| |
| while (off < len) { |
| if (d[off] == 0) |
| return 0; |
| off += d[off]; |
| off++; |
| } |
| |
| return off == len; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| int ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s, unsigned char **p, unsigned char *d, |
| int n, int *al) |
| { |
| unsigned short length; |
| unsigned short type; |
| unsigned short size; |
| unsigned char *data = *p; |
| int tlsext_servername = 0; |
| int renegotiate_seen = 0; |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 0; |
| # endif |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat &= ~(SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED | |
| SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS); |
| # endif |
| |
| if (data >= (d + n - 2)) |
| goto ri_check; |
| |
| n2s(data, length); |
| if (data + length != d + n) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| while (data <= (d + n - 4)) { |
| n2s(data, type); |
| n2s(data, size); |
| |
| if (data + size > (d + n)) |
| goto ri_check; |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_debug_cb) |
| s->tlsext_debug_cb(s, 1, type, data, size, s->tlsext_debug_arg); |
| |
| if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) { |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname == NULL || size > 0) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| tlsext_servername = 1; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) { |
| unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| int ecpointformatlist_length = *(sdata++); |
| |
| if (ecpointformatlist_length != size - 1 || |
| ecpointformatlist_length < 1) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (!s->hit) { |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 0; |
| if (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| if ((s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = |
| OPENSSL_port_malloc(ecpointformatlist_length)) == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = |
| ecpointformatlist_length; |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist, sdata, |
| ecpointformatlist_length); |
| } |
| # if 0 |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr( |
| "ssl_parse_serverhello_tlsext s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist "); |
| sdata = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("%i ", *(sdata++)); |
| OPENSSL_port_printferr("\n"); |
| # endif |
| } |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { |
| if (s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb && |
| !s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb(s, data, size, |
| s->tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_arg)) |
| { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if ((SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| || (size > 0)) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| } |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input && |
| s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| unsigned char *sdata = data; |
| |
| if (size < 2) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| n2s(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len != size - 2) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| } |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { |
| /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); |
| } else { |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = |
| BUF_memdup(sdata, s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request && |
| s->version != DTLS1_VERSION) { |
| /* |
| * MUST be empty and only sent if we've requested a status |
| * request message. |
| */ |
| if ((s->tlsext_status_type == -1) || (size > 0)) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg && |
| s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0) { |
| unsigned char *selected; |
| unsigned char selected_len; |
| |
| /* We must have requested it. */ |
| if (s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb == NULL) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| /* The data must be valid */ |
| if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(data, size)) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| if (s-> |
| ctx->next_proto_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, data, |
| size, |
| s->ctx->next_proto_select_cb_arg) != |
| SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| s->next_proto_negotiated = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); |
| if (!s->next_proto_negotiated) { |
| *al = TLS1_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(s->next_proto_negotiated, selected, selected_len); |
| s->next_proto_negotiated_len = selected_len; |
| s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen = 1; |
| } |
| # endif |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) { |
| if (!ssl_parse_serverhello_renegotiate_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| return 0; |
| renegotiate_seen = 1; |
| } |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| else if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat) { |
| switch (data[0]) { |
| case 0x01: /* Server allows us to send HB requests */ |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| break; |
| case 0x02: /* Server doesn't accept HB requests */ |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED; |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat |= SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS; |
| break; |
| default: |
| *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP |
| else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && type == TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) { |
| if (ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(s, data, size, al)) |
| return 0; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| data += size; |
| } |
| |
| if (data != d + n) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| if (!s->hit && tlsext_servername == 1) { |
| if (s->tlsext_hostname) { |
| if (s->session->tlsext_hostname == NULL) { |
| s->session->tlsext_hostname = BUF_strdup(s->tlsext_hostname); |
| if (!s->session->tlsext_hostname) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } else { |
| *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; |
| return 0; |
| } |
| } |
| } |
| |
| *p = data; |
| |
| ri_check: |
| |
| /* |
| * Determine if we need to see RI. Strictly speaking if we want to avoid |
| * an attack we should *always* see RI even on initial server hello |
| * because the client doesn't see any renegotiation during an attack. |
| * However this would mean we could not connect to any server which |
| * doesn't support RI so for the immediate future tolerate RI absence on |
| * initial connect only. |
| */ |
| if (!renegotiate_seen && !(s->options & SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT) |
| && !(s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION)) { |
| *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| SSL_R_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION_DISABLED); |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_prepare_clienthello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| /* |
| * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher |
| * suite, send the point formats and elliptic curves we support. |
| */ |
| int using_ecc = 0; |
| int i; |
| unsigned char *j; |
| unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; |
| STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = SSL_get_ciphers(s); |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); i++) { |
| SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); |
| |
| alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; |
| alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; |
| if ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe) |
| || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { |
| using_ecc = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->version >= TLS1_VERSION); |
| if (using_ecc) { |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = |
| TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = |
| TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| |
| /* we support all named elliptic curves in RFC 4492 */ |
| if (s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist); |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = |
| sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]) * 2; |
| if ((s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist = |
| OPENSSL_port_malloc(s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length)) == NULL) { |
| s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist_length = 0; |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| for (i = 0, j = s->tlsext_ellipticcurvelist; (unsigned int)i < |
| sizeof(pref_list) / sizeof(pref_list[0]); i++) { |
| int id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(pref_list[i]); |
| s2n(id, j); |
| } |
| } |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| { |
| int r = 1; |
| |
| if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { |
| r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, |
| s-> |
| ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| if (!r) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input); |
| } |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { |
| /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); |
| } else { |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input = |
| BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| } |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len = |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| } |
| |
| if (r == 2) |
| /* |
| * at callback's request, insist on receiving an appropriate |
| * server opaque PRF input |
| */ |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| /* |
| * If we are server and using an ECC cipher suite, send the point formats |
| * we support if the client sent us an ECPointsFormat extension. Note |
| * that the server is not supposed to send an EllipticCurves extension. |
| */ |
| |
| unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| int using_ecc = (alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) |
| || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA); |
| using_ecc = using_ecc && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL); |
| |
| if (using_ecc) { |
| if (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist); |
| if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist = OPENSSL_malloc(3)) == NULL) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PREPARE_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length = 3; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[0] = TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[1] = |
| TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime; |
| s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist[2] = |
| TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2; |
| } |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| /* |
| * The handling of the ECPointFormats extension is done elsewhere, namely |
| * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| */ |
| /* |
| * The handling of the EllipticCurves extension is done elsewhere, namely |
| * in ssl3_choose_cipher in s3_lib.c. |
| */ |
| # endif |
| |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| ret = |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL |
| && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| ret = |
| s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, |
| s-> |
| initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| { |
| /* |
| * This sort of belongs into ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(), but we |
| * might be sending an alert in response to the client hello, so this |
| * has to happen here in ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_early(). |
| */ |
| |
| int r = 1; |
| |
| if (s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback != 0) { |
| r = s->ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(s, NULL, 0, |
| s-> |
| ctx->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg); |
| if (!r) { |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| /* shouldn't really happen */ |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input); |
| } |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = NULL; |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input != NULL) { |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input != NULL && |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len == |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len) { |
| /* |
| * can only use this extension if we have a server opaque PRF |
| * input of the same length as the client opaque PRF input! |
| */ |
| |
| if (s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len == 0) { |
| /* dummy byte just to get non-NULL */ |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = OPENSSL_malloc(1); |
| } else { |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input = |
| BUF_memdup(s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input, |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len); |
| } |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len = |
| s->tlsext_opaque_prf_input_len; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| if (r == 2 && s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| /* |
| * The callback wants to enforce use of the extension, but we |
| * can't do that with the client opaque PRF input; abort the |
| * handshake. |
| */ |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| # endif |
| switch (ret) { |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| s->servername_done = 0; |
| default: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| int al; |
| |
| /* |
| * If status request then ask callback what to do. Note: this must be |
| * called after servername callbacks in case the certificate has |
| * changed, and must be called after the cipher has been chosen because |
| * this may influence which certificate is sent |
| */ |
| if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { |
| int r; |
| CERT_PKEY *certpkey; |
| certpkey = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); |
| /* If no certificate can't return certificate status */ |
| if (certpkey == NULL) { |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| /* |
| * Set current certificate to one we will use so SSL_get_certificate |
| * et al can pick it up. |
| */ |
| s->cert->key = certpkey; |
| r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| switch (r) { |
| /* We don't want to send a status request response */ |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| break; |
| /* status request response should be sent */ |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK: |
| if (s->tlsext_ocsp_resp) |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 1; |
| else |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| break; |
| /* something bad happened */ |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } else |
| s->tlsext_status_expected = 0; |
| |
| err: |
| switch (ret) { |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); |
| return 1; |
| |
| default: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| int ssl_check_serverhello_tlsext(SSL *s) |
| { |
| int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; |
| int al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; |
| |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC |
| /* |
| * If we are client and using an elliptic curve cryptography cipher |
| * suite, then if server returns an EC point formats lists extension it |
| * must contain uncompressed. |
| */ |
| unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; |
| unsigned long alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; |
| if ((s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) |
| && (s->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) |
| && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist != NULL) |
| && (s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length > 0) |
| && ((alg_k & (SSL_kEECDH | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) |
| || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA))) { |
| /* we are using an ECC cipher */ |
| size_t i; |
| unsigned char *list; |
| int found_uncompressed = 0; |
| list = s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist; |
| for (i = 0; i < s->session->tlsext_ecpointformatlist_length; i++) { |
| if (*(list++) == TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed) { |
| found_uncompressed = 1; |
| break; |
| } |
| } |
| if (!found_uncompressed) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT, |
| SSL_R_TLS_INVALID_ECPOINTFORMAT_LIST); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; |
| # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ |
| |
| if (s->ctx != NULL && s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| ret = |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, |
| s->ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| else if (s->initial_ctx != NULL |
| && s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback != 0) |
| ret = |
| s->initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_callback(s, &al, |
| s-> |
| initial_ctx->tlsext_servername_arg); |
| |
| # ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len > 0) { |
| /* |
| * This case may indicate that we, as a client, want to insist on |
| * using opaque PRF inputs. So first verify that we really have a |
| * value from the server too. |
| */ |
| |
| if (s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input == NULL) { |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Anytime the server *has* sent an opaque PRF input, we need to |
| * check that we have a client opaque PRF input of the same size. |
| */ |
| if (s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input == NULL || |
| s->s3->client_opaque_prf_input_len != |
| s->s3->server_opaque_prf_input_len) { |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; |
| } |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| OPENSSL_port_free(s->tlsext_ocsp_resp); |
| s->tlsext_ocsp_resp = NULL; |
| s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen = -1; |
| /* |
| * If we've requested certificate status and we wont get one tell the |
| * callback |
| */ |
| if ((s->tlsext_status_type != -1) && !(s->tlsext_status_expected) |
| && !(s->hit) && s->ctx && s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb) { |
| int r; |
| /* |
| * Call callback with resp == NULL and resplen == -1 so callback |
| * knows there is no response |
| */ |
| r = s->ctx->tlsext_status_cb(s, s->ctx->tlsext_status_arg); |
| if (r == 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE_STATUS_RESPONSE; |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| } |
| if (r < 0) { |
| al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; |
| ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| switch (ret) { |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); |
| return -1; |
| |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING: |
| ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_WARNING, al); |
| return 1; |
| |
| case SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK: |
| s->servername_done = 0; |
| default: |
| return 1; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * Since the server cache lookup is done early on in the processing of the |
| * ClientHello, and other operations depend on the result, we need to handle |
| * any TLS session ticket extension at the same time. |
| * |
| * session_id: points at the session ID in the ClientHello. This code will |
| * read past the end of this in order to parse out the session ticket |
| * extension, if any. |
| * len: the length of the session ID. |
| * limit: a pointer to the first byte after the ClientHello. |
| * ret: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
| * point to the resulting session. |
| * |
| * If s->tls_session_secret_cb is set then we are expecting a pre-shared key |
| * ciphersuite, in which case we have no use for session tickets and one will |
| * never be decrypted, nor will s->tlsext_ticket_expected be set to 1. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
| * 0: no ticket was found (or was ignored, based on settings). |
| * 1: a zero length extension was found, indicating that the client supports |
| * session tickets but doesn't currently have one to offer. |
| * 2: either s->tls_session_secret_cb was set, or a ticket was offered but |
| * couldn't be decrypted because of a non-fatal error. |
| * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *ret was set. |
| * |
| * Side effects: |
| * Sets s->tlsext_ticket_expected to 1 if the server will have to issue |
| * a new session ticket to the client because the client indicated support |
| * (and s->tls_session_secret_cb is NULL) but the client either doesn't have |
| * a session ticket or we couldn't use the one it gave us, or if |
| * s->ctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket. |
| * Otherwise, s->tlsext_ticket_expected is set to 0. |
| */ |
| int tls1_process_ticket(SSL *s, unsigned char *session_id, int len, |
| const unsigned char *limit, SSL_SESSION **ret) |
| { |
| /* Point after session ID in client hello */ |
| const unsigned char *p = session_id + len; |
| unsigned short i; |
| |
| *ret = NULL; |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; |
| |
| /* |
| * If tickets disabled behave as if no ticket present to permit stateful |
| * resumption. |
| */ |
| if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) |
| return 0; |
| if ((s->version <= SSL3_VERSION) || !limit) |
| return 0; |
| if (p >= limit) |
| return -1; |
| /* Skip past DTLS cookie */ |
| if (s->version == DTLS1_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { |
| i = *(p++); |
| p += i; |
| if (p >= limit) |
| return -1; |
| } |
| /* Skip past cipher list */ |
| n2s(p, i); |
| p += i; |
| if (p >= limit) |
| return -1; |
| /* Skip past compression algorithm list */ |
| i = *(p++); |
| p += i; |
| if (p > limit) |
| return -1; |
| /* Now at start of extensions */ |
| if ((p + 2) >= limit) |
| return 0; |
| n2s(p, i); |
| while ((p + 4) <= limit) { |
| unsigned short type, size; |
| n2s(p, type); |
| n2s(p, size); |
| if (p + size > limit) |
| return 0; |
| if (type == TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) { |
| int r; |
| if (size == 0) { |
| /* |
| * The client will accept a ticket but doesn't currently have |
| * one. |
| */ |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| if (s->tls_session_secret_cb) { |
| /* |
| * Indicate that the ticket couldn't be decrypted rather than |
| * generating the session from ticket now, trigger |
| * abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to |
| * calculate the master secret later. |
| */ |
| return 2; |
| } |
| r = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, p, size, session_id, len, ret); |
| switch (r) { |
| case 2: /* ticket couldn't be decrypted */ |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| return 2; |
| case 3: /* ticket was decrypted */ |
| return r; |
| case 4: /* ticket decrypted but need to renew */ |
| s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 1; |
| return 3; |
| default: /* fatal error */ |
| return -1; |
| } |
| } |
| p += size; |
| } |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| /*- |
| * tls_decrypt_ticket attempts to decrypt a session ticket. |
| * |
| * etick: points to the body of the session ticket extension. |
| * eticklen: the length of the session tickets extenion. |
| * sess_id: points at the session ID. |
| * sesslen: the length of the session ID. |
| * psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to |
| * point to the resulting session. |
| * |
| * Returns: |
| * -1: fatal error, either from parsing or decrypting the ticket. |
| * 2: the ticket couldn't be decrypted. |
| * 3: a ticket was successfully decrypted and *psess was set. |
| * 4: same as 3, but the ticket needs to be renewed. |
| */ |
| static int tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, |
| int eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, |
| int sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess) |
| { |
| SSL_SESSION *sess; |
| unsigned char *sdec; |
| const unsigned char *p; |
| int slen, mlen, renew_ticket = 0; |
| unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; |
| HMAC_CTX hctx; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx; |
| SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; |
| /* Need at least keyname + iv + some encrypted data */ |
| if (eticklen < 48) |
| return 2; |
| /* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */ |
| HMAC_CTX_init(&hctx); |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx); |
| if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { |
| unsigned char *nctick = (unsigned char *)etick; |
| int rv = tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, nctick, nctick + 16, |
| &ctx, &hctx, 0); |
| if (rv < 0) |
| return -1; |
| if (rv == 0) |
| return 2; |
| if (rv == 2) |
| renew_ticket = 1; |
| } else { |
| /* Check key name matches */ |
| if (OPENSSL_port_memcmp(etick, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16)) |
| return 2; |
| if (HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, |
| tlsext_tick_md(), NULL) <= 0 |
| || EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, |
| tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, |
| etick + 16) <= 0) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| } |
| /* |
| * Attempt to process session ticket, first conduct sanity and integrity |
| * checks on ticket. |
| */ |
| mlen = HMAC_size(&hctx); |
| if (mlen < 0) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| eticklen -= mlen; |
| /* Check HMAC of encrypted ticket */ |
| if (HMAC_Update(&hctx, etick, eticklen) <= 0 |
| || HMAC_Final(&hctx, tick_hmac, NULL) <= 0) { |
| goto err; |
| } |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| return 2; |
| } |
| /* Attempt to decrypt session data */ |
| /* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */ |
| p = etick + 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| eticklen -= 16 + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(&ctx); |
| sdec = OPENSSL_malloc(eticklen); |
| if (!sdec || EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, sdec, &slen, p, eticklen) <= 0) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| if (EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, sdec + slen, &mlen) <= 0) { |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| OPENSSL_port_free(sdec); |
| return 2; |
| } |
| slen += mlen; |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| p = sdec; |
| |
| sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, slen); |
| OPENSSL_port_free(sdec); |
| if (sess) { |
| /* |
| * The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect |
| * that the ticket has been accepted. So we copy it to the session |
| * structure. If it is empty set length to zero as required by |
| * standard. |
| */ |
| if (sesslen) |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(sess->session_id, sess_id, sesslen); |
| sess->session_id_length = sesslen; |
| *psess = sess; |
| if (renew_ticket) |
| return 4; |
| else |
| return 3; |
| } |
| ERR_clear_error(); |
| /* |
| * For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket. |
| */ |
| return 2; |
| err: |
| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx); |
| HMAC_CTX_cleanup(&hctx); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* Tables to translate from NIDs to TLS v1.2 ids */ |
| |
| typedef struct { |
| int nid; |
| int id; |
| } tls12_lookup; |
| |
| static tls12_lookup tls12_md[] = { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 |
| {NID_md5, TLSEXT_hash_md5}, |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| {NID_sha1, TLSEXT_hash_sha1}, |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| {NID_sha224, TLSEXT_hash_sha224}, |
| {NID_sha256, TLSEXT_hash_sha256}, |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| {NID_sha384, TLSEXT_hash_sha384}, |
| {NID_sha512, TLSEXT_hash_sha512} |
| # endif |
| }; |
| |
| static tls12_lookup tls12_sig[] = { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| {EVP_PKEY_RSA, TLSEXT_signature_rsa}, |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| {EVP_PKEY_DSA, TLSEXT_signature_dsa}, |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| {EVP_PKEY_EC, TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa} |
| # endif |
| }; |
| |
| static int tls12_find_id(int nid, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { |
| if (table[i].nid == nid) |
| return table[i].id; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| # if 0 |
| static int tls12_find_nid(int id, tls12_lookup *table, size_t tlen) |
| { |
| size_t i; |
| for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) { |
| if (table[i].id == id) |
| return table[i].nid; |
| } |
| return -1; |
| } |
| # endif |
| |
| int tls12_get_sigandhash(unsigned char *p, const EVP_PKEY *pk, |
| const EVP_MD *md) |
| { |
| int sig_id, md_id; |
| if (!md) |
| return 0; |
| md_id = tls12_find_id(EVP_MD_type(md), tls12_md, |
| sizeof(tls12_md) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
| if (md_id == -1) |
| return 0; |
| sig_id = tls12_get_sigid(pk); |
| if (sig_id == -1) |
| return 0; |
| p[0] = (unsigned char)md_id; |
| p[1] = (unsigned char)sig_id; |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| int tls12_get_sigid(const EVP_PKEY *pk) |
| { |
| return tls12_find_id(pk->type, tls12_sig, |
| sizeof(tls12_sig) / sizeof(tls12_lookup)); |
| } |
| |
| const EVP_MD *tls12_get_hash(unsigned char hash_alg) |
| { |
| switch (hash_alg) { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha1: |
| return EVP_sha1(); |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA256 |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha224: |
| return EVP_sha224(); |
| |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha256: |
| return EVP_sha256(); |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SHA512 |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha384: |
| return EVP_sha384(); |
| |
| case TLSEXT_hash_sha512: |
| return EVP_sha512(); |
| # endif |
| default: |
| return NULL; |
| |
| } |
| } |
| |
| /* Set preferred digest for each key type */ |
| |
| int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s, const unsigned char *data, int dsize) |
| { |
| int i, idx; |
| const EVP_MD *md; |
| CERT *c = s->cert; |
| /* Extension ignored for TLS versions below 1.2 */ |
| if (TLS1_get_version(s) < TLS1_2_VERSION) |
| return 1; |
| /* Should never happen */ |
| if (!c) |
| return 0; |
| |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = NULL; |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = NULL; |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = NULL; |
| |
| for (i = 0; i < dsize; i += 2) { |
| unsigned char hash_alg = data[i], sig_alg = data[i + 1]; |
| |
| switch (sig_alg) { |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| case TLSEXT_signature_rsa: |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN; |
| break; |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| case TLSEXT_signature_dsa: |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN; |
| break; |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| case TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa: |
| idx = SSL_PKEY_ECC; |
| break; |
| # endif |
| default: |
| continue; |
| } |
| |
| if (c->pkeys[idx].digest == NULL) { |
| md = tls12_get_hash(hash_alg); |
| if (md) { |
| c->pkeys[idx].digest = md; |
| if (idx == SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN) |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = md; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Set any remaining keys to default values. NOTE: if alg is not |
| * supported it stays as NULL. |
| */ |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA |
| if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest) |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA |
| if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest) { |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_SIGN].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| } |
| # endif |
| # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ECDSA |
| if (!c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest) |
| c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].digest = EVP_sha1(); |
| # endif |
| return 1; |
| } |
| |
| #endif |
| |
| #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS |
| int tls1_process_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *p = &s->s3->rrec.data[0], *pl; |
| unsigned short hbtype; |
| unsigned int payload; |
| unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
| |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(0, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| &s->s3->rrec.data[0], s->s3->rrec.length, |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| /* Read type and payload length first */ |
| if (1 + 2 + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) |
| return 0; /* silently discard */ |
| hbtype = *p++; |
| n2s(p, payload); |
| if (1 + 2 + payload + 16 > s->s3->rrec.length) |
| return 0; /* silently discard per RFC 6520 sec. 4 */ |
| pl = p; |
| |
| if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_REQUEST) { |
| unsigned char *buffer, *bp; |
| int r; |
| |
| /* |
| * Allocate memory for the response, size is 1 bytes message type, |
| * plus 2 bytes payload length, plus payload, plus padding |
| */ |
| buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
| bp = buffer; |
| |
| /* Enter response type, length and copy payload */ |
| *bp++ = TLS1_HB_RESPONSE; |
| s2n(payload, bp); |
| OPENSSL_port_memcpy(bp, pl, payload); |
| bp += payload; |
| /* Random padding */ |
| if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(bp, padding) < 0) { |
| OPENSSL_port_free(buffer); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| r = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buffer, |
| 3 + payload + padding); |
| |
| if (r >= 0 && s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| buffer, 3 + payload + padding, |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| OPENSSL_port_free(buffer); |
| |
| if (r < 0) |
| return r; |
| } else if (hbtype == TLS1_HB_RESPONSE) { |
| unsigned int seq; |
| |
| /* |
| * We only send sequence numbers (2 bytes unsigned int), and 16 |
| * random bytes, so we just try to read the sequence number |
| */ |
| n2s(pl, seq); |
| |
| if (payload == 18 && seq == s->tlsext_hb_seq) { |
| s->tlsext_hb_seq++; |
| s->tlsext_hb_pending = 0; |
| } |
| } |
| |
| return 0; |
| } |
| |
| int tls1_heartbeat(SSL *s) |
| { |
| unsigned char *buf, *p; |
| int ret = -1; |
| unsigned int payload = 18; /* Sequence number + random bytes */ |
| unsigned int padding = 16; /* Use minimum padding */ |
| |
| /* Only send if peer supports and accepts HB requests... */ |
| if (!(s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_ENABLED) || |
| s->tlsext_heartbeat & SSL_TLSEXT_HB_DONT_SEND_REQUESTS) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PEER_DOESNT_ACCEPT); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* ...and there is none in flight yet... */ |
| if (s->tlsext_hb_pending) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_TLS_HEARTBEAT_PENDING); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* ...and no handshake in progress. */ |
| if (SSL_in_init(s) || s->in_handshake) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE); |
| return -1; |
| } |
| |
| /* |
| * Check if padding is too long, payload and padding must not exceed 2^14 |
| * - 3 = 16381 bytes in total. |
| */ |
| OPENSSL_assert(payload + padding <= 16381); |
| |
| /*- |
| * Create HeartBeat message, we just use a sequence number |
| * as payload to distuingish different messages and add |
| * some random stuff. |
| * - Message Type, 1 byte |
| * - Payload Length, 2 bytes (unsigned int) |
| * - Payload, the sequence number (2 bytes uint) |
| * - Payload, random bytes (16 bytes uint) |
| * - Padding |
| */ |
| buf = OPENSSL_malloc(1 + 2 + payload + padding); |
| p = buf; |
| /* Message Type */ |
| *p++ = TLS1_HB_REQUEST; |
| /* Payload length (18 bytes here) */ |
| s2n(payload, p); |
| /* Sequence number */ |
| s2n(s->tlsext_hb_seq, p); |
| /* 16 random bytes */ |
| if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, 16) < 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| p += 16; |
| /* Random padding */ |
| if (RAND_pseudo_bytes(p, padding) < 0) { |
| SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS1_HEARTBEAT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); |
| goto err; |
| } |
| |
| ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, buf, 3 + payload + padding); |
| if (ret >= 0) { |
| if (s->msg_callback) |
| s->msg_callback(1, s->version, TLS1_RT_HEARTBEAT, |
| buf, 3 + payload + padding, |
| s, s->msg_callback_arg); |
| |
| s->tlsext_hb_pending = 1; |
| } |
| |
| err: |
| OPENSSL_port_free(buf); |
| |
| return ret; |
| } |
| #endif |