src/updater_components/client_update_protocol/ecdsa.cc

// Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.

#include "components/client_update_protocol/ecdsa.h"

#include "base/logging.h"
#include "base/memory/ptr_util.h"
#include "base/stl_util.h"
#include "base/strings/string_number_conversions.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/string_util.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "crypto/sha2.h"
#include "crypto/signature_verifier.h"

namespace client_update_protocol {

namespace {

std::vector<uint8_t> SHA256HashStr(const base::StringPiece& str) {
  std::vector<uint8_t> result(crypto::kSHA256Length);
  crypto::SHA256HashString(str, &result.front(), result.size());
  return result;
}

std::vector<uint8_t> SHA256HashVec(const std::vector<uint8_t>& vec) {
  if (vec.empty())
    return SHA256HashStr(base::StringPiece());

  return SHA256HashStr(base::StringPiece(
      reinterpret_cast<const char*>(&vec.front()), vec.size()));
}

bool ParseETagHeader(const base::StringPiece& etag_header_value_in,
                     std::vector<uint8_t>* ecdsa_signature_out,
                     std::vector<uint8_t>* request_hash_out) {
  DCHECK(ecdsa_signature_out);
  DCHECK(request_hash_out);

  // The ETag value is a UTF-8 string, formatted as "S:H", where:
  // * S is the ECDSA signature in DER-encoded ASN.1 form, converted to hex.
  // * H is the SHA-256 hash of the observed request body, standard hex format.
  // A Weak ETag is formatted as W/"S:H". This function treats it the same as a
  // strong ETag.
  base::StringPiece etag_header_value(etag_header_value_in);

  // Remove the weak prefix, then remove the begin and the end quotes.
  const char kWeakETagPrefix[] = "W/";
  if (etag_header_value.starts_with(kWeakETagPrefix))
    etag_header_value.remove_prefix(base::size(kWeakETagPrefix) - 1);
  if (etag_header_value.size() >= 2 && etag_header_value.starts_with("\"") &&
      etag_header_value.ends_with("\"")) {
    etag_header_value.remove_prefix(1);
    etag_header_value.remove_suffix(1);
  }

  const base::StringPiece::size_type delim_pos = etag_header_value.find(':');
  if (delim_pos == base::StringPiece::npos || delim_pos == 0 ||
      delim_pos == etag_header_value.size() - 1)
    return false;

  const base::StringPiece sig_hex = etag_header_value.substr(0, delim_pos);
  const base::StringPiece hash_hex = etag_header_value.substr(delim_pos + 1);

  // Decode the ECDSA signature. Don't bother validating the contents of it;
  // the SignatureValidator class will handle the actual DER decoding and
  // ASN.1 parsing. Check for an expected size range only -- valid ECDSA
  // signatures are between 8 and 72 bytes.
  if (!base::HexStringToBytes(sig_hex, ecdsa_signature_out))
    return false;
  if (ecdsa_signature_out->size() < 8 || ecdsa_signature_out->size() > 72)
    return false;

  // Decode the SHA-256 hash; it should be exactly 32 bytes, no more or less.
  if (!base::HexStringToBytes(hash_hex, request_hash_out))
    return false;
  if (request_hash_out->size() != crypto::kSHA256Length)
    return false;

  return true;
}

}  // namespace

Ecdsa::Ecdsa(int key_version, const base::StringPiece& public_key)
    : pub_key_version_(key_version),
      public_key_(public_key.begin(), public_key.end()) {}

Ecdsa::~Ecdsa() {}

std::unique_ptr<Ecdsa> Ecdsa::Create(int key_version,
                                     const base::StringPiece& public_key) {
  DCHECK_GT(key_version, 0);
  DCHECK(!public_key.empty());

  return base::WrapUnique(new Ecdsa(key_version, public_key));
}

void Ecdsa::OverrideNonceForTesting(int key_version, uint32_t nonce) {
  DCHECK(!request_query_cup2key_.empty());
  request_query_cup2key_ = base::StringPrintf("%d:%u", pub_key_version_, nonce);
}

void Ecdsa::SignRequest(const base::StringPiece& request_body,
                        std::string* query_params) {
  DCHECK(query_params);

  // Generate a random nonce to use for freshness, build the cup2key query
  // string, and compute the SHA-256 hash of the request body. Set these
  // two pieces of data aside to use during ValidateResponse().
  uint32_t nonce = 0;
  crypto::RandBytes(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
  request_query_cup2key_ = base::StringPrintf("%d:%u", pub_key_version_, nonce);
  request_hash_ = SHA256HashStr(request_body);

  // Return the query string for the user to send with the request.
  std::string request_hash_hex =
      base::HexEncode(&request_hash_.front(), request_hash_.size());
  request_hash_hex = base::ToLowerASCII(request_hash_hex);

  *query_params = base::StringPrintf("cup2key=%s&cup2hreq=%s",
                                     request_query_cup2key_.c_str(),
                                     request_hash_hex.c_str());
}

bool Ecdsa::ValidateResponse(const base::StringPiece& response_body,
                             const base::StringPiece& server_etag) {
  DCHECK(!request_hash_.empty());
  DCHECK(!request_query_cup2key_.empty());

  if (response_body.empty() || server_etag.empty())
    return false;

  // Break the ETag into its two components (the ECDSA signature, and the
  // hash of the request that the server observed) and decode to byte buffers.
  std::vector<uint8_t> signature;
  std::vector<uint8_t> observed_request_hash;
  if (!ParseETagHeader(server_etag, &signature, &observed_request_hash))
    return false;

  // Check that the server's observed request hash is equal to the original
  // request hash. (This is a quick rejection test; the signature test is
  // authoritative, but slower.)
  DCHECK_EQ(request_hash_.size(), crypto::kSHA256Length);
  if (observed_request_hash.size() != crypto::kSHA256Length)
    return false;
  if (!std::equal(observed_request_hash.begin(), observed_request_hash.end(),
                  request_hash_.begin()))
    return false;

  // Next, build the buffer that the server will have signed on its end:
  //   hash( hash(request) | hash(response) | cup2key_query_string )
  // When building the client's version of the buffer, it's important to use
  // the original request hash that it attempted to send, and not the observed
  // request hash that the server sent back to us.
  const std::vector<uint8_t> response_hash = SHA256HashStr(response_body);

  std::vector<uint8_t> signed_message;
  signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), request_hash_.begin(),
                        request_hash_.end());
  signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), response_hash.begin(),
                        response_hash.end());
  signed_message.insert(signed_message.end(), request_query_cup2key_.begin(),
                        request_query_cup2key_.end());

  const std::vector<uint8_t> signed_message_hash =
      SHA256HashVec(signed_message);

  // Initialize the signature verifier.
  crypto::SignatureVerifier verifier;
  if (!verifier.VerifyInit(crypto::SignatureVerifier::ECDSA_SHA256, signature,
                           public_key_)) {
    DVLOG(1) << "Couldn't init SignatureVerifier.";
    return false;
  }

  // If the verification fails, that implies one of two outcomes:
  // * The signature was modified
  // * The buffer that the server signed does not match the buffer that the
  //   client assembled -- implying that either request body or response body
  //   was modified, or a different nonce value was used.
  verifier.VerifyUpdate(signed_message_hash);
  return verifier.VerifyFinal();
}

}  // namespace client_update_protocol