blob: 71c7441c213e9a186cf9f28334b2cd685e707c96 [file] [log] [blame]
// Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "components/client_update_protocol/ecdsa.h"
#include <stdint.h>
#include <limits>
#include <memory>
#include <vector>
#include "base/base64.h"
#include "base/strings/string_piece.h"
#include "base/strings/stringprintf.h"
#include "crypto/random.h"
#include "crypto/secure_util.h"
#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
namespace client_update_protocol {
namespace {
std::string GetPublicKeyForTesting() {
// How to generate this key:
// openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -out ecpriv.pem
// openssl ec -in ecpriv.pem -pubout -out ecpub.pem
static const char kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64[] =
"MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJNOjKyN6UHyUGkGow+xCmQthQXUo"
"9sd7RIXSpVIM768UlbGb/5JrnISjSYejCc/pxQooI6mJTzWL3pZb5TA1DA==";
std::string result;
if (!base::Base64Decode(std::string(kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64), &result))
return std::string();
return result;
}
} // end namespace
class CupEcdsaTest : public testing::Test {
protected:
void SetUp() override {
cup_ = Ecdsa::Create(8, GetPublicKeyForTesting());
ASSERT_TRUE(cup_.get());
}
Ecdsa& CUP() { return *cup_; }
private:
std::unique_ptr<Ecdsa> cup_;
};
TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, SignRequest) {
static const char kRequest[] = "TestSequenceForCupEcdsaUnitTest";
static const char kRequestHash[] =
"&cup2hreq="
"cde1f7dc1311ed96813057ca321c2f5a17ea2c9c776ee0eb31965f7985a3074a";
static const char kKeyId[] = "cup2key=8:";
std::string query;
CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query);
std::string query2;
CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query2);
EXPECT_FALSE(query.empty());
EXPECT_FALSE(query2.empty());
EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query.find(kKeyId));
EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query2.find(kKeyId));
EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query.find(kRequestHash));
EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query2.find(kRequestHash));
// In theory, this is a flaky test, as there's nothing preventing the RNG
// from returning the same nonce twice in a row. In practice, this should
// be fine.
EXPECT_NE(query, query2);
}
TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestETagParsing) {
// Invalid ETags must be gracefully rejected without a crash.
std::string query_discard;
CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard);
CUP().OverrideNonceForTesting(8, 12345);
// Expect a pass for a well-formed etag.
EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Reject empty etags.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", ""));
// Reject etags with zero-length hashes or signatures, even if the other
// component is wellformed.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", ":"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Reject etags with non-hex content in either component.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458__ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901d__7d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Reject etags where either/both component has a length that's not a
// multiple of 2 (i.e. not a valid hex encoding).
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f"));
// Reject etags where the hash is even, but not 256 bits.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff"));
// Reject etags where the signature field is too small to be valid. (Note that
// the case isn't even a signature -- it's a validly encoded ASN.1 NULL.)
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"0500"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
// Reject etags where the signature field is too big to be a valid signature.
// (This is a validly formed structure, but both ints are over 256 bits.)
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3048"
"202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
"202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff"));
// Reject etags where the signature is valid DER-encoded ASN.1, but is not
// an ECDSA signature. (This is actually stressing crypto's SignatureValidator
// library, and not CUP's use of it, but it's worth testing here.) Cases:
// * Something that's not a sequence
// * Sequences that contain things other than ints (i.e. octet strings)
// * Sequences that contain a negative int.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"0406020100020100"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
"06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3046"
"02047fffffff"
"0220ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
// Reject etags where the signature is not a valid DER encoding. (Again, this
// is stressing SignatureValidator.) Test cases are:
// * No length field
// * Zero length field
// * One of the ints has truncated content
// * One of the ints has content longer than its length field
// * A positive int is improperly zero-padded
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"30"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3000"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00"
"02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243"));
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3044"
"022000007f24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656"
"02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
}
TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestSigning) {
std::string query_discard;
CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard);
CUP().OverrideNonceForTesting(8, 12345);
// How to generate an ECDSA signature:
// echo -n Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 > h
// echo -n Response_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> h
// cat h | xxd -r -p > hbin
// echo -n 8:12345 >> hbin
// sha256sum hbin | cut -d " " -f 1 | xxd -r -p > hbin2
// openssl dgst -hex -sha256 -sign ecpriv.pem hbin2 | cut -d " " -f 2 > sig
// echo -n :Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> sig
// cat sig
// It's useful to throw this in a bash script and parameterize it if you're
// updating this unit test.
// Valid case:
// * Send "Request_A" with key 8 / nonce 12345 to server.
// * Receive "Response_A", signature, and observed request hash from server.
// * Signature signs HASH(Request_A) | HASH(Response_A) | 8:12345.
// * Observed hash matches HASH(Request_A).
EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3"
"022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Failure case: "Request_A" made it to the server intact, but the response
// body is modified to "Response_B" on return. The signature is now invalid.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_B",
"3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3"
"022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached
// the server. Test a fast reject based on the observed_hash parameter.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_B",
"304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876"
"8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c"
":80e3ef1b373efe5f2a8383a0cf9c89fb2e0cbb8e85db4813655ff5dc05009e7e"));
// Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached
// the server. Test a slow reject based on a signature mismatch.
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_B",
"304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876"
"8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
// Failure case: Request/response are intact, but the signature is invalid
// because it was signed against a different nonce (67890).
EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse(
"Response_A",
"3046022100d3bbb1fb4451c8e04a07fe95404cc39121ed0e0bc084f87de19d52eee50a97"
"bf022100dd7d41d467be2af98d9116b0c7ba09740d54578c02a02f74da5f089834be3403"
":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5"));
}
} // namespace client_update_protocol