| // Copyright 2016 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. | |
| // Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be | |
| // found in the LICENSE file. | |
| #include "components/client_update_protocol/ecdsa.h" | |
| #include <stdint.h> | |
| #include <limits> | |
| #include <memory> | |
| #include <vector> | |
| #include "base/base64.h" | |
| #include "base/strings/string_piece.h" | |
| #include "base/strings/stringprintf.h" | |
| #include "crypto/random.h" | |
| #include "crypto/secure_util.h" | |
| #include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h" | |
| namespace client_update_protocol { | |
| namespace { | |
| std::string GetPublicKeyForTesting() { | |
| // How to generate this key: | |
| // openssl ecparam -genkey -name prime256v1 -out ecpriv.pem | |
| // openssl ec -in ecpriv.pem -pubout -out ecpub.pem | |
| static const char kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64[] = | |
| "MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEJNOjKyN6UHyUGkGow+xCmQthQXUo" | |
| "9sd7RIXSpVIM768UlbGb/5JrnISjSYejCc/pxQooI6mJTzWL3pZb5TA1DA=="; | |
| std::string result; | |
| if (!base::Base64Decode(std::string(kCupEcdsaTestKey_Base64), &result)) | |
| return std::string(); | |
| return result; | |
| } | |
| } // end namespace | |
| class CupEcdsaTest : public testing::Test { | |
| protected: | |
| void SetUp() override { | |
| cup_ = Ecdsa::Create(8, GetPublicKeyForTesting()); | |
| ASSERT_TRUE(cup_.get()); | |
| } | |
| Ecdsa& CUP() { return *cup_; } | |
| private: | |
| std::unique_ptr<Ecdsa> cup_; | |
| }; | |
| TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, SignRequest) { | |
| static const char kRequest[] = "TestSequenceForCupEcdsaUnitTest"; | |
| static const char kRequestHash[] = | |
| "&cup2hreq=" | |
| "cde1f7dc1311ed96813057ca321c2f5a17ea2c9c776ee0eb31965f7985a3074a"; | |
| static const char kKeyId[] = "cup2key=8:"; | |
| std::string query; | |
| CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query); | |
| std::string query2; | |
| CUP().SignRequest(kRequest, &query2); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(query.empty()); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(query2.empty()); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query.find(kKeyId)); | |
| EXPECT_EQ(0UL, query2.find(kKeyId)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query.find(kRequestHash)); | |
| EXPECT_NE(std::string::npos, query2.find(kRequestHash)); | |
| // In theory, this is a flaky test, as there's nothing preventing the RNG | |
| // from returning the same nonce twice in a row. In practice, this should | |
| // be fine. | |
| EXPECT_NE(query, query2); | |
| } | |
| TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestETagParsing) { | |
| // Invalid ETags must be gracefully rejected without a crash. | |
| std::string query_discard; | |
| CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard); | |
| CUP().OverrideNonceForTesting(8, 12345); | |
| // Expect a pass for a well-formed etag. | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Reject empty etags. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", "")); | |
| // Reject etags with zero-length hashes or signatures, even if the other | |
| // component is wellformed. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse("Response_A", ":")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Reject etags with non-hex content in either component. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458__ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901d__7d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Reject etags where either/both component has a length that's not a | |
| // multiple of 2 (i.e. not a valid hex encoding). | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f")); | |
| // Reject etags where the hash is even, but not 256 bits. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff")); | |
| // Reject etags where the signature field is too small to be valid. (Note that | |
| // the case isn't even a signature -- it's a validly encoded ASN.1 NULL.) | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "0500" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| // Reject etags where the signature field is too big to be a valid signature. | |
| // (This is a validly formed structure, but both ints are over 256 bits.) | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3048" | |
| "202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
| "202207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5ff")); | |
| // Reject etags where the signature is valid DER-encoded ASN.1, but is not | |
| // an ECDSA signature. (This is actually stressing crypto's SignatureValidator | |
| // library, and not CUP's use of it, but it's worth testing here.) Cases: | |
| // * Something that's not a sequence | |
| // * Sequences that contain things other than ints (i.e. octet strings) | |
| // * Sequences that contain a negative int. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "0406020100020100" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" | |
| "06200123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3046" | |
| "02047fffffff" | |
| "0220ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| // Reject etags where the signature is not a valid DER encoding. (Again, this | |
| // is stressing SignatureValidator.) Test cases are: | |
| // * No length field | |
| // * Zero length field | |
| // * One of the ints has truncated content | |
| // * One of the ints has content longer than its length field | |
| // * A positive int is improperly zero-padded | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "30" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3000" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "02207fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff00" | |
| "02207fb15d24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243")); | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3044" | |
| "022000007f24e66c168ac150458c7ae51f843c4858e27d41be3f9396d4919bbd5656" | |
| "02202291bae598e4a41118ea1df24ce8494d4055b2842dc046e0223f5e17e86bd10e" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| } | |
| TEST_F(CupEcdsaTest, ValidateResponse_TestSigning) { | |
| std::string query_discard; | |
| CUP().SignRequest("Request_A", &query_discard); | |
| CUP().OverrideNonceForTesting(8, 12345); | |
| // How to generate an ECDSA signature: | |
| // echo -n Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 > h | |
| // echo -n Response_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> h | |
| // cat h | xxd -r -p > hbin | |
| // echo -n 8:12345 >> hbin | |
| // sha256sum hbin | cut -d " " -f 1 | xxd -r -p > hbin2 | |
| // openssl dgst -hex -sha256 -sign ecpriv.pem hbin2 | cut -d " " -f 2 > sig | |
| // echo -n :Request_A | sha256sum | cut -d " " -f 1 >> sig | |
| // cat sig | |
| // It's useful to throw this in a bash script and parameterize it if you're | |
| // updating this unit test. | |
| // Valid case: | |
| // * Send "Request_A" with key 8 / nonce 12345 to server. | |
| // * Receive "Response_A", signature, and observed request hash from server. | |
| // * Signature signs HASH(Request_A) | HASH(Response_A) | 8:12345. | |
| // * Observed hash matches HASH(Request_A). | |
| EXPECT_TRUE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3" | |
| "022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Failure case: "Request_A" made it to the server intact, but the response | |
| // body is modified to "Response_B" on return. The signature is now invalid. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_B", | |
| "3045022077a2d004f1643a92af5d356877c3434c46519ce32882d6e30ef6d154ee9775e3" | |
| "022100aca63c77d34152bdc0918ae0629e82b59314e5459f607cdc5ac95f1a4b7c31a2" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached | |
| // the server. Test a fast reject based on the observed_hash parameter. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_B", | |
| "304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876" | |
| "8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c" | |
| ":80e3ef1b373efe5f2a8383a0cf9c89fb2e0cbb8e85db4813655ff5dc05009e7e")); | |
| // Failure case: Request body was modified to "Request_B" before it reached | |
| // the server. Test a slow reject based on a signature mismatch. | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_B", | |
| "304402206289a7765f0371c7c48796779747f1166707d5937a99af518845f44af95876" | |
| "8c0220139fe935fde3e6b416ee742f91c6a480113762d78d889a2661de37576866d21c" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| // Failure case: Request/response are intact, but the signature is invalid | |
| // because it was signed against a different nonce (67890). | |
| EXPECT_FALSE(CUP().ValidateResponse( | |
| "Response_A", | |
| "3046022100d3bbb1fb4451c8e04a07fe95404cc39121ed0e0bc084f87de19d52eee50a97" | |
| "bf022100dd7d41d467be2af98d9116b0c7ba09740d54578c02a02f74da5f089834be3403" | |
| ":2727bc2b3c33feb6800a830f4055901dd87d65a84184c5fbeb3f816db0a243f5")); | |
| } | |
| } // namespace client_update_protocol |