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// Copyright 2014 The Crashpad Authors. All rights reserved.
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include "util/mach/task_for_pid.h"
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <algorithm>
#include <iterator>
#include <set>
#include "base/mac/mach_logging.h"
#include "base/mac/scoped_mach_port.h"
#include "util/posix/process_info.h"
namespace crashpad {
namespace {
//! \brief Determines whether the groups that \a process_reader belongs to are
//! a subset of the groups that the current process belongs to.
//! This function is similar to 10.9.5
//! `xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/kern/kern_credential.c` `kauth_cred_gid_subset()`.
bool TaskForPIDGroupCheck(const ProcessInfo& process_info) {
std::set<gid_t> groups = process_info.AllGroups();
ProcessInfo process_info_self;
if (!process_info_self.InitializeWithPid(getpid())) {
return false;
std::set<gid_t> groups_self = process_info_self.AllGroups();
// difference will only contain elements of groups not present in groups_self.
// It will not contain elements of groups_self not present in groups. (That
// would be std::set_symmetric_difference.)
std::set<gid_t> difference;
std::inserter(difference, difference.begin()));
if (!difference.empty()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (gid)";
return false;
return true;
//! \brief Determines whether the current process should have permission to
//! access the specified task port.
//! This function is similar to 10.9.5
//! `xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/vm/vm_unix.c` `task_for_pid_posix_check()`.
//! This function accepts a `task_t` argument instead of a `pid_t` argument,
//! implying that the task send right must be retrieved before it can be
//! checked. This is done because a `pid_t` argument may refer to a different
//! task in between the time that access is checked and its corresponding
//! `task_t` is obtained by `task_for_pid()`. When `task_for_pid()` is called
//! first, any operations requiring the process ID will call `pid_for_task()`
//! and be guaranteed to use the process ID corresponding to the correct task,
//! or to fail if that task is no longer running. If the task dies and the PID
//! is recycled, it is still possible to look up the wrong PID, but falsely
//! granting task access based on the new process’ characteristics is harmless
//! because the task will be a dead name at that point.
bool TaskForPIDCheck(task_t task) {
// If the effective user ID is not 0, then this code is not running as root at
// all, and the kernel’s own checks are sufficient to determine access. The
// point of this function is to simulate the kernel’s own checks when the
// effective user ID is 0 but the real user ID is anything else.
if (geteuid() != 0) {
return true;
// If the real user ID is 0, then this code is not running setuid root, it’s
// genuinely running as root, and it should be allowed maximum access.
uid_t uid = getuid();
if (uid == 0) {
return true;
// task_for_pid_posix_check() would permit access to the running process’ own
// task here, and would then check the kern.tfp.policy sysctl. If set to
// KERN_TFP_POLICY_DENY, it would deny access.
// This behavior is not duplicated here because the point of this function is
// to permit task_for_pid() access for setuid root programs. It is assumed
// that a setuid root program ought to be able to overcome any policy set in
// kern.tfp.policy.
// Access to the running process’ own task is not granted outright and is
// instead subjected to the same user/group ID checks as any other process.
// This has the effect of denying access to the running process’ own task when
// it is setuid root. This is intentional, because it prevents the same sort
// of cross-privilege disclosure discussed below at the DidChangePriveleges()
// check. The running process can still access its own task port via
// mach_task_self(), but a non-root user cannot coerce a setuid root tool to
// operate on itself by specifying its own process ID to this TaskForPID()
// interface.
ProcessInfo process_info;
if (!process_info.InitializeWithTask(task)) {
return false;
// The target process’ real user ID, effective user ID, and saved set-user ID
// must match this process’ own real user ID. task_for_pid_posix_check()
// checks against the current process’ effective user ID, but for the purposes
// of this function, when running setuid root, the real user ID is the correct
// choice.
if (process_info.RealUserID() != uid ||
process_info.EffectiveUserID() != uid ||
process_info.SavedUserID() != uid) {
LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (uid)";
return false;
// The target process must not have changed privileges. The rationale for this
// check is explained in 10.9.5 xnu-2422.115.4/bsd/kern/kern_prot.c
// issetugid(): processes that have changed privileges may have loaded data
// using different credentials than they are currently operating with, and
// allowing other processes access to this data based solely on a check of the
// current credentials could violate confidentiality.
if (process_info.DidChangePrivileges()) {
LOG(ERROR) << "permission denied (P_SUGID)";
return false;
return TaskForPIDGroupCheck(process_info);
} // namespace
task_t TaskForPID(pid_t pid) {
task_t task;
kern_return_t kr = task_for_pid(mach_task_self(), pid, &task);
if (kr != KERN_SUCCESS) {
MACH_LOG(ERROR, kr) << "task_for_pid";
return TASK_NULL;
base::mac::ScopedMachSendRight task_owner(task);
if (!TaskForPIDCheck(task)) {
return TASK_NULL;
return task_owner.release();
} // namespace crashpad